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Abstract 
Schizophrenia	is	a	long-term	psychotic	disorder	that	affects	approximately	1%	
of	the	population	worldwide.	Schizophrenia	is	characterised	by	negative	
symptoms,	such	as	anhedonia	and	social	withdrawal,	and	positive	symptoms,	
such	as	hallucinations	and	delusions.	The	impact	of	schizophrenia	reaches	
beyond	the	impaired	social	and	cognitive	function	of	the	individual,	affecting	
families	and	wider	communities.	Therefore,	despite	its	low	prevalence,	there	is	
a	long	history	of	multidisciplinary	research	investigating	the	causes	of	
schizophrenia.	The	effect	of	antipsychotics	in	reducing	the	intensity	of	
symptoms,	through	their	antagonistic	effect	on	dopamine,	has	led	to	
dopaminergic	based	theories	of	schizophrenia.	One	such	theory	is	based	on	
aberrant	salience,	the	assignment	of	importance	to	stimuli	that	have	no	intrinsic	
or	learned	value	or	salience.		The	aberrant	salience	hypothesis	links	
hyperdopaminergic	activation	to	symptoms	of	schizophrenia	through	the	
intermediary	effect	of	motivational	salience.	Specifically,	it	is	proposed	that	
hyperdopaminergic	activation	in	schizophrenia	creates	an	aberrant	
motivational	association	with	a	stimulus,	leading	to	cognitive	explanations	for	
the	unexplained	importance	that	contribute	to	the	development	of	symptoms.	
Behavioural	and	neural	evidence	supports	heightened	aberrant	salience	in	
schizophrenia,	although	specific	measures	of	aberrant	salience	have	yielded	
inconsistent	results.	There	is	also	a	large	body	of	evidence	suggesting	cognitive	
functions	anchored	in	dopaminergic	activation,	such	as	reward	processing	and	
motivated	behaviour,	are	impaired	in	schizophrenia.	To	date,	however,	the	
assumption	that	motivational	salience	mediates	the	relationship	between	
hyperdopaminergic	activation	and	aberrant	salience	has	not	been	tested.		
	 The	current	project	sought	to	elucidate	the	relationship	between	
aberrant	salience	and	motivational	salience.		The	convergent	validity	among	
measures	of	aberrant	salience	(Salience	Attribution	Task	and	Aberrant	Salience	
Inventory)	and	motivated	behaviour	(Effort	Expenditure	for	Rewards	Task	and	
Stimulus	Chase	Task)	were	investigated	in	undergraduates.	To	assess	whether	
aberrant	salience,	and	the	underlying	relationship	with	motivational	salience,	is	
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unique	to	schizophrenia,	the	same	measures	were	completed	by	individuals	
diagnosed	with	schizophrenia,	experiencing	symptoms	of	anxiety,	or	unaffected	
by	mental	health.	Whereas	schizophrenia	was	associated	with	heightened	
aberrant	salience,	the	aberrant	salience	indices	lacked	specificity,	sensitivity,	
and	convergent	validity.	Furthermore,	whereas	schizophrenia	was	associated	
with	maladaptive	motivated	behaviour,	there	was	limited	evidence	supporting	a	
relationship	between	measures	of	aberrant	salience	and	motivational	salience.		
The	failure	to	find	evidence	of	such	a	relationship	may	be	due	to	issues	with	the	
aberrant	salience	measures	or	the	underlying	assumption	that	motivational	
salience	mediates	aberrant	salience.	Further	research	is	needed	to	develop	
measures	of	aberrant	salience	that	are	anchored	to	known	neural	systems	
underlying	salience	processing.				
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1 Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia	is	a	psychotic	disorder	that	affects	thought	and	behaviour	
(Barbato,	1996).	Schizophrenia	is	characterised	by	negative	and	positive	
symptoms.	Negative	symptoms	refers	to	symptoms	of	diminished	functioning	
such	as	avolition,	anhedonia,	asociality,	affective	flattening,	and	poverty	of	
speech	(Barbato,	1996;	Foussias,	Agid,	Fervaha,	&	Remington,	2014;	Messinger	
et	al.,	2011).	Positive	symptoms	refers	to	behaviours	or	experiences	that	are	
additional	to,	or	not	usually	present	in,	typical	experience.	Examples	include	
delusions,	hallucinations,	and	disorganised	speech	and	behaviour	(Barbato,	
1996;	Huxley	&	Fonseca,	2014).	Schizophrenia	is	also	characterised	by	a	wide	
range	of	cognitive	deficits.	These	include	impairments	in	perception,	attention,	
working	memory,	cognitive	control,	and	executive	function	(Fioravanti,	Carlone,	
Vitale,	Cinti,	&	Clare,	2005;	Kelly	et	al.,	2019).	 	
	 Schizophrenia	is	ubiquitous	(Barbato,	1996).	It	affects	between	four	
(McGrath,	Saha,	Chant,	&	Welham,	2008;	Saha,	Chant,	Welham,	&	McGrath,	
2005)	and	seven	(Moreno-Küstner,	Martín,	&	Pastor,	2018)	people	per	
thousand	(lifetime	prevalence),	approximately	29	million	people	globally	
(Barbato,	1996).	The	estimated	heritability	of	schizophrenia	is	around	80%	
(Hilker	et	al.,	2017)	and	its	prevalence	tends	to	be	higher	among	ethnic	
minority	groups	such	as	Māori	(Kake,	Arnold,	&	Ellis,	2008).	Onset	of	positive	
symptoms	is	typically	in	late	adolescence	(Gogtay,	Vyas,	Testa,	Wood,	&	
Pantelis,	2011),	although	there	are	sex	differences.	Onset	in	males	is	higher	
during	adolescence	whereas	onset	in	females	is	usually	later	(Eranti,	MacCabe,	
Bundy,	&	Murray,	2013;	Häfner,	2005;	Rabinowitz,	Levine,	&	Häfner,	2006).		
	 Schizophrenia	is	associated	with	reduced	life	expectancy.	Comorbid	
medical	conditions	(Laursen,	2014;	Weber	et	al.),	lifestyle	factors	(Laursen,	
2014),	and	suicide	(Palmer	et	al	2005)	contribute	to	the	20-year	reduction	in	
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life-span	compared	to	the	average	population	(Laursen,	2014).	Risk	of	suicide	is	
higher	immediately	following	first	diagnosis	(Palmer	et	al	2005;	Simon	et	al	
2018).		
	 Cognitive	dysfunction	is	common	in	schizophrenia	(Hofer	et	al.,	2005).	
Common	neurocognitive	deficits	include	poor	working	memory	and	executive	
dysfunction	(Millan,	Fone,	Steckler,	&	Horan,	2014;	Ventura,	Hellemann,	
Thames,	Koellner,	&	Nuechterlein,	2009).	Social	cognition,	or	the	cognitive	
processes	that	underlie	social	interaction	and	the	ability	to	perceive,	interpret,	
and	respond	to	others,	is	also	diminished	in	schizophrenia	(Green	et	al.,	2008).	
For	example,	theory	of	mind,	the	ability	to	infer	mental	states	of	others	and	self	
(Brüne,	2005),	is	impaired	(Bora,	Yucel,	&	Pantelis,	2009).	
	 Schizophrenia	has	a	social,	emotional,	and	financial	impact	on	
individuals,	their	families,	and	the	wider	community.	The	consequences	of	
schizophrenia	include	social	disability,	such	as	unemployment	(Bouwmans,	De	
Sonneville,	Mulder,	&	Hakkaart-van	Roijen,	2015)	and	reduced	self-care	
(Montejo,	2010).	Cognitive	ability	has	been	shown	to	predict	employment	and	
independent	living	outcomes	in	schizophrenia	(Hofer	et	al.,	2005).	Conversely,	
employment	predicted	increased	well-being	(Priebe,	Warner,	Hubschmid,	&	
Eckle,	1998).	In	young	people,	employment	and	social	inclusion	predicted	
recovery	(Berry	&	Greenwood,	2018).	Therefore,	cognitive	deficits	associated	
with	schizophrenia	lead	to	reduced	social	integration	that	affects	outcome.	
Social	dysfunction	is	compounded	by	the	negative	effects	of	self-	and	social-
stigma	(Karidi	et	al.,	2010;	Koschorke	et	al.,	2014;	Lien	et	al.,	2018).	Family	
relationships	can	positively	affect	psychosocial	functioning	(Guada,	Hoe,	Floyd,	
Barbour,	&	Brekke,	2012).	However,	schizophrenia	places	a	strain	on	families	
(Ahlem	et	al.,	2017;	Caqueo-Urízar	et	al.,	2017;	Shibre	et	al.,	2003;	Y.	Yu	et	al.,	
2017),	especially	caregivers	(Mitsonis	et	al.,	2012).	Thus,	the	support	network	
required	to	facilitate	positive	outcomes	is	affected.	Schizophrenia	contributes	to	
health	care	costs	disproportionately	to	its	prevalence	(H.	Y.	Chong	et	al.,	2016).	
The	length	of	untreated	psychosis	was	found	to	predict	outcome	(relapse	and	
positive	symptoms),	such	that	the	longer	the	delay	to	treatment,	the	poorer	the	
outcome	(Austin	et	al.,	2015;	Cechnicki,	Hanuszkiewicz,	Polczyk,	&	Bielańska,	
2011;	Marshall	et	al.,	2005;	McGorry,	Nelson,	Goldstone,	&	Yung,	2010;	Veru,	
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Jordan,	Joober,	Malla,	&	Iyer,	2016).	Therefore,	early	intervention	has	a	positive	
individual,	social,	and	financial	impact	but	efficacy	is	hindered	by	diminished	
functioning.			
	
1.1.2 Aberrant Salience 
Factors	that	contribute	to	schizophrenia	include	genetic	and	biological	(Fromer	
et	al.,	2014;	Kavanagh,	Tansey,	O’Donovan,	&	Owen,	2015;	Müller,	Weidinger,	
Leitner,	&	Schwarz,	2015;	Ripke	et	al.,	2014),	social	and	environmental	
(Blomström	et	al.,	2016;	Kirkbride	et	al.,	2017).	Whereas	research	has	
investigated	associations	between	such	factors,	the	link	between	neurobiology	
and	phenomenology	of	psychosis	is	rarely	addressed.	Psychosis	is	associated	
with	phenomenological	factors	such	as	sharpened	senses,	increased	
significance,	impending	understanding,	and	heightened	emotionality	and	
cognition	(Cicero,	Kerns,	&	McCarthy,	2010).	These	factors	suggest	an	increased	
salience	of	internal	and	external	stimuli.		
	 Kapur	(2003)	proposed	that	the	positive	symptoms	(or	psychosis)	occur	
as	a	direct	or	indirect	result	of	aberrant	salience.	Aberrant	salience	is	the	
assignment	of	importance	to	otherwise	irrelevant	internal	and	external	stimuli.	
Aberrant	salience	can	be	attached	to	completely	irrelevant	stimuli,	or	it	can	
exaggerate	the	importance	of	moderately	relevant	stimuli	(henceforth	referred	
to	as	irrelevant	stimuli).	For	example,	hallucinations	represent	a	direct	
exaggeration	of	internal	stimuli	whereas	delusions	occur	as	the	result	of	an	
implausible	explanation	for	the	aberrant	salience	of	external	stimuli,	thus	are	
indirect.	Additionally,	the	presence	of	delusions	and	subthreshold	
hallucinations	has	been	shown	to	predict	onset	of	schizophrenia	and	may	reflect	
the	early	effects	of	aberrant	salience	(Smeets	et	al.,	2013).	
	 Aberrant	salience	may	explain	the	relationship	between	neurological	
disturbances	in	the	dopaminergic	system	and	the	symptoms	of	psychosis.	
Dopaminergic	dysregulation	in	schizophrenia	is	thought	to	cause,	or	create,	
stimulus	salience	(Kapur,	2003).	Spontaneous	dopamine	neuron	firing	in	the	
mesocorticolimbic	pathways,	in	conjunction	with	the	presentation	(internal	or	
external)	of	an	irrelevant	stimulus,	leads	to	an	erroneous	association	based	on	
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the	typical	functions	of	dopamine.	In	other	words,	the	brain	interprets	the	
stimulus	as	important	because	of	dopaminergic	firing.	However,	whereas	
erroneous	triggering	of	the	mesocorticolimbic	system	may	cause	irrelevant	
stimuli	to	be	momentarily	salient,	this	does	not	account	for	aberrant	salience.	
Deficits	in	motivational	salience,	including	the	monitoring	and	updating	of	
stimulus	information,	are	required	to	support	aberrant	salience.		
1.1.3 Motivational Salience 
Motivational	salience	is	the	desire	to	obtain	or	avoid	a	stimulus.	Motivational	
salience	refers	to	the	anticipatory	pleasure	that	fluctuates	based	on	state	
neurobiological	factors,	such	as	hunger	(Berridge,	2013).	Motivational	salience	
affects	approach	and	avoidance	(motivated)	behaviour	and	is	affected	by	
sensitivity	to	gain	and	loss	(Gray,	1981;	Gray	&	McNaughton,	2000).	
Furthermore,	sensitization	to	environmental	risk	factors	may	result	in	an	
enduring	amplified	response	to	internal	and	external	cues	(Collip,	Myin-
Germeys,	&	van	Os,	2008),	affecting	motivated	behaviour	and	contributing	to	
aberrant	salience.		
1.1.4 The Missing Link 
Many	factors	contribute	to	the	symptoms	of	schizophrenia.	The	aberrant	
salience	framework	links	the	neurobiological	and	phenomenological	factors	of	
psychosis.	Evidence	suggests	that	schizophrenia	is	associated	with	behaviour	
that	reflects	aberrant	salience.	However,	specific	measures	of	aberrant	salience	
have	yielded	inconsistent	results	and	comparison	of	aberrant	salience	measures	
is	needed.	Furthermore,	the	current	body	of	evidence	supporting	aberrant	
salience	lacks	data	about	the	relationship	between	aberrant	salience	and	
motivational	salience.	Thus,	key	aspects	of	the	aberrant	salience	framework	
remain	untested.		
1.2 Research aims 
The	aim	of	the	current	research	project	was	to	investigate	the	relationships	
among	measures	of	motivational	salience	and	aberrant	salience.	Based	on	
Kapur’s	(2003)	aberrant	salience	theory,	measures	of	aberrant	salience	and	
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motivated	behaviour	should	correlate,	such	that	impairments	in	motivated	
behaviour	should	predict	higher	aberrant	salience	scores.	Whereas	a	failure	to	
find	this	relationship	may	challenge	the	aberrant	salience	hypothesis,	the	
construct	validity	of	measures	of	aberrant	salience	also	need	substantiating.			
	 The	objectives	of	the	project	were	to	determine	whether	aberrant	
salience	measures	are:	(a)	measuring	the	same	construct;	(b)	correlated	with	
measures	of	motivated	behaviour,	motivational	salience,	and	reinforcer	
sensitivity;	and	(c)	measuring	a	construct	unique	to	schizophrenia	or	a	
characteristic	of	other	psychopathologies.		
	 At	the	time	of	project	design,	two	standardised	measures	of	aberrant	
salience	were	identified	for	use	in	the	study:	the	Salience	Attribution	Test	(SAT;	
Roiser	et	al.,	2009)	and	the	Aberrant	Salience	Inventory	(ASI;	Cicero	et	al.,	
2010).	The	SAT	is	a	computerised	cognitive	behavioural	task	that	utilises	a	
reinforcement	learning	paradigm	to	assess	speed	of	response	to	relevant	and	
irrelevant	stimuli.	The	ASI	is	a	self-report,	yes/no	questionnaire	that	measures	
the	phenomenological	experience	of	aberrant	salience.	Motivational	salience	
was	measured	using	the	Effort	Expenditure	for	Rewards	Task	(EEfRT;	
Treadway,	Buckholtz,	Schwartzman,	Lambert,	&	Zald,	2009)	and	the	Stimulus	
Chase	Task	(SCT;	Hall,	Chong,	McNaughton,	&	Corr,	2011).	The	EEfRT	provides	a	
measure	of	the	willingness	to	exert	effort	(motivated	behaviour)	based	on	
reward	value	and	probability	of	obtaining	reward.	The	Stimulus	Chase	Task	
provides	a	ratio	of	gain	relative	to	loss	sensitivity	and	approach	relative	to	
avoidant	behaviour.	Use	of	these	two	measures	of	motivational	salience,	
therefore,	provided	the	opportunity	to	explore	the	relationship	between	factors	
affecting	motivational	salience	and	their	relationship	to	aberrant	salience.		
1.3 Thesis Outline 
In	reviewing	the	aberrant	salience	hypothesis,	it	is	important	to	look	at	each	
component	of	the	hypothesis,	whether	evidence	supports	a	difference	in	
schizophrenia,	compared	to	unaffected	individuals,	and	how	this	relates	to	
aberrant	salience.	Therefore,	I	review	three	issues.		
In	Chapter	2	I	look	at	aberrant	salience.	I	first	review	literature	linking	
dopaminergic	activation	to	aberrant	salience	then	present	evidence	
1: Introduction       Page 18 of 233 
investigating	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia.	I	then	review	evidence	
showing	how	the	salience	network	and	default	mode	network	interact	to	
support	salience	processing	and	how	atypical	neural	activation	in	these	
networks	may	contribute	to	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia.	Finally,	I	
present	findings	from	studies	using	the	SAT	and	the	ASI	before	discussing	
limitations	of	the	aberrant	salience	hypothesis.		
	 In	Chapter	3,	I	consider	reward	and	motivation.	First,	I	outline	the	
function	of	dopaminergic	activation	along	the	mesocorticolimbic	pathways	and	
how	this	supports	reward	processing.	I	define	motivational	salience	and	
highlight	the	link	between	dopamine	and	motivational	salience.	I	present	the	
reinforcement	sensitivity	theory,	linking	this	theory	to	motivational	salience,	
and	outlining	issues	with	the	current,	popular	measure.	Following	this,	I	
critically	evaluate	evidence	suggesting	that	dopamine	signals	salience	and	
reward.	I	review	how	disruptions	to	dopamine	impact	reward	processing	
before	turning	attention	to	evidence	of	differential	reward	and	motivation	
processing	in	schizophrenia.		
	 In	the	final	literature	review,	Chapter	4,	I	assess	whether	research	
supports	the	theoretical	association	between	aberrant	salience	and	
motivational	salience.	I	review	neurological	and	behaviour	evidence,	comparing	
findings	from	unaffected	individuals	with	those	found	in	individuals	with	
schizophrenia.	I	highlight	the	lack	of	evidence	on	the	relationship	between	these	
two	constructs.	I	propose	a	potential	extension	to	the	aberrant	salience	
framework,	derived	from	currently	available	literature,	that	could	support	an	
explanation	for	negative	and	positive	symptoms.		
	 Chapters	5	and	6	are	manuscripts,	submitted	as	journal	articles,	
reporting	on	findings	from	this	research.	In	the	first	study,	I	assessed	the	
relationship	among	measures	of	aberrant	salience,	reward	processing,	and	
reinforcer	sensitivity	in	university	students.	This	study	was	run	to	obtain	
baseline	data	on	relationships	among	the	measures.	This	manuscript	was	
published	in	the	International	Journal	of	Methods	in	Psychiatric	Research	
(Neumann	&	Linscott,	2018).	As	Chapter	5,	it	was	amended	to	fit	with	the	thesis	
format.	The	second	manuscript,	appearing	as	Chapter	6,	reports	on	the	
relationship	between	the	same	measures	in	individuals	diagnosed	with	
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schizophrenia,	individuals	experiencing	anxiety,	and	individuals	unaffected	by	
mental	disorder.	This	manuscript	has	been	submitted	for	publication	
(Neumann,	Linscott,	&	Glue,	2019)	and	has	been	amended	to	fit	the	thesis	
format	and	remove	redundancy	(e.g.,	if	components	of	methods	were	already	
described	in	earlier	chapters,	these	were	not	repeated).	The	co-authors	on	these	
manuscripts	were	supervisors	of	my	doctoral	research.	They	contributed	to	
conceptualization	of	the	research,	provided	oversight	of	its	design	and	planning,	
assisted	with	aspects	of	assessment	and	analyses,	and	contributed	to	
preparation	of	the	written	reports.	These	contributions	reflect	the	standard	
level	of	assistance	provided	by	doctoral	supervisors.	  
	 In	the	final	chapter	I	discuss	the	overall	results	in	light	of	the	aims.	I	
compare	the	findings	to	previous	research,	discuss	potential	implications	for	
future	research	and	the	limitations	of	current	studies.	I	suggest	future	research	
directions.			
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2 Chapter Two 
Is Aberrant Salience the Core of Schizophrenia?  
In	this	chapter	I	review	the	evidence	for	aberrant	salience	as	an	explanation	of	
the	positive	symptoms	of	schizophrenia.	I	first	briefly	note	the	role	of	the		
neurotransmitter	dopamine	in	signalling	stimulus	salience.	I	compare	typical	
functioning	with	functioning	in	schizophrenia,	reviewing	neurological,	
cognitive,	and	behavioural	evidence	for	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia.	I	
then	present	evidence	of	neural	network	influence	on	salience	before	
presenting	evidence	of	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia	using	two	indices:	the	
Salience	Attribution	Task	(SAT)	and	Aberrant	Salience	Inventory	(ASI).	I	discuss	
the	limitations	of	the	aberrant	salience	hypothesis	and	review	gaps	in	current	
evidence.	These	provide	the	questions	addressed	in	the	current	thesis.	
2.1 Dopamine and Aberrant Salience 
2.1.1 Dopamine and salience 
Dopamine	cells	often	fire	in	the	context	of	stimuli	that	are	rewarding	
(Bromberg-Martin,	Matsumoto,	&	Hikosaka,	2011;	Wise,	2004;	L.	Zhang,	Doyon,	
Clark,	Phillips,	&	Dani,	2009;	Zweifel	et	al.,	2009)	or	novel	(Berridge,	2013;	
Hazy,	Frank,	&	O’Reilly,	2010;	Horvitz,	2000;	Schultz,	2010).	Berridge	and	
Robinson	(1998)	suggest	dopamine	is	associated	with	incentive	salience,	the	
wanting	rather	than	liking	component	of	rewards.	Dopaminergic	neurons	
project	to	neural	regions	associated	with	cost	and	effort	computations	
(Salamone,	Correa,	Mingote,	&	Weber,	2005;	Salamone,	Cousins,	&	Snyder,	
1997;	Wardle,	Treadway,	Mayo,	Zald,	&	de	Wit,	2011),	emotion	and	valence	
processing	(Jackson	&	Moghaddam,	2001),	evaluation	and	prediction	of	
outcomes	(Jahn,	Nee,	Alexander,	&	Brown,	2014),	and	motivated	behaviour	
(Balconi	&	Crivelli,	2010;	McNaughton,	2004;	Salamone	et	al.,	1997).	Thus,	
dopamine	is	associated	with	value	encoding,	reward	anticipation,	learning,	and	
goal-directed	behaviour	(Kim,	2013).			
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	 Aversive	stimuli	were	thought	to	elicit	an	inhibitory	dopaminergic	
response	(Schultz,	2007;	Ungless,	2004).	This	inhibitory	response	suppresses	
the	projection	of	activation	to	regions	implicated	in	value	computations	(M.	
Matsumoto	&	Hikosaka,	2009)	and	prevents	an	association	between	aversive	
stimuli	and	reward	value.	More	recent	evidence	suggests	a	common	excitatory	
dopaminergic	response	to	both	appetitive	and	aversive	stimuli	(Bromberg-
Martin	et	al.,	2011).	This	excitatory	response	projects	to	the	medial	prefrontal	
cortex	(mPFC;	Ventura,	Morrone,	&	Puglisi-Allegra,	2007),	a	region	associated	
with	focusing	attention	and	planning	(Kim,	2003),	and	to	the	dorsal	striatum	
(Matsumoto	&	Hikosaka,	2009),	which	is	associated	with	action	selection	and	
initiation	(Belleine,	Delgado	&	Hikosaka,	2007).	Based	on	the	projections	to	
regions	associated	with	attentional	focus,	for	both	appetitive	and	aversive	
stimuli,	dopaminergic	activation	facilitates	salience.		
2.1.2 Dopamine and aberrant salience 
The	relationship	between	dopamine	and	schizophrenia	was	discovered	
following	evidence	that	antipsychotics,	which	reduce	the	experience	of	
psychotic	symptoms,	were	dopamine	antagonists	(Howes	&	Kapur,	2009;	
Seeman,	1987).	Kapur	(2003)	proposed	that	dysregulated	dopaminergic	firing	
in	schizophrenia	contributes	to	associations	between	irrelevant	stimuli	and	
motivational	salience;	the	degree	to	which	a	stimulus	elicits	goal-directed	
behaviour.	Because	they	block	dopamine	receptors,	dopamine	antagonists	
attenuate	motivational	salience	(Wise,	2004)	thus	lessen	the	experience	of	
psychosis	(Kapur	&	Mamo,	2003).		
According	to	the	aberrant	salience	hypothesis,	when	dopamine	firing	is	
dysregulated,	irrelevant	external	and	internal	stimuli	are	selected	and	attended	
to	(Kapur,	2003;	Winton-Brown,	Fusar-Poli,	Ungless	and	Howes,	2014).	In	
everyday	life,	experiences	are	incorporated	into	schemata	(Plant	&	Stanton,	
2013).	A	schema	is	the	generic	cognitive	representation	of	a	stimulus	that	
facilitates	the	integration	and	categorisation	of	information	(Plant	&	Stanton,	
2013).	Novel	stimuli	may	be	incorporated	into	an	existing	schema	or	dismissed	
as	unimportant	(Graziano	&	Webb,	2015).	However,	in	schizophrenia,	irrelevant	
stimuli	appear	relevant	due	to	aberrant	salience.	Irrelevant	stimuli	are,	
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therefore,	incorporated	into	existing	schemata	(Howes	and	Kapur,	2009;	
Winton-Brown	et	al.,	2014),	which	explains	the	ethno-cultural	specificity	of	
delusions	and	hallucinations	reported	in	psychosis	(Howes	&	Kapur,	2009;	
Stompe	et	al.,	2006;	Winton-Brown,	Fusar-Poli,	Ungless,	&	Howes,	2014;	
Yamada,	Barrio,	Morrison,	Sewell,	&	Jeste,	2006).	For	example,	a	review	of	
historical	case	studies	found	a	relationship	between	delusional	beliefs	and	the	
individual’s	religious	and	cultural	beliefs	(Krzystanek,	Krysta,	Klasik,	&	Krupka-
Matuszczyk,	2012).		
Although	the	mechanism	by	which	dopaminergic	dysregulation	
influences	salience	is	unclear,	neurobiological	(electroencephalographic)	and	
imaging	studies	have	identified	regions	of	interest.	Specifically,	key	networks	
associated	with	salience	processing,	which	are	influenced	by	dopamine	
activation,	exhibit	differential	processing,	structure,	and	function	in	
schizophrenia	compared	to	unaffected	individuals.		
2.2 Evidence supporting Aberrant Salience in Schizophrenia 
Neurological,	cognitive,	and	self-report	data	show	differences	in	perceptual	
experience	and	cognitive	processing	indicative	of	aberrant	salience.	Such	
differences	are	evident	in	those	at	risk	of,	and	diagnosed	with,	schizophrenia.	
The	aberrant	salience	hypothesis	states	that,	whereas	biophysical	differences	
lead	to	cognitive	processing	differences,	it	is	the	interpretation	of	these	
differences	that	leads	to	the	development	of	symptoms.	In	assessing	the	
aberrant	salience	hypothesis,	it	is	important	to	consider	methods	for	assessing	
conscious	and	subconscious	cognitive	processing.	For	example,	data	from	self-
report	ratings	provide	an	explicit	measure	of	cognitive	processing,	whereas	
behavioural	and	physiological	assessments	provide	implicit	measures	
(Underwood	&	Bright,	1995).		
2.2.1 Aberrant attentional processing in individuals at risk of schizophrenia 
Individuals	at	risk	of	psychosis	show	altered	semantic	processing,	characteristic	
of	aberrant	salience.	Kerns	and	Berenbaum	(2000)	investigated	the	
relationships	among	measures	of	psychosis	proneness,	semantic	processing	and	
affective	valence	(positive	and	negative)	in	undergraduates.	Participants	were	
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assigned	to	one	of	three	groups	based	on	three	measures	of	psychosis	
proneness:	high	perceptual	aberration	and/or	magical	ideation	(high	psychosis	
prone	group),	high	social	anhedonia	(low	psychosis	prone	group),	or	low	
perceptual	aberration,	magical	ideation	and	social	anhedonia	(comparison	
group).	Semantic	processing	and	affective	valence	were	measured	using	a	
word-pair	association	task.	Baseline	average	response	latency	to	unrelated	
word	pairs	were	subtracted	from	response	latency	to	target	word	pairs.	Word-
pairs	were	either	semantic	(e.g.,	animals)	or	functional.	The	low	psychosis	
prone	group	responded	faster	to	positively	valenced	words	than	negatively	
valenced	words.	The	high	psychosis	group	responded	faster	than	the	
comparison	group	to	semantically	primed	words.	Heightened	semantic	priming	
has	also	been	found	in	schizophrenia	(Lerner,	Bentin,	&	Shriki,	2012).	
Additionally,	the	high	psychosis	prone	group	responded	faster	to	non-
associated	words	than	baseline,	whereas	the	low	psychosis	group	responded	
slower	than	baseline	(Kerns	&	Berenbaum,	2000).	The	results	suggest	
prodromal	aberrant	attentional	processing,	resulting	in	the	over-inclusion	and	
increased	importance	of	irrelevant	stimuli.		
2.2.2 Increased aberrant salience and reduced adaptive salience in 
schizophrenia 
Aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia	is	evident	in	atypical	self-rated	and	
physiological	responses	to	neutral	stimuli.	Haralanova,	Haralanova,	Beraldi,	
Moller,	and	Hennig-Fast	(2012)	investigated	self-rated	emotional	arousal	to	
pictures	of	neutral	and	negative	social	scenes	in	paranoid	schizophrenia.	
Compared	to	unaffected	individuals,	participants	with	paranoid	schizophrenia	
had	higher	levels	of	emotional	arousal	to	neutral	stimuli.	Similarly,	negative	
non-social	stimuli	elicited	higher	ratings	of	emotional	arousal	in	schizophrenia	
than	negative	social	stimuli	(Okruszek	et	al.,	2016).	Schizophrenia	is	also	
associated	with	increased	ERP	amplitudes	to	neutral	compared	to	negative	(W	
P	Horan,	Hajcak,	Wynn,	&	Green,	2013)	and	non-social	compared	to	social	
stimuli	(Peterman,	Bekele,	Bian,	Sarkar,	&	Park,	2015).	The	adaptive	pattern	of	
heightened	arousal	to	negative	and	social	stimuli	in	unaffected	individuals	is,	
therefore,	absent	in	schizophrenia.	Instead,	neutral	and	non-social	stimuli	elicit	
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higher	arousal,	indicating	an	aberrant	assignment	of	importance	to	stimuli	not	
attended	to	in	unaffected	individuals.		
	 Deficits	in	social	cognition	have	frequently	been	reported	in	
schizophrenia	(Couture,	Penn,	&	Roberts,	2006;	Daros,	Ruocco,	Reilly,	Harris,	&	
Sweeney,	2014;	Kohler,	Walker,	Martin,	Healey,	&	Moberg,	2010;	Yalcin-
siedentopf	et	al.,	2014).	Symptoms	of	psychosis	are	linked	to	the	aberrant	
salience	of	social	cues.	One	such	nonverbal	form	of	social	communication	is	a	
non-verbal	gesture,	such	as	a	hand	motion	(Perkins,	2016).	Bucci,	Startup,	
Wynn,	Baker,	and	Lewin	(2008)	investigated	the	relevance	assigned	to	non-
verbal	gestures	in	schizophrenia.	While	correctly	interpreting	meaningful	
gestures,	albeit	less	accurately	than	unaffected	individuals,	participants	who	
experienced	delusions	of	reference	misinterpreted	the	relevance	of	non-
meaningful,	incidental	gestures.	Delusions	of	reference	is	the	belief	that	
irrelevant	stimuli	have	personal	meaning	(Startup,	Bucci,	&	Langdon,	2009).	
Startup	et	al.	(2009)	argued	that	the	salience	of	neutral	stimuli	results	in	a	
personally	significant	explanation	of	their	importance,	leading	to	delusions	of	
reference.	A	subsequent	study	found	participants	with	schizophrenia	were	
more	likely	to	misinterpret	the	personal	significance	of	ambiguous	gestures	and	
gestures	directed	away	from	them	but	not	incidental	gestures	directed	towards	
them	(White,	Borgan,	Ralley,	&	Shergill,	2016).	These	findings	support	the	
argument	that	irrelevant	stimuli	can	be	incorporated	into	schema	and	influence	
symptoms.		
Aberrant	salience	is	also	evident	in	the	atypical	threat	superiority	effect	
in	schizophrenia.	The	threat	superiority	effect	is	the	tendency	for	more	effective	
detection	and	preferential	processing	to	be	assigned	to	potentially	threatening	
stimuli	(e.g.,	angry	faces	or	snakes;	Pinkham	et	al.,	2014;	Subra,	Muller,	
Fourgassie,	Chauvin,	&	Alexopoulos,	2017).	However,	in	schizophrenia,	threat	
superiority	effect	is	intact	for	non-social	(e.g.,	snakes)	but	not	social	threats	
(e.g.,	angry	faces;	Pinkham	et	al.,	2014).	Additionally,	unaffected	individuals	find	
angry	faces	more	distracting	than	individuals	with	schizophrenia,	who	are	more	
distracted	by	happy	then	angry	or	neutral	faces	(Grave,	Soares,	Morais,	
Rodrigues,	&	Madeira,	2017).		
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	 However,	not	all	social	cognition	deficits	are	neatly	explained	within	the	
aberrant	salience	hypothesis.	Impairments	in	the	perception	of	emotion	(Kohler	
et	al.,	2010),	including	recognition	of	facial	expressions	(Abram	et	al.,	2014;	
Daros	et	al.,	2014;	Yalcin-siedentopf	et	al.,	2014),	appear	to	reflect	reduced	
adaptive	salience.	When	discriminating	between	neutral	and	angry	faces,	
participants	with	schizophrenia	required	significantly	more	facial	information,	
attended	to	regions	around	the	nose	and	mouth	more,	and	regions	around	the	
eyes	less,	than	unaffected	individuals	(Clark,	Gosselin,	&	Goghari,	2013).	
Furthermore,	schizophrenia	was	associated	with	a	reduction	in	the	number	and	
duration	of	visual	fixations	on	faces	compared	to	unaffected	individuals	
(Loughland,	Williams,	&	Gordon,	2002;	Nikolaides	et	al.,	2016).	Accuracy	in	
emotion	identification	was	not	affected.	Such	findings	indicate	reduced	adaptive	
salience,	or	importance	of	relevant	stimuli,	rather	than	aberrant	salience.		
2.2.3 Summary 
Schizophrenia	is	associated	with	aberrant	attention	processing	leading	to	an	
over	inclusion	of	stimuli	(Kerns	&	Berenbaum,	2000).	In	turn,	arousal	
(Haralanova	et	al.,	2012)	and	neural	activation	(W	P	Horan	et	al.,	2013)	are	
heightened	in	response	to	neutral	stimuli	and	processing	of	non-meaningful	
(Bucci	et	al.,	2008;	T.	P.	White,	Borgan,	et	al.,	2016)	and	non-threatening	social	
cues	impaired	(Grave	et	al.,	2017).	Reduced	adaptive	salience	is	evident	in	
impaired	processing	of	social	cues	(Clark	et	al.,	2013;	Loughland	et	al.,	2002),	
including	threatening	ones	(Okruszek	et	al.,	2016;	Peterman	et	al.,	2015;	
Pinkham	et	al.,	2014).	The	idea	that	positive	symptoms	develop	from	aberrant	
salience	is	also	supported.	Individuals	at	risk	of	psychosis	exhibit	aberrant	
salience	(Kerns	&	Berenbaum,	2000).	Furthermore,	aberrant	salience	can	
explain	the	variance	in	expression	of	symptoms	(Bucci	et	al.,	2008;	Startup	et	al.,	
2009;	White	et	al.,	2016).	The	data	from	various	methodologies	provide	a	
strong	argument	for	the	aberrant	salience	hypothesis.	
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2.3 Neural Functions and Networks that Contribute to Aberrant 
Salience 
2.3.1 Sensory gating 
Sensory	gating,	or	attentional	filtering,	allows	the	brain	to	filter	out	unnecessary	
information	(Postle,	2005).	McGhie	and	Chapman	(1961)	first	suggested	that	
there	are	sensory	gating	deficits	in	schizophrenia.	This	has	been	confirmed	by	
subsequent	neurophysiology	using	an	electroencephalograph	(EEG)	to	assess	
auditory	sensory	gating	(Judd,	McAdams,	Budnick,	&	Braff,	1992;	Myles-
Worsley,	2002;	Williams,	Nuechterlein,	Subotnik,	&	Yee,	2011).	The	P50	is	an	
event-related	potential	(ERP)	with	a	peak	positivity	around	50ms	following	
presentation	of	an	auditory	stimulus.	In	unaffected	individuals,	the	amplitude	of	
the	P50	is	usually	significantly	smaller	on	the	second	presentation	of	an	
auditory	stimulus	compared	to	the	first	(Judd	et	al.,	1992;	Micoulaud-Franchi	et	
al.,	2012).	This	difference	is	represented	as	a	ratio.	Low	ratios	indicate	auditory	
gating,	that	is,	the	filtering	out	of	auditory	stimuli	on	second	presentation,	with	
the	inhibition	occurring	at	a	very	early	stage	of	processing	(Judd	et	al.,	1992;	
Micoulaud-Franchi	et	al.,	2012).	Higher	P50	amplitude	ratios	in	schizophrenia	
indicate	reduced	auditory	gating	(Judd	et	al.,	1992;	Myles-Worsley,	2002).	It	
follows	that	reduced	sensory	gating	could	result	in	attendance	to	irrelevant	
stimuli	and	contribute	to	aberrant	salience.		
	 Inefficient	sensory	gating	in	schizophrenia	is	associated	with	perceptual	
experience	and	symptom	severity.	Micoulaud-Franchi	et	al.	(2012)	assessed	
P50	amplitude	ratios,	using	an	auditory	click,	in	schizophrenia	and	unaffected	
individuals.	They	then	presented	participants	with	environmental	sounds,	
heard	in	everyday	life,	and	digitally	created	abstract	sounds.	Participants	were	
asked	to	rate	the	valence	of	each	sound.	Compared	to	unaffected	individuals,	
participants	with	schizophrenia	had	a	higher	mean	P50	amplitude	ratio,	rated	
abstract	sounds	as	more	familiar,	and	rated	reassuring	and	environmental	
sounds	as	more	invasive	and	frightening.	The	P50	amplitude	ratio	positively	
correlated	with	the	invasive	rating	of	environmental	sounds	and	negatively	
correlated	with	the	familiarity	rating	of	abstract	sounds.	Furthermore,	delusion	
severity	negatively	correlated	with	familiarity	ratings	of	environmental	sounds.	
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The	results	show	reduced	sensory	gating	for	auditory	stimuli	in	schizophrenia	
is	associated	with	an	aberrant	perceptual	experience	of	stimuli.		
	 However,	sensory	gating	variances	are	not	unique	to	schizophrenia.	A	
meta-analysis	of	39	studies	indicated	that,	although	the	overall	mean	P50	
amplitude	ratio	was	lower	for	unaffected	individuals,	variance	in	the	unaffected	
group	was	such	that	40%	of	unaffected	individuals	fell	within	the	schizophrenia	
group	range	(Patterson	et	al.,	2008).	El-kaim,	Aramaki,	Ystad,	Kronland-
Martinet	and	Cermolacce	(2015)	investigated	the	relationship	between	P50	
amplitude	ratios	and	perceptual	inundation,	the	self-rated	measure	of	how	
overwhelmed	or	flooded	an	individual	felt	when	presented	with	auditory	
stimuli.	Individuals	with	schizophrenia	had	higher	P50	amplitude	ratios	and	
perceptual	inundation	than	unaffected	individuals.	However,	the	positive	
correlation	between	P50	amplitude	ratios	and	perceptual	inundation	was	only	
significant	for	the	whole	group,	not	each	group	separately.	Similarly,	the	
positive	correlation	between	perceptual	inundation	and	self-rated	measures	of	
distractibility	and	over-inclusion	of	stimuli	were	only	significant	for	the	whole	
group.	Therefore,	although	sensory	gating	facilitates	the	availability	of	stimuli,	it	
is	unlikely	that	sensory	gating	variance	can	explain	aberrant	salience.		
2.3.2 Salience Network 
The	salience	network	(SN)	co-ordinates	the	activation	and	deactivation	of	
regions	required	for	task-relevant	processing.	The	SN	includes	the	anterior	
insula,	anterior	cingulate	cortex	(ACC),	amygdala,	ventral	tegmental	area	and	
hypothalamus	(Menon,	2015;	Uddin,	2017a).	These	regions	show	increased	
blood	oxygen	dependent	(BOLD)	signal,	indicating	increased	activation,	in	
response	to	internal	(Jones,	Ward,	&	Critchley,	2010)	and	external	(Sridharan,	
Levitin,	&	Menon,	2008)	stimuli.	The	SN	integrates	sensory	information	and	
facilitates	the	selection	and	initiation	of	behavioural	responses	(Chand	&	
Dhamala,	2016b;	Lamichhane	&	Dhamala,	2015;	Uddin,	2017d,	2017b).	
Importantly,	the	SN	co-ordinates	the	concomitant	activation	and	deactivation	of	
the	central	executive	network	(CEN)	and	default	mode	network	(DMN;	Chand	&	
Dhamala,	2016a;	Goulden	et	al.,	2014;	Sridharan	et	al.,	2008;	Uddin,	2017c).	The	
CEN,	comprising	the	dorsolateral	prefrontal	cortex	(dlPFC)	and	lateral	parietal	
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regions,	shows	increased	activation	during	tasks	requiring	attention	and	
decision-making	(Goulden	et	al.,	2014;	Sridharan	et	al.,	2008).	The	DMN	
(discussed	in	next	section)	is	involved	in	self-referential	processing	and	shows	
decreased	activation	during	task-related	activities	(Buckner,	Andrews-Hanna,	&	
Schacter,	2008).		
	 Structural	and	functional	deficits	in	the	SN	in	schizophrenia	are	related	
to	symptom	severity.	Schizophrenia	has	been	associated	with	volume	reduction	
in	the	insula	(Kim	et	al.,	2003;	Makris	et	al.,	2006;	Saze	et	al.,	2007;	Takahashi	et	
al.,	2005)	and	ACC	(Baiano	et	al.,	2007),	and	reduced	functional	connectivity	
between	the	insula	and	ACC	(White,	Gilleen,	&	Shergill,	2013;	White,	Joseph,	
Francis,	&	Liddle,	2010).	Reduced	grey	matter	volume	of	the	anterior	insula	and	
ACC	correlated	with	reality	distortions	(Palaniyappan,	Mallikarjun,	Joseph,	
White,	&	Liddle,	2011).	Dysrupted	functional	connectivity	within	the	SN	
postively	correlated	with	intensity	of	delusions	(Orliac	et	al.,	2013).		
	 Increased	cognitive	load	affects	the	efficiency	of	the	SN.	Luo	et	al.	(2014)	
investigated	the	impact	of	aversive	stimuli	on	working	memory	in	unaffected	
individuals.	During	functional	magnetic	resonance	imaging	(fMRI),	participants	
completed	a	working	memory	task,	the	N-back	task,	involving	neutral	or	fearful	
faces.	Participants	indicated,	via	button	press,	whether	the	current	face	was	the	
same	or	different	to	the	face	presented	immediately	prior	(low	load)	or	2	items	
previously	(high	load).	Response	times	were	faster,	with	fewer	errors,	for	the	
low	compared	to	high	working	memory	load.	However,	during	the	low	load	
task,	more	errors	occurred	for	fearful	faces	than	neutral	faces.	This	pattern	was	
reversed	during	the	high	load	task,	with	more	errors	for	neutral	faces.	During	
the	low	load	task,	activation	in	the	SN	was	higher	for	fearful	than	neutral	faces.	
This	pattern	was	reversed	during	the	high-load	task,	with	increased	SN	
activation	for	neutral	faces.	Thus,	the	stimulus	dependent	number	of	errors	
during	the	N-back	task	was	associated	with	increased	activation	in	the	SN.			 	
	 Interestingly,	for	fearful	faces	during	the	high	load	task,	Luo	et	al.	(2014)	
found	increased	activation	in	emotion	processing	regions	not	the	SN.	One	
explanation	for	the	apparent	anomaly	in	findings	is	the	temporal	limitation	of	
fMRI.	fMRI	research	indicates	more	regions	of	the	SN	are	activated	during	
increased	cognitive	load	(Chand	&	Dhamala,	2016a),	whereas	EEG	data	suggest	
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that	activation	in	the	SN	precedes	that	of	the	CEN	(Chand	&	Dhamala,	2016b).	
On	first	presentation	of	highly	salient	stimuli,	such	as	fearful	faces,	the	SN	
triggers	activation	of	other	regions.	When	the	same	fearful	face	is	presented	two	
pictures	later,	it	is	already	being	processed	as	a	salient	stimulus	thus	no	
additional	activation	of	the	SN	is	required.	In	contrast,	neutral	faces	have	not	
resulted	in	activation	of	additional	regions	therefore	the	SN	activates.	The	
efficiency	of	the	SN	is	therefore	reduced	by	cognitive	load	not	just	concurrent	
salient	stimuli.	Further	research	is	needed	to	determine	the	feasibility	of	this	
explanation.		
Diminished	functional	connectivity	in	schizophrenia	impairs	the	function	
of	the	SN.	During	the	resting-state	in	unaffected	individuals,	the	SN	has	an	
excitatory	influence	on	the	dlPFC	(Palaniyappan,	Simmonite,	White,	Liddle,	&	
Liddle,	2013).	In	turn,	the	dlPFC	has	an	inhibitory	influence	on	the	SN	
(Palaniyappan,	Simmonite,	White,	Liddle,	&	Liddle,	2013).	In	schizophrenia,	this	
reciprocal	pattern	of	activation	is	significantly	reduced	(Palaniyappan	et	al.,	
2013).	Additionally,	compared	to	unaffected	individuals,	resting-state	
functional	connectivity	in	the	right	anterior	insula	is	reduced	in	schizophrenia	
and	correlates	with	severity	of	hallucinations	(Manoliu	et	al.,	2014).	The	right	
anterior	insula	plays	a	key	role	in	the	interconnection	between	neural	regions	
(Bonnelle	et	al.,	2012).		
The	SN,	in	unaffected	individuals,	co-ordinates	the	activation	of	key	
regions	involved	in	task-related	activities.	However,	the	efficacy	of	the	SN	is	
impaired	under	increased	cognitive	load.	In	schizophrenia,	reduced	
connectivity	and	volume	in	the	SN	is	associated	with	symptom	severity.	
Furthermore,	the	resting-state	functional	connectivity	between	the	salience	and	
central	executive	networks	is	impaired	in	schizophrenia.	Given	the	association	
between	increased	SN	activation	and	reduced	efficacy	during	task-related	
activities	in	unaffected	individuals,	increased	resting-state	SN	activation	in	
schizophrenia	may	contribute	to	errors	in	self-referential	processing.		
2.3.3 Default Mode Network 
The	default	mode	network	is	implicated	in	self-referential	processing.		The	DMN	
includes	the	mPFC,	ventromedial	prefrontal	cortex	(vmPFC),	posterior	cingulate	
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cortex	(PCC),	precuneus	and	inferior	parietal	lobule	(Buckner	et	al.,	2008;	
Uddin,	Kelly,	Biswal,	Castellanos,	&	Milham,	2009).	The	PCC	influences	
activation	in	the	mPFC,	via	the	inferior	parietal	lobule	(Davey,	Pujol,	&	Harrison,	
2016).	In	turn,	the	mPFC	inhibits	activation	in	the	PCC	(Davey,	Pujol,	&	
Harrison,	2016).	Activation	in	the	DMN	increases	during	active	self-referential	
tasks,	such	as	autobiographical	memory,	moral	decision	making	(Buckner	et	al.,	
2008),	and	the	attribution	of	others’	mental	states	(Mars	et	al.,	2012).	Increased	
DMN	activation	is	also	associated	with	mind	wandering	(Scheibner,	Bogler,	
Gleich,	Haynes,	&	Bermpohl,	2017)	and	lapses	in	attention	to	external	stimuli	
(Buckner	et	al.,	2008).	Conversely,	DMN	activation	is	attenuated	during	task-
related	activities	that	show	increased	activation	in	regions	associated	with	
active	cognitive	functions	(Buckner	et	al.,	2008;	Crone	et	al.,	2011;	Scheibner	et	
al.,	2017).	
	 Schizophrenia	is	associated	with	atypical	DMN	activation.	Compared	to	
unaffected	individuals,	individuals	with	schizophrenia	showed	increased	
activation	in	the	DMN	during	resting-state	(Kim	et	al.,	2014;	Whitfield-Gabrieli	
et	al.,	2009)	and	task-related	activities	(Anticevic	et	al.,	2015;	Chai	et	al.,	2011;	
Garrity	et	al.,	2007;	Hoptman	et	al.,	2010;	Landin-Romero,	Mckenna,	Sarró,	
Aguirre,	&	Sarri,	2015;	Littow	et	al.,	2015;	Pankow,	Deserno,	et	al.,	2015;	
Whitfield-Gabrieli	et	al.,	2009).	The	increased	task-related	DMN	activation	is	
likely	the	result	of	reduced	de-activation,	which	may	be	linked	to	increased	
dopamine	synthesis	(Carbonell	et	al.,	2014).	Concomitant	to	increased	DMN	
activation,	the	CEN	(Landin-Romero	et	al.,	2015)	and	other	task-related	regions	
(Chai	et	al.,	2011)	show	attenuated	task-related	activation	in	schizophrenia.	The	
DMN	therefore	appears	hyperactive	in	schizophrenia,	resulting	in	atypical	
functional	connectivity	with	the	CEN.	
	 There	is	impaired	functional	connectivity	between	the	PCC	and	other	
DMN	regions	in	schizophrenia,	although	evidence	indicating	the	direction	of	
impairment	is	conflicting.	For	example,	increased	(Skudlarski	et	al.,	2010;	
Whitfield-Gabrieli	et	al.,	2009)	and	decreased	(Alonso-Solís	et	al.,	2015;	Orliac	
et	al.,	2013;	Rotarska-Jagiela	et	al.,	2010)	resting-state	functional	connectivity	
with	the	PCC	has	been	reported	in	schizophrenia	compared	to	unaffected	
individuals.	The	conflicting	findings	may	be	due	to	methodological	differences	
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in	the	assessment	of	functional	connectivity	(Whitfield-Gabrieli	&	Ford,	2012),	
namely	seed-based	methods,	which	assess	the	correlation	of	BOLD	activation	in	
pre-selected	regions	of	interest,	and	independent	component	analysis,	which	is	
a	mathematical	procedure	to	spatially	identify	components	without	prior	
selection	of	regions	of	interest	(Lee,	Smyser,	&	Shimony,	2013).	Although	this	
would	be	a	tidy	explanation,	findings	supporting	methodological	differences	are	
inconclusive	(Alonso-Solís	et	al.,	2015;	Skudlarski	et	al.,	2010;	Whitfield-Gabrieli	
et	al.,	2009).			
	 Atypical	mPFC	activation	may	account	for	the	conflicting	findings	
regarding	PCC	functional	connectivity	in	schizophrenia.	The	mPFC	is	critical	for	
self-referential	processing	(Benoit,	Gilbert,	Volle,	&	Burgess,	2010;	Mitchell,	
Banaji,	&	Macrae,	2005;	Turner,	Simons,	Gilbert,	Frith,	&	Burgess,	2008).	
Despite	directional	disparities,	there	is	consistent	evidence	of	atypical	
functional	connectivity	between	the	mPFC	and	PCC	in	schizophrenia	(Alonso-
Solís	et	al.,	2015;	Bluhm	et	al.,	2007;	Jang	et	al.,	2011;	Larivière	et	al.,	2017;	
Whitfield-Gabrieli	et	al.,	2009).	Given	the	reciprocal	modulatory	effect	between	
the	PCC	and	mPFC	(Davey,	Pujol,	&	Harrison,	2016),	irregularities	in	mPFC	
activation	may	influence	the	functional	connectivity	between	the	two	regions.			
	 Activation	in	the	mPFC	is	associated	with	symptoms	of	schizophrenia.	
Increased	task-related	mPFC	activation	in	schizophrenia	predicted	positive	and	
negative	symptoms	(Whitfield-Gabrieli	et	al.,	2009).	Conversely,	mPFC	
activation	during	self-referential	processing	was	reduced	in	schizophrenia	
compared	to	unaffected	individuals	(Vinogradov,	Luks,	Schulman,	&	Simpson,	
2008).	Attenuated	mPFC	activation	during	self-referential	processing	was	
related	to	poor	insight	(Raij,	Riekki,	&	Hari,	2012),	the	level	of	awareness	and	
attribution	of	symptoms	(Mintz,	Dobson,	&	Romney,	2003),	and	aberrant	
salience	(Pankow	et	al.,	2015).	Interestingly,	delusions	were	associated	with	
increased	activation	in	the	mPFC	during	self-referential	processing,	whereas	
increased	PCC	activation	was	found	in	non-delusional	schizophrenia	compared	
to	unaffected	individuals	(Larivière	et	al.,	2017).	The	divergent	mPFC	activation	
in	schizophrenia	may	lead	to	stimuli	outside	the	self	being	explained	as	self-
relevant	and	self-relevant	stimuli	being	explained	within	external	contexts.			
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	 	Although	much	is	yet	to	be	learned	about	the	DMN,	evidence	suggests	it	
is	linked	with	self-referential	processing	and	shows	decreased	activation	during	
task-related	activities.	In	schizophrenia,	there	is	a	dysregulated	pattern	of	DMN	
activation	and	functional	connectivity	that	correlates	with	symptoms.	The	
atypical	DMN	activation	in	schizophrenia	may	create	erroneous	associations	
between	internal	and	external	stimuli	and	the	self-action	or	association,	
resulting	in	an	over-attribution	of	importance	to	stimuli,	or	aberrant	salience.	
Thus,	the	DMN	is	implicated	as	a	key	network	underlying	the	aberrant	salience	
hypothesis.		
2.3.4 The potential contribution of the salience and default mode networks to 
aberrant salience 
The	DMN	and	SN	are	activated	by	dopaminergic	firing.	Using	dopamine	agonists	
and	antagonists,	Cole	et	al.	(2013)	investigated	the	role	of	dopamine	on	neural	
network	functional	connectivity.	Ingestion	of	a	dopamine	agonist	increased	the	
functional	connectivity	between	the	SN	and	ventral	striatum,	a	key	neural	
region	involved	in	reward	processing.	A	significant	decrease	was	seen	after	
ingestion	of	a	dopamine	antagonist.	Likewise,	the	dopamine	agonist	increased	
(and	antagonist	decreased)	the	functional	connectivity	between	the	DMN	and	
the	SN	and	other	cortical	regions	(Cole	et	al.,	2013).	The	hyperdopaminergic	
activation	associated	with	schizophrenia,	therefore,	may	facilitate	increased	
resting-state	functional	connectivity	between	the	DMN	and	SN.		
	 Failure	of	the	SN	to	deactivate	DMN	during	task-related	processing	
affects	the	processing	of	salient	stimuli.	A	key	function	of	the	SN	is	the	
deactivation	of	the	DMN	during	task-related	activities	(Goulden	et	al.,	2014;	
Jilka	et	al.,	2014;	Sridharan	et	al.,	2008;	Uddin,	2017c).	Reduced	task-related	
deactivation	of	the	DMN	(Bonnelle	et	al.,	2012;	Jilka	et	al.,	2014),	which	
correlated	with	reduced	behavioural	inhibition	(Bonnelle	et	al.,	2012;	Jilka	et	al.,	
2014),	was	found	in	traumatic	brain	injury	affecting	the	SN.	These	findings	were	
linked	to	weakened	right	anterior	insula	activation	(Jilka	et	al.,	2014).	
Furthermore,	in	unaffected	individuals,	increased	resting-state	functional	
connectivity	between	the	SN	and	DMN	predicted	the	distractibility	of	salient	
and	non-salient	visual	stimuli	during	an	auditory	task	(Götting	et	al.,	2017).	
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Combined,	these	findings	suggest	DMN	deactivation,	by	the	SN,	is	necessary	for	
attending	and	responding	to	salient	stimuli.		
	 Research	into	the	effect	of	psychedelics	suggests	reduced	resting-state	
activation	in	the	DMN	and	SN	contributes	to	aberrant	salience.	Carhart-Harris	et	
al.	(2012)	administered	the	psychedelic	psilocybin,	and	a	placebo,	to	
participants	with	no	history	of	mental	health	issues.	For	both	placebo	and	
psilocybin	conditions,	participants	underwent	MRI	scans,	ascertaining	either	
cerebral	blood	flow	or	BOLD	activation.	Following	the	scans,	participants	rated	
statements	regarding	the	intensity	of	their	psychedelic	experience.	These	
included	characteristics	similar	to	those	associated	with	aberrant	salience.	For	
example,	“Everything	seemed	‘alive,’”	“I	experienced	a	loss	of	separation	from	
my	surroundings,”	“	The	experience	had	a	spiritual	or	mystical	quality,"	and	“I	
felt	unusual	bodily	sensations”	(Carhart-Harris	et	al.,	2012	page	4,	Supporting	
Information).	Psilocybin	was	associated	with	decreased	cerebral	blood	flow	and	
BOLD	activation	in	the	SN	(ACC)	and	DMN	(mPFC	and	PCC)	and	reduced	
functional	connectivity	between	the	mPFC	and	PCC.	Cerebral	blood	flow	in	the	
ACC	and	PCC	negatively	correlated	with	self-rated	intensity	of	the	experience.	
Furthermore,	functional	connectivity	between	the	DMN	and	task-related	
networks	increased	following	psilocybin	(Carhart-Harris	et	al.,	2013).	Aberrant	
salience,	therefore,	appears	to	be	linked	to	atypical	functional	connectivity	
between	the	DMN,	SN,	and	task-related	regions.		
	 Dysfunction	of	the	SN	facilitates	aberrant	associations	between	self-
referential	and	task-related	processing	that	contributes	to	the	symptoms	of	
schizophrenia.	Compared	to	unaffected	individuals,	individuals	with	
schizophrenia	showed	reduced	functional	connectivity	between	the	ACC	and	
mPFC	(Yan	et	al.,	2012).	Conversely,	activation	in	the	DMN	(Manoliu	et	al.,	
2014)	and	CEN	(Chai	et	al.,	2011;	Manoliu	et	al.,	2014)	was	augmented	and	
correlated	with	reduced	right	anterior	insula	activation	(Manoliu	et	al.,	2014).	
The	frequency	and	intensity	of	hallucinations	correlated	with	the	atypical	
resting-state	activation	in	these	three	networks	(Manoliu	et	al.,	2014).		
	 Increased	functional	connectivity	between	the	SN	and	DMN,	which	is	
linked	to	hyperdopaminergic	activation,	is	associated	with	symptoms	of	
schizophrenia.	The	failure	of	the	SN	to	deactivate	the	DMN	during	task-related	
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activities,	leads	to	disruptions	in	the	processing	of	salient	stimuli.	Thus,	the	
dysregulated	connectivity	between	the	DMN	and	salience	network	may	be	a	key	
mechanism	underlying	aberrant	salience.		
2.3.5 Summary 
Schizophrenia	is	associated	with	decreased	sensory	gating	(Judd	et	al.,	1992;	
Myles-Worsley,	2002;	Williams	et	al.,	2011)	and	a	dysregulated	pattern	of	
neural	activity	in	regions	associated	with	self-referential	processing	(J.	S.	Kim	et	
al.,	2014;	Micoulaud-Franchi	et	al.,	2012)	and	task-related	activities	(e.g.	
Anticevic	et	al.,	2015;	Chai	et	al.,	2011;	Littow	et	al.,	2015).	Underlying	this	is	an	
impairment	in	the	functioning	of	the	SN	(Baiano	et	al.,	2007;	Saze	et	al.,	2007;	T.	
White	et	al.,	2013),	which	co-ordinates	the	activation	of	these	neural	regions.	
Furthermore,	sensory	gating	deficits	lead	to	increased	processing	of	irrelevant	
stimuli,	resulting	in	higher	cognitive	load	that	further	impacts	SN	efficiency	
(Luo	et	al.,	2014).	The	subsequent	erroneous	associations	of	the	importance	of	
internal	and	external	stimuli	facilitates	the	development	of	positive	symptoms	
of	psychosis	(Manoliu	et	al.,	2014;	Orliac	et	al.,	2013;	L	Palaniyappan	et	al.,	
2011).	These	findings	implicate	the	SN	and	DMN	as	the	neural	mechanisms	
underlying	aberrant	salience.			
2.4 Measures of Aberrant Salience 
The	aberrant	salience	hypothesis	links	neural,	cognitive,	phenomenological,	and	
behavioural	factors.	Different	methodologies	are	used	to	test	each	of	these	
factors	but	comparing	different	methodologies	is	problematic.	For	example,	
self-report	and	behavioural	measures	of	constructs,		such	as	impulsivity,	have	a	
weak	relationship	but	each	moderately	correlate	with	a	third	factor,	real-life	
behaviour	(Sharma,	Markon,	&	Clark,	2014).		However,	Karcher	et	al.	(Karcher,	
Cicero,	&	Kerns,	2015)	found	a	relationship	between	behavioural	and	self-
report	measures	of	magical	thinking	and	reversal	learning.	Therefore,	if	the	
aberrant	salience	hypothesis	is	true,	the	interdependence	between	some	of	the	
factors	should	be	evident,	despite	differing	methodologies.	The	purpose	of	the	
current	project	was	to	investigate	the	relationships	among	some	of	these	
factors,	namely	aberrant	salience	and	motivational	salience.	This	is	important	
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given	Kapur	(2003)	proposed	that	aberrant	salience	was	mediated	by	
motivational	salience.	The	SAT	and	ASI	assess	two	different	factors	within	the	
aberrant	salience	hypothesis:	behavioural	and	phenomenological.		
	 Two	measures	were	identified	as	having	been	developed	to	assess	
aberrant	salience:	the	SAT	(Roiser	et	al.,	2009)	and	the	Aberrant	Salience	
Inventory	(Cicero	et	al.,	2010).	At	the	time	of	writing,	these	were	the	only	
available	standardised	measures	of	aberrant	salience.	In	the	following	sections,	
I	discuss	each	measure	in	turn,	including	a	description,	review	of	research,	and	
discussion	of	the	limitations.	
2.4.1 Salience Attribution Task  
The	Salience	Attribution	Task	(SAT;	Roiser	et	al.,	2009)	is	a	computerised	
learning	paradigm	that	uses	stimulus	reinforcement	to	assess	implicit	and	
explicit	aberrant	and	adaptive	salience.	Stimulus	reinforcement	facilitates	
associative	learning	by	rewarding	responses	to	conditioned	stimuli,	which	are	
stimuli	without	an	innate	rewarding	value	(Anselme	&	James,	2015).	During	the	
SAT,	participants	respond	as	quickly	as	possible	to	a	stimulus	(a	black	box	
which	appears	centre	screen)	presented	with	task	relevant	or	task	irrelevant	
stimuli	(Roiser	et	al.,	2009).	Participants	are	assigned	one	of	four	possible	
scenarios	that	vary	in	the	weighted	relevance	of	the	dimension	of	colour	(red	or	
blue)	or	shape	(household	object	or	animal).	For	the	task-relevant	dimension,	
one	level	(e.g.,	household	object)	has	a	high	probability	(87.5%)	of	being	
reinforced	while	the	other	(e.g.,	animal)	has	a	low	probability	(12.5%).	For	the	
task-irrelevant	dimension,	both	levels	(e.g.,	blue	and	red)	have	a	50%	
probability	of	being	reinforced.	Response	latency	to	the	presentation	of	the	
black	box	determines	the	amount	of	money	that	can	be	earned.	However,	the	
probability	of	reward	is	determined	by	the	stimulus	type.	Participants	are	
instructed	to	identify	which	of	the	four	stimulus	types	yields	the	highest	
probability	of	reward.		
	 During	the	SAT,	the	explicit	task	is	self-report,	assessing	the	ability	to	
identify	the	likelihood	of	reward	associated	with	each	stimulus	dimension,	
while	the	implicit	task	is	behavioural.	Implicit	salience	is	measured	using	
response	latency	(ms)	while	explicit	salience	is	measured	using	visual	analogue	
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scale	(VAS)	rating	(mm).	The	task	consists	of	two	trial	blocks,	with	a	VAS	rating	
at	the	end	of	each.	Implicit	adaptive	salience	is	calculated	as	the	difference	
between	mean	response	latency	for	low	(10%;	e.g.,	household	object)	versus	
high	(90%;	e.g.,	animal)	reinforcement	probability	trials.	Implicit	aberrant	
salience	is	calculated	as	the	absolute	difference	in	response	latency	between	the	
two	task-irrelevant	dimensions	(e.g.,	blue	and	red;	Roiser	et	al.,	2009).	Explicit	
measures	are	calculated	as	the	difference	in	probability	rating	between	the	low-	
and	high-probability	relevant	stimuli	(adaptive)	and	between	the	two	irrelevant	
stimuli	(aberrant).	Salience	is	therefore	defined	as	the	difference	between	
probabilistic	learning	for	relevant	(adaptive)	and	irrelevant	(aberrant)	stimuli	
in	self-report	(explicit)	and	behavioural	(implicit)	measures.		
	 Individuals	with	no	history	of	psychotic	disorder	show	increased	
adaptive	salience	relative	to	aberrant	salience.	Roiser,	Stephan,	den	Ouden,	
Friston,	and	Joyce	(2010)	found	unaffected	individuals	responded	faster	to	
high-	versus	low-probability	stimuli	(implicit	adaptive	salience).	Furthermore,	
the	ability	to	distinguish	high-	from	low-probability	relevant	stimuli	(explicit	
adaptive	salience),	increased	across	the	trial	blocks.	Implicit	and	explicit	
adaptive	salience	measures	were	positively	correlated.	There	was	also	a	small	
difference	in	reward	probability	ratings	for	task	irrelevant	stimuli	(explicit	
aberrant	salience),	that	was	constant	between	task	blocks.	Implicit	aberrant	
salience	was	also	present,	with	participants	responding	more	quickly	to	the	
irrelevant	dimension	they	perceived	as	having	a	higher	reward	probability.	
There	was	no	relationship	between	adaptive	and	aberrant	salience	measures	
nor	between	aberrant	salience	indices.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	4,	if	the	aberrant	
salience	hypothesis	is	correct,	SAT	aberrant	salience	indices	should	negatively	
correlate	with	adaptive	salience	indices,	which	measure	motivational	salience.	
Furthermore,	if	antipsychotics	reduce	adaptive	salience,	adaptive	salience	
should	not	be	impaired	in	medication	naïve	individuals	with	schizophrenia.		
	 The	SAT	measure	of	adaptive	salience	denotes	reward	processing,	
whereas	SAT	aberrant	salience	inversely	relates	to	engagement	of	task-related	
regions.	Roiser	et	al.	(2010)	used	fMRI	to	investigate	correlates	between	neural	
activation	and	the	SAT	indices	in	unaffected	individuals.	High-probability	
relevant	stimuli	correlated	with	BOLD	activation	in	two	reward	processing	
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regions,	the	ventral	tegmental	area	and	ventral	striatum.	Presentation	of	
irrelevant	stimuli	rated	as	having	a	high	probability	of	reward	(explicit	aberrant	
salience)	correlated	with	decreased	activation	in	the	dlPFC	(involved	in	task	
processing)	and	increased	activation	in	the	middle	temporal	gyrus.	The	middle	
temporal	gyrus	shows	increased	activation	when	orienting	attention	between	
internal	(self-referential)	and	external	(task-related)	cues	(Davey	et	al.,	2016;	
Japee,	Holiday,	Satyshur,	Mukai,	&	Ungerleider,	2015).	Although	not	implicating	
the	DMN	directly	(Roiser	et	al.,	2010),	the	findings	support	the	idea	that	
aberrant	salience	involves	atypical	self-referential	processing	of	external	
stimuli.	There	was	no	correlation	between	implicit	aberrant	salience	and	BOLD	
activation.		
The	SAT	shows	good	discriminant	validity	in	unaffected	individuals.	
Schmidt	and	Roiser	(2009)	compared	the	SAT	indices	with	measures	of:	learned	
irrelevance;	reversal	of	probabilistic	learning;	reinforcement	sensitivity;	
working	memory;	and	a	continuous	performance	test	(which	assesses	sustained	
attention	and	the	ability	to	maintain	context	of	relevant	information	when	
presented	with	irrelevant	information).	Participants	who	reported	no	history	of	
psychiatric	disorder	were	assessed	for	schizotypy.	Factor	analysis	revealed	that	
SAT	implicit	aberrant	salience	was	independent	of	the	other	measures	and	was	
negatively	related	to	social	anhedonia.	Explicit	adaptive	salience	loaded	
positively,	and	explicit	aberrant	salience	negatively,	onto	one	factor	that	the	
authors	labelled	operant/explicit	learning.	There	was	no	evidence	of	a	
relationship	between	explicit	aberrant	salience	and	schizotypy.	
Although	the	findings	offer	some	support	for	the	construct	validity	of	the	
SAT	implicit	aberrant	salience,	the	SAT	did	not	support	predictions	based	on	the	
aberrant	salience	hypothesis.	Additionally,	whereas	aberrant	salience	may	be	
present	in	unaffected	individuals,	one	assumption	of	the	hypothesis	is	that	this	
does	not	have	the	robust	effect	that	the	incorporation	of	irrelevant	stimuli	into	
schemata	has	in	schizophrenia.	Therefore,	aberrant	salience	is	not	just	
perception	but	also	the	cognitive	explanation	.	Aberrant	salience	should,	
therefore,	be	minimal	or	even	absent	in	unaffected	individuals.	And	even	though	
schizotypy	predicts	symptom	onset,	participants	were	below	the	mean	scores	
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for	the	general	population	(Mason	&	Claridge,	2006).	Thus,	a	key	constraint	of	
the	study	was	the	exclusion	criterion	of	a	history	of	psychiatric	disorders.			
In	contrast,	individuals	with	sub-clinical	symptoms	show	evidence	of	
aberrant	salience	that	is	associated	with	atypical	neural	activation.	Roiser,	
Howes,	Chaddock,	Joyce	and	McGuire	(2013)	investigated	aberrant	salience	in	
individuals	who	exhibited	abnormal	beliefs,	which	the	authors	classified	as	
ultra-high	risk	of	psychosis	(UHR).	Participants	completed	the	SAT	during	fMRI	
followed	by	positron	emission	topography,	which	was	used	to	ascertain	
dopamine	synthesis	capacity.	The	UHR	participants	scored	higher	than	
unaffected	individuals	on	explicit	aberrant	salience	but	not	implicit	aberrant	
salience.	The	UHR	group’s	tendency	to	attribute	salience	to	irrelevant	stimuli	
was	related	to	the	severity	of	their	abnormal	beliefs.	The	explicit	aberrant	
salience	index	is	measured	as	the	relative	difference	between	the	perceived	
value	of	stimulus	types	rewarded	at	chance.	A	greater	difference	reflects	greater	
value,	therefore	importance,	of	one	irrelevant	stimulus.		Furthermore,	striatal	
dopaminergic	synthesis	capacity	in	UHR	correlated	negatively	with	neural	
activation	in	the	hippocampal	region	during	irrelevant	stimulus	presentation	
(Roiser	et	al.,	2013).	This	correlation	was	positive	in	unaffected	individuals.	
Aberrant	salience	in	the	prodromal	phase,	therefore,	includes	both	the	
perception	of,	and	assignment	of	importance	to,	irrelevant	stimuli.		
In	the	first	study	assessing	SAT	indices	in	schizophrenia,	investigators	
found	limited	support	for	the	utility	of	the	SAT	in	identifying	aberrant	salience.	
Roiser	et	al.	(2009)	examined	differences	in	adaptive	and	aberrant	salience	in	
participants	with	schizophrenia	(all	on	antipsychotic	medication)	and	
unaffected	individuals.	There	was	decreased	implicit	adaptive	salience	in	the	
schizophrenia	group	but	not	explicit	adaptive	salience	nor	explicit	or	implicit	
aberrant	salience.	Participants	with	treatment	resistant	schizophrenia	(TRS),	
defined	as	individuals	on	antipsychotics	who	still	experienced	delusions,	had	
higher	explicit	aberrant	salience	scores	than	those	who	were	treatment	
responsive.	There	was	also	evidence	of	relationships	between	SAT	aberrant	
salience	and	symptoms.	Explicit	aberrant	salience	predicted	delusions	and	
negative	symptoms,	although	the	latter	relationship	was	weak.	Conversely,	
schizophrenia	participants	who	reported	an	absence	of	negative	symptoms	had	
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lower	explicit	aberrant	salience	scores	than	unaffected	individuals.	These	
results	suggest	an	impaired	capacity	to	differentiate	probabilistic	outcomes	for	
task	relevant,	but	not	irrelevant,	stimuli	in	schizophrenia	that	is	associated	with	
positive	and	negative	symptoms	of	schizophrenia.	 	
	 Recent	studies	have	been	more	successful	in	finding	a	relationship	
between	the	SAT	aberrant	salience	and	schizophrenia.	Pankow	et	al.	(2015)	
found	individuals	with	schizophrenia	exhibited	significantly	increased	implicit	
aberrant	salience	compared	to	unaffected	individuals.	Interestingly,	the	mean	
implicit	aberrant	salience	scores	for	individuals	with	subclinical	delusions	fell	
between,	but	not	significantly	different	from,	that	of	unaffected	individuals	and	
those	with	schizophrenia.		
	 Katthagen	et	al.	(2016)	investigated	the	construct	validity	of	SAT	implicit	
aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia	and	unaffected	individuals.	They	employed	
the	SAT	and	an	implicit	salience	paradigm,	which	was	similar	to	the	SAT	implicit	
indices.	However,	participants	were	not	advised	there	was	a	relationship	
between	stimulus	types	and	reward.	This	was	done	to	reduce	increased	
attention,	therefore	salience,	for	all	stimuli.	The	SAT	explicit	and	implicit	
adaptive	salience	scores	were	higher	for	unaffected	individuals,	whereas	
implicit	aberrant	salience	scores	for	both	the	SAT	and	implicit	salience	
paradigm	were	higher	for	individuals	with	schizophrenia.	Furthermore,	the	
measures	of	implicit	aberrant	salience	correlated	positively	with	each	other	and	
negatively	with	reversal	learning.	No	correlations	between	implicit	and	explicit	
aberrant	salience	measures	nor	between	aberrant	and	adaptive	salience	
measures	were	indicated.	The	results	suggest	explicit	knowledge	of	a	reward	
contingency	does	not	affect	outcome.	However,	there	are	limitations	to	the	
authors’	claim	that	the	results	validate	the	SAT	as	a	measure	of	aberrant	
salience.	The	implicit	salience	paradigm	measured	implicit	aberrant	salience	in	
the	same	way	as	the	SAT,	thus	is	subject	to	the	same	methodological	issues.	
Additionally,	the	failure	to	find	an	effect	of	reward	contingency	may	reflect	a	
failure	to	attend	to	instructions	(reduced	adaptive	salience).			
	 Abboud	et	al.	(2016)	investigated	the	impact	of	antipsychotics	on	SAT	
indices.	They	argued	that	individuals	with	TRS	would	exhibit	differences	in	
aberrant	salience	compared	to	unaffected	individuals	but	that	antipsychotics	
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would	reduce	adaptive	salience.	There	were	no	group	differences	in	explicit	
aberrant	or	implicit	adaptive	salience.	The	TRS	group	had	lower	explicit	
adaptive	salience	scores	and	were	more	likely	to	underestimate	the	likelihood	
of	high,	but	not	low,	probability	reinforced	stimuli	than	unaffected	individuals.	
Higher	implicit	aberrant	salience	in	TRS	was	related	to	impaired	working	
memory.	Given	previous	findings	of	explicit	aberrant	salience	in	the	prodromal	
phase	(Roiser	et	al,	2013),	the	authors	suggest	that	persistent	delusions	in	TRS	
may	be	due	to	an	inability	to	unlearn	early	dopaminergic	related	aberrant	
salience	(Abboud	et	al.,	2016).		
	 Alternative	explanations	for	inconsistent	findings	using	the	SAT	have	
been	identified	and	discounted	by	subsequent	research.	One	such	explanation	is	
that	the	conscious	awareness	of	aberrant	stimuli	is	more	prominent	during	the	
prodromal	stage	(Roiser	et	al.,	2013).	However,	Smieskova	et	al.	(2015)	found	
no	difference	in	the	SAT	measures	of	aberrant	salience	between	unaffected	
individuals,	those	at	risk	of	psychosis	and	those	with	first	episode	psychosis.	
They	suggested	one	of	the	issues	with	the	SAT	is	that	common	cognitive	
processing	deficits	seen	in	schizophrenia,	such	as	attention	and	executive	
function,	may	confound	results.	Subsequent	data	support	this	argument	
(Abboud	et	al.,	2016).	Smieskova	et	al.	(2015)	suggested	impaired	neural	
responsivity	in	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex	and	insula,	associated	with	
antipsychotics,	may	interfere	with	salience	attribution.	A	more	recent	article	
casts	doubt	on	this	suggestion.	In	assessing	the	BOLD	response	during	the	SAT,	
Walter	et	al.	(2016)	found	no	association	between	SAT	aberrant	salience	and	
insula	activation	or	symptom	severity.	Conversely,	there	was	an	association	
between	severity	of	positive	symptoms	and	increased	insula	activation.	The	
evidence	therefore	suggests	atypical	SN	function	in	schizophrenia	that	is	related	
to	symptoms	but	not	the	SAT	indices	of	aberrant	salience.		
	 The	SAT	was	developed	as	a	measure	of	aberrant	and	adaptive	salience,	
however	subsequent	research	has	yielded	conflicting	results.	Although	there	is	
some	indication	of	increased	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia	(Katthagen	et	
al.,	2016;	Pankow	et	al.,	2015)	this	finding	is	inconsistent	(Roiser	et	al.,	2009;	
Smieskova	et	al.,	2015).	Increased	explicit	aberrant	salience	has	been	identified	
in	TRS	individuals	compared	to	those	for	whom	antipsychotics	are	effective	
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(Roiser	et	al.,	2009)	but	not	in	unaffected	individuals	(Abboud	et	al.,	2016).	
Support	for	the	construct	validity	of	the	SAT	is	also	limited	(Katthagen	et	al.,	
2016;	Roiser	et	al.,	2010;	K.	Schmidt	&	Roiser,	2009).	Furthermore,	speculative	
explanations	for	differential	findings	(Roiser	et	al.,	2013;	Smieskova	et	al.,	2015)	
are	not	supported	by	subsequent	evidence	(Walter	et	al.,	2016).	It	has	also	been	
suggested	that	aberrant	salience	is	involved	in	the	early	development	of	
symptoms,	with	other	factors	contributing	to	the	severity	of	symptoms	(Smeets	
et	al.,	2013).	Inconsistent	findings	for	SAT	indices	in	schizophrenia	may,	
therefore,	reflect	variances	in	the	integration	of	irrelevant	stimuli	into	a	schema.	
Combined	with	the	effect	of	antipsychotics,	this	may	serve	to	reduce	sustained	
attention	to	stimuli	that	do	not	adhere	to	the	believed	explanation.		
2.4.2 Aberrant Salience Inventory 
The	ASI	is	a	29-item	questionnaire	designed	to	ascertain	the	key	experiential	
factors	associated	with	aberrant	salience	(Cicero	et	al.,	2010).	Specifically,	the	
ASI	assesses	experiences	such	as	heightened	perception,	understanding,	
emotionality,	and	significance	of	internal	and	external	stimuli	that	otherwise	
would	not	be	attended	to	(Cicero	et	al.,	2010).	The	ASI	was	developed	from	
factor	analysis	of	undergraduate	(n	=	233)	responses	to	an	initial	list	of	yes/no	
items	(Cicero	et	al.,	2010).	Five	factors	were	identified:	increased	significance,	
senses	sharpening,	impending	understanding,	heightened	emotionality,	and	
heightened	cognition.	Removal	of	items	that	were	highly	endorsed	(>80%)	or	
had	high	loadings	(>	.30)	on	more	than	one	factor	left	the	resultant	29-item	
questionnaire.	The	ASI	was	then	administered	to	another	undergraduate	group	
(n	=	348)	along	with	measures	of	dissociation,	social	anhedonia,	absorption	and	
psychosis-proneness.	Psychosis-proneness	was	defined	as	increased	magical	
ideation,	perceptual	aberration,	and	referential	thinking.	The	ASI	correlated	
weakly	with	social	anhedonia	and	highly	with	psychosis-proneness	measures,	
although	not	as	highly	as	the	psychotic-proneness	measures	correlated	to	each	
other.	Similar	findings	were	obtained	in	an	Italian	version	of	the	ASI	
administered	to	undergraduates	(Raballo	et	al.,	2017).	
	 The	ASI	also	shows	discriminant	validity	in	those	at	risk	of	psychosis	
compared	to	unaffected	individuals,	but	inconsistent	evidence	in	individuals	
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with	psychosis.	Cicero	et	al.	(2010)	compared	ASI	scores	for:	participants	with	
high	psychosis	proneness	(1.96	SD	above	mean	on	either	magical	ideation	or	
perceptual	aberration	scales);	participants	with	high	social	anhedonia	(2	SD	
above	mean);	a	comparison	group	(who	scored	less	than	0.5	SD	above	mean	on	
magical	ideation,	perceptual	aberration,	and	anhedonia	scales);	individuals	
diagnosed	with	schizophrenia	or	schizoaffective	disorder;	and	individuals	
diagnosed	with	a	nonpsychotic	disorder.	The	psychosis	proneness	group	had	
higher	ASI	scores	than	the	comparison	group	and	social	anhedonia	group,	who	
also	scored	higher	than	the	comparison	group.	Furthermore,	ASI	scores	were	
higher	in	individuals	with	a	primary	diagnosis	of	schizophrenia	or	
schizoaffective	disorder	than	individuals	diagnosed	with	a	non-psychotic	
disorder	(Cicero	et	al.,	2010).	Ratings	on	the	ASI	have	also	been	associated	with	
lifetime	psychotic	symptoms	(Godini	et	al.,	2015;	Lelli	et	al.,	2013)	and	do	not	
appear	to	be	affected	by	pharmacological	treatment	(Tofani	et	al.,	2016).	
Conversely,	a	subsequent	study	found	higher	ASI	scores	in	schizophrenia	failed	
to	reach	significance	(Ceaser	&	Barch,	2016).	Further	research	into	the	
discriminant	validity	of	the	ASI	is	needed.		
	 The	relationship	between	ASI	and	self-identity	predicts	the	severity	of	
positive	symptoms	of	psychosis.	Cicero,	Becker,	Martin,	Docherty,	and	Kerns	
(2013)	investigated	the	interaction	between	aberrant	salience	and	self-concept	
clarity;	the	stability,	consistency	and	cognitive	availability	of	one’s	beliefs	about	
oneself.	Psychotic-like	experiences	were	defined	as	magical	ideation	and	
perceptual	aberration,	with	individuals	scoring	2	SD	above	the	mean	included	in	
the	high	schizotypy	group.	Mean	ASI	and	self-concept	clarity	scores	were	
obtained,	with	±	1	SD	from	group	means	used	to	determine	high	and	low	scores	
for	each	measure.	In	individuals	with	high	schizotypy	scores,	the	interaction	
between	high	(but	not	low)	ASI	scores	and	low-self-concept	predicted	
psychotic-like	experiences,	including	delusions.	A	subsequent	study	revealed	an	
interaction	between	the	ASI	and	both	self-concept	clarity	and	low	ethnic	
identity	that	predicted	psychotic-like	symptoms	in	undergraduates	(Cicero	&	
Cohn,	2018).	There	was	no	significant	interaction	between	ASI	and	self-concept	
clarity	in	predicting	anhedonia	or	paranoia	(Cicero	et	al.,	2013).	ASI	and	self-
concept	clarity	predicted	paranoia	individually.	The	authors	suggest	that	
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individuals	with	an	unclear	self-concept	are	more	prone	to	a	psychotic-like	
interpretation	of	the	experience	of	aberrant	salience.	A	subsequent	study	
revealed	a	positive	relationship	between	self-concept	clarity	and	psychotic-like	
experiences	in	undergraduates.	 	
	 Published	research	using	the	ASI	is	scarce	and	more	research	is	required	
to	determine	the	discriminant	validity	of	the	ASI.	One	strength	of	the	
questionnaire	is	the	focus	on	the	perceived	importance,	rather	than	just	the	
identification,	of	stimuli	that	previously	went	unnoticed.	According	to	the	
aberrant	salience	hypothesis,	the	positive	symptoms	of	schizophrenia	develop	
from	the	explanation	given	to	the	importance	of	irrelevant	stimuli,	not	from	
simply	noticing	stimuli.	Furthermore,	the	interaction	between	the	ASI	and	self-
concept	clarity,	in	the	prediction	of	symptom	severity,	supports	the	idea	that	
atypical	self-referential	processing	contributes	to	aberrant	salience.	However,	
whereas	the	ASI	measures	a	trait	that	is	found	in	schizophrenia,	it	is	not	clear	
whether	this	trait	is	unique	to	schizophrenia	or	indeed	measuring	aberrant	
salience.					
2.4.3 Summary of Evidence 
Research	indicates	sensory	gating	deficits	in	schizophrenia	lead	to	increased	
availability	of	irrelevant	stimuli	(Judd	et	al.,	1992;	McGhie	&	Chapman,	1961;	
Micoulaud-Franchi	et	al.,	2012).	Impaired	functioning	in	the	SN	(Manoliu	et	al.,	
2014;	Lena	Palaniyappan	et	al.,	2013)	facilitates	the	aberrant	cognitive	
processing	of	available	stimuli.	Specifically,	an	aberrant	connectivity	between	
the	DMN	and	task-related	neural	regions	(Landin-Romero	et	al.,	2015;	Manoliu	
et	al.,	2014;	Skudlarski	et	al.,	2010;	Woodward,	Rogers,	&	Heckers,	2011)	leads	
to	increased	importance	being	assigned	to	irrelevant	stimuli,	or	aberrant	
salience.		
	 Evidence	supports	the	idea	of	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia	(Grave	
et	al.,	2017;	Haralanova	et	al.,	2012;	W	P	Horan	et	al.,	2013;	Kerns	&	
Berenbaum,	2000).	Supporting	data	include	that	from	two	specific	measures	of	
aberrant	salience,	the	SAT	and	ASI.	The	SAT	is	based	on	stimulus	reinforcement	
and	associative	learning.	Inconsistent	findings	from	the	SAT	may	reflect	a	
difference	between	the	awareness	of	irrelevant	stimuli	and	the	incorporation	of	
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that	awareness	into	an	explanation.	Thus,	the	aberrant	salience	of	stimuli	is	
determined	by	stimulus	pairing	with	dopaminergic	firing	and	fit	with	the	
internal	explanation	or	schema.	The	ASI	offers	a	phenomenological	measure	of	
aberrant	salience	but	published	research	on	the	ASI	is	limited.	Furthermore,	it	is	
unclear	whether	the	trait	that	the	ASI	measures	is	aberrant	salience	or	unique	
to	schizophrenia.	
2.5 AS Limitations 
The	dopaminergic	theory	of	schizophrenia,	on	which	the	aberrant	salience	
hypothesis	is	based,	suggests	hyperactive	dysregulation	of	the	dopaminergic	
system	underlies	the	positive	symptoms	of	schizophrenia	(Kapur,	2003).	
Evidence	for	this	is	founded	on	the	effect	of	antipsychotics	in	reducing	
dopamine	activation	and	symptoms.	One	of	the	limitations	surrounding	a	purely	
dopaminergic	explanation	is,	however,	the	limited	and	inconsistent	effect	of	
antipsychotics.	For	example,	some	patients	report	a	reduction	in	the	importance	
of	symptoms,	not	the	absence	of	symptoms	(Sarin	&	Wallin,	2014).	Others	
report	experiencing	little	or	no	effect	of	antipsychotics	(Suzuki	et	al.,	2012;	
White	et	al.,	2016).	There	is	also	insufficient	evidence	supporting	the	effect	of	
antipsychotics	on	negative	or	cognitive	symptoms	(Lau,	Wang,	Hsu,	&	Liu,	
2013).		
Glutamate	plays	an	important	role	in	the	development	and	expression	of	
psychotic	symptoms.	The	hypo-glutamate	hypothesis	suggests	decreased	
function	of	a	key	glutamate	receptor,	N-methyl-D-aspartate	(NMDA),	offers	a	
partial	explanation	for	the	positive,	negative	and	cognitive	symptoms	of	
schizophrenia	(Farber	et	al.,	1995;	Jentsch	&	Roth,	1999).	For	example,	certain	
antipsychotics	(e.g.	clozapine	and	haloperidol)	prevent	or	reverse	
schizophrenia-like	symptoms	in	animals	exposed	to	NMDA	antagonists	(Jentsch	
&	Roth,	1999).		Antipsychotic	add-on	treatments	that	enhance	NMDA	function	
improve	positive	and	negative	symptoms,	general	psychopathology	scores,	and	
cognitive	function	in	TRS	(Kantrowitz	et	al.,	2010;	Lane	et	al.,	2013).	A	hypo-
glutamate	hypothesis	may	better	explain	the	negative	symptoms	and	cognitive	
deficits	seen	in	schizophrenia.	
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	However,	neurotransmitters	interact	to	affect	cognitive	function	
(Laruelle,	Kegeles,	&	Abi-Dargham,	2003).	For	example,	the	inactivation	of	
NMDA	glutamate	receptors	in	dopamine	neurons	results	in	the	absence	of	
dopaminergic	firing,	impairing	cue-dependent	learning	(Zweifel	et	al.,	2009).	
Whereas	research	fuels	the	debate	on	which	hypothesis	best	explains	
schizophrenia,	there	are	limitations	in	any	singular	explanation	(Jentsch	&	Roth,	
1999).	A	combination	of	hypo-glutamate	and	hyper-dopaminergic	activation	
may	provide	a	more	comprehensive	explanation	of	symptoms	(Olney	&	Farber,	
1995)	and	antipsychotic	treatment	resistance.		
Another	criticism	of	the	aberrant	salience	hypothesis	is	that	aberrant	
salience	may	not	be	specific	to	schizophrenia.	Poletti	and	Sambataro	(2013)	
suggest	aberrant	salience	may	be	extended	to	explain	delusions	in	other	
disorders,	neurological	damage,	or	disease.	Research	is	therefore	needed	to	
ascertain	whether	aberrant	salience	is	unique	to	schizophrenia.	
2.6 Conclusion 
Aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia	is	indicated	in	semantic	processing	(Kerns	&	
Berenbaum,	2000),	subjective	arousal	ratings	to	visual	scenes	(Haralanova	et	
al.,	2012),	subjective	ratings	of	auditory	stimuli	(Micoulaud-Franchi	et	al.,	
2012),	facial	cues	in	emotional	recognition	(Goghari,	Sponheim,	&	
MacDonald	3rd,	2010),	and	interpretation	of	gestures	(Bucci	et	al.,	2008;	White	
et	al.,	2016).	Furthermore,	individuals	with	schizophrenia	exhibit	atypical	
neural	activation	in	regions	associated	with	salience	(Anticevic	et	al.,	2015;	Cole	
et	al.,	2013;	Kim	et	al.,	2014;	White,	Gilleen,	&	Shergill,	2013),	task	filtering	(e.g.	
Judd	et	al.,	1992;	McGhie	&	Chapman,	1961;	Micoulaud-Franchi	et	al.,	2012),	
and	self-referential	processing	(Pankow	et	al.,	2015).	Specific	measures	(Cicero	
et	al.,	2010;	Roiser	et	al.,	2009)	have	been	developed	to	assess	aberrant	
salience.	However,	further	research	is	required	to	assess	the	validity	of	these	
measures.		
	 Numerous	explanations	have	been	offered	regarding	the	inconsistent	
findings	supporting	aberrant	salience	measures,	including	stage	of	the	disorder	
(Roiser	et	al.,	2013)	and	medication	(Smieskova	et	al.,	2015).	However,	the	
aberrant	salience	hypothesis	includes	a	cognitive	explanation	of	aberrant	
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salience	that	pre-empts	the	development	of	positive	symptoms.	Negative	
symptoms	are	often	present	prior	to	first	episode	psychosis	(Foussias	et	al.,	
2014)	and	are	retrospectively	identified	as	an	indicator.	If	aberrant	salience	
pre-empts,	and	contributes	to,	positive	symptoms,	initial	negative	symptoms	
may	reflect	a	period	of	reconstruction	of	the	individual’s	position	of	self	within	
the	world.	Whether	an	underlying	mechanism,	or	reflective	of	a	subsequent	
effect,	aberrant	salience	is	strengthened	by	reduced	functional	connectivity	
within	and	between	key	neural	networks	involved	in	salience	and	self.	
Continued	aberrant	salience	may	lead	to	an	explanation	whereby	the	rationale	
for	aberrant	salience	becomes	embedded	in	an	individual’s	view	of	the	world	
and	themselves.	This	in	turn	may	lead	to	positive	symptoms	such	as	delusions,	
paranoia	and	hallucinations.	Whereas	antipsychotics	reduce	the	salience	of	
new,	irrelevant	stimuli,	they	dampen	rather	than	reverse	existing	aberrant	
salience	associations.	
	 Understanding	the	mechanisms	underlying	the	development	of	
symptoms	is	important	for	early	intervention.	A	key	prerequisite	to	achieving	
this	goal	is	that	issues	in	the	definition	of	aberrant	salience	are	addressed	and	
evidence	sought	to	ascertain	whether	aberrant	salience	is	unique	to	
schizophrenia.	The	current	research	project	was	designed	to	elucidate	the	
relationship	between	aberrant	salience	measures	and	their	specificity	in	
identifying	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia.		
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3 Chapter Three 
Reward and Motivation 
Kapur	(2003)	argued	that	dopamine’s	role	as	a	mediator	of	motivational	
salience	underlies	the	connection	between	dopaminergic	dysregulation	and	
aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia.	As	outlined	in	chapter's	1	and	2,	the	
aberrant	salience	hypothesis	links	the	relationship	between	dopamine	and	
schizophrenia	to	symptom	development	and	maintenance.	Aberrant	salience	
itself	is	mediated	by	disrupted	motivational	salience,	which	is	influenced	by	
dopaminergic	function.	This	chapter	summarizes	theories	and	research	linking	
reward	processing	and	motivated	behaviour.	I	review	literature	to	evaluate	the	
links	between	dopamine,	reward	processing,	and	motivational	salience.	I	first	
provide	an	overview	of	dopamine's	role	in	signalling	reward	and	salience	of	
appetitive	and	aversive	cues.		I	then	briefly	explore	the	current	understanding	
and	definition	of	motivational	salience	and	the	influence	of	reinforcer	
sensitivity	on	motivated	behaviour.	Next,	I	examine	the	role	of	dopamine	in	
motivational	salience,	using	neurological	and	cognitive	behavioural	evidence	
from	unaffected	individuals.		I	conclude	with	a	review	of	the	evidence	for	
disrupted	reward	processing	and	motivational	salience	in	schizophrenia.		
3.1 Dopamine and Reward Processing 
Evidence	that	dopamine	depletion	in	rats	reduced	instrumental	behaviour	for	
obtaining	food	led	to	the	idea	that	dopamine	and	reward	processing	are	linked	
(Wise,	2004).		Reward	processing	involves	the	perception	and	assessment	of	
stimuli,	events,	or	behaviour	that	have	a	beneficial,	or	rewarding,	outcome.	
Theories	of	reward	processing	have	developed	from	animal	and	human	studies	
where	the	availability	of	dopamine	is	altered,	either	pharmacologically	or	
through	disease.	The	prominent	theory	was	that	dopamine	cell	firing	signalled	
rewarding	stimuli	and,	by	strengthening	the	connection	between	a	stimulus	and	
response	outcome,	dopamine	release	produced	reinforcement	learning.	
However,	reinforcement	learning	is	also	linked	to	motivational	salience,	i.e.,	the	
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cognitive	process	involved	in	directing	attention	and	behaviour	towards	
(approach)	or	away	from	(withdrawal)	stimuli.		
	 It	should	be	noted	that	dopamine	is	not	the	only	neurotransmitter	
involved	in	reward	processing	–	although	it	appears	to	be	the	final	common	
path.	For	example,	glutamate	activation	in	the	nucleus	accumbens	mediates	
dopaminergic	activation	in	the	ventral	tegmental	area	(Floresco,	Todd,	&	Grace,	
2001).	Gamma-aminobutyric	acid	inhibits	dopaminergic	activation	(Barrot	et	
al.,	2012)	and	modulates	existing	reward-related	behaviours	(Seo	et	al.,	2016).		
However,	a	comprehensive	review	of	all	neurotransmitters	involved	in	reward	
and	motivation	processing	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.		
	 The	following	subsections	present	a	specific	focus	on	dopamine	function	
as	it	impacts	on	motivational	salience.	There	is	a	large	literature	that	also	links	
dopamine	to	addiction	(Bosker,	Neuner,	&	Shah,	2017),	flexible	and	persistent	
processing	that	contributes	to	creative	cognition	(Boot,	Baas,	van	Gaal,	Cools,	&	
De	Dreu,	2017),	depression	(Bonhomme	&	Esposito,	1998),	and	motor	function	
(Mishra,	Singh,	&	Shukla,	2018),	and	the	impact	of	stress	during	adolescence	on	
adult	aggression	(Tielbeek	et	al.,	2018).	But	the	current	project	did	not	include	
pharmacological	or	neural	imaging	methods,	so	an	in-depth	review	of	the	
complex	role	of	dopamine	and	associated	neural	circuitry	in	these	other	brain	
processes	is	beyond	the	scope	of	the	chapter.		There	are	a	number	of	detailed	
reviews	on	the	relationship	of	dopamine	to	reward	processing	structures	and	
connectivity	(Haber,	2017;	Ikemoto,	Yang,	&	Tan,	2015;	Malvaez,	Shieh,	Murphy,	
Greenfield,	&	Wassum,	2019;	Yang	et	al.,	2018)	and	their	effect	on	motivated	
behaviour	(Gentry,	Schuweiler,	&	Roesch,	2019)	and	cognitive	function	
(Malvaez	et	al.,	2019;	Martinez-Rubio,	Paulk,	McDonald,	Widge,	&	Eskandar,	
2018;	Miendlarzewska,	Bavelier,	&	Schwartz,	2016).	
	
3.1.1 Tonic versus phasic firing  
Rapid	(phasic)	and	slow	(tonic)	firing	of	dopamine	neurons	have	different	
functions.	Phasic	dopamine	firing	is	associated	with	processing	of	rewarding	
stimuli	(Bromberg-Martin,	Matsumoto,	&	Hikosaka,	2011;	Zhang,	Doyon,	Clark,	
Phillips,	&	Dani,	2009;	Zweifel	et	al.,	2009),	facilitating	associative	learning	
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(Zweifel	et	al.,	2009)	and	motivated	behaviour	(Phillips,	Stuber,	Helen,	
Wightman,	&	Carelli,	2003;	Wassum,	Ostlund,	&	Maidment,	2012).	Reward	
magnitude	and	probability	also	influence	phasic	firing	(Phillips,	Walton,	&	Jhou,	
2007).	Although	phasic	firing	has	predominantly	been	related	to	rewarding	
stimuli,	it	also	occurs	in	response	to	aversive	and	novel	stimuli	(Bromberg-
Martin	et	al.,	2011;	Matsumoto	&	Hikosaka,	2009;	Schultz,	2010).		
	 Tonic	firing	is	independent	of	phasic	firing	(Parkinson	et	al.,	2002)	and	is	
thought	to	provide	the	necessary	dopamine	levels	to	support	learned	
(Parkinson	et	al.,	2002)	and	non-reward	related	behaviour	(Zweifel	et	al.,	
2009).	Increased	tonic	firing	reduces	reward-related	behaviours	(Bass	et	al.,	
2013;	Mikhailova	et	al.,	2016),	suggesting	tonic	firing	may	function	to	moderate	
the	intensity	of	phasic	firing	(Hage	&	Khaliq,	2015;	Parkinson	et	al.,	2002;	L.	
Zhang	et	al.,	2009).	Therefore,	whereas	phasic	firing	is	associated	with	learning	
stimulus-outcome	associations,	tonic	firing	is	associated	with	maintaining	
homeostasis.	
3.1.2 Dopaminergic pathways  
Reward-associated	stimuli	activate	two	key	dopaminergic	reward	pathways:	
the	mesolimbic	and	mesocortical	systems.	These	dopamine	pathways	arise	in	
the	ventral	tegmental	area	and	act	on	D1-like	and	D2-like	receptors.	The	roles	
and	functions	of	D1	and	D2	receptors,	which	include	motor,	cognitive,	and	
automatic	processes,	depend	critically	on	which	type	of	neurons	they	are	
expressed	on	(Ikemoto	et	al.,	2015;	Jiang	et	al.,	2014;	Keeler,	Pretsell,	&	
Robbins,	2014;	Kellendonk	et	al.,	2006;	Locke	et	al.,	2018;	Stopper	&	Floresco,	
2015;	Wei	et	al.,	2018).	For	example,	D1	receptor	inhibition	in	the	lateral	
cerebellar	nucleus	impaired	spatial	navigation	memory,	response	inhibition,	
and	working	memory	in	rodents	(Locke	et	al.,	2018).	D1	receptors	in	the	medial	
prefrontal	cortex	and	nucleus	accumbens	are	involved	in	risk	taking	and	
decision	making	whereas	D2	receptors	in	the	PFC	are	involved	in	exploration	of	
options	in	line	with	changing	probabilities	(Stopper	&	Floresco,	2015).	The	
mesolimbic	and	mesocortical	systems	project	to	different	neural	regions,	and	so	
have	different	functions.	
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	 The	mesolimbic	system	comprises	dopaminergic	projections	from	the	
ventral	tegmental	area	to	key	reward-related	regions.	Such	regions	include	the	
nucleus	accumbens	(Horvitz,	2000;	Wise,	2004),	which	forms	part	of	the	ventral	
striatum	(VS).	The	nucleus	accumbens	is	associated	with,	fear	(S.	S.	Y.	Li	&	
McNally,	2015;	Lopes	et	al.,	2012),	aversion	(Al-Hasani	et	al.,	2015;	Bergamini	et	
al.,	2016),	sleep	(Oishi	et	al.,	2017;	Valencia	Garcia	&	Fort,	2018),	pain	(Sardi,	
Tobaldini,	Morais,	&	Fischer,	2018;	Seminowicz	et	al.,	2019),	impulsivity	
(Caprioli	et	al.,	2014;	Donnelly	et	al.,	2014;	Wu	et	al.,	2018)	and	reward.	It	is	this	
last	that	is	the	focus	of	this	chapter.	For	example,	activation	in	the	nucleus	
accumbens	is	associated	with	salience	(Zaehle	et	al.,	2013),	reward-predicting	
cues	(Weiland	et	al.,	2014;	Zweynert	et	al.,	2011),	and	reward-related	behaviour	
(Mikhailova	et	al.,	2016;	Parkinson	et	al.,	2002;	Stuber	et	al.,	2011).	The	
orbitofrontal	cortex	(OFC)	and	mPFC	moderate	the	reward	seeking	drives	
resulting	from	nucleus	accumbens	activation	(Stopper	&	Floresco,	2015).	
	 Dopamine	depletion	in	the	nucleus	accumbens	impairs	acquisition	of	
reward-stimulus	associations	and	task	performance	based	on	previously	
learned	pairing	(Dalley	et	al.,	2002;	Parkinson	et	al.,	2002).	However,	the	
nucleus	accumbens	is	also	associated	with	motivated	behaviour	(Balconi	&	
Crivelli,	2010;	McNaughton	&	Corr,	2004;	Pascucci,	Hickey,	Jovanovic,	&	Turatto,	
2017;	Salamone	et	al.,	1997)	and	motivational	salience	(Berridge,	2012).		
Therefore,	rather	than	being	a	reward	or	pleasure	centre,	the	nucleus	
accumbens	is	thought	to	be	involved	in	cost	and	effort	computations	(Salamone	
&	Correa,	2002).		
	 The	amygdala	also	interacts	with	the	mesolimbic	pathway,	facilitating	the	
evaluation	of	decisions	(Chudasama	et	al.,	2013;	Rogers	et	al.,	2004;	Yu,	R,	Zhou,	
&	Zhou,	2011)	and	processing	of	emotions	and	motivationally	relevant	stimuli	
(Cunningham	&	Brosch,	2012).	The	amygdala	is	involved	in	the	control	of	
virtually	all	responses	that	involve	increased	arousal,	such	as	fear	(Duvarci,	
Popa,	&	Paré,	2011;	J.	H.	Lee,	Lee,	&	Kim,	2017;	H.	Li	et	al.,	2013;	Penzo	et	al.,	
2015),	anxiety	(Babaev,	Piletti	Chatain,	&	Krueger-Burg,	2018;	Gray	&	
McNaughton,	2000;	Sah,	2017),	and	stress	(Lakshminarasimhan	&	Chattarji,	
2012;	Motoike	et	al.,	2016),	and	memory	(Beyeler	et	al.,	2016;	Inman	et	al.,	
2018).	Cunningham	et	al.	(2012)	argue	that	the	amygdala	guides	processing	and	
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responding	after	a	stimulus	is	deemed	relevant,	ascertaining	the	relevance	of	
stimuli	in	relation	to	the	organism’s	motivational	state.		 	
	 The	mesocortical	pathway	comprises	dopaminergic	projections	to	
prefrontal	cortical	regions	responsible	for	executive	functioning,	including	the	
medial	prefrontal	cortex	and	anterior	cingulate	cortex	(Kim,	2013).	The	
prefrontal	cortex	is	primarily	associated	with	higher	cognitive	functions	such	as	
planning	(Kaller,	Rahm,	Spreer,	Weiller,	&	Unterrainer,	2011),	attention	
(Katsuki	&	Constantinidis,	2012),	and	working	memory	(Katsuki	&	
Constantinidis,	2012;	Markowitz,	Curtis,	&	Pesaran,	2015),	social,	emotional	and	
executive	function	(Schultz,	2017b),	and	decision-making	(Domenech	et	al	,	
2015).	Of	note,	in	the	context	of	the	aberrant	salience	hypothesis,	the	prefrontal	
cortex	is	associated	with	motivated	behaviour.	The	medial	prefrontal	cortex	is	
involved	in	goal-directed	behaviour	Laskowski	et	al.,	2016;	Pinto	&	Dan,	2015),	
signalling	unexpected	omission	of	an	outcome	(Alexander	&	Brown,	2011).		The	
anterior	cingulate	cortex	is	also	involved	in	goal-directed	behaviour	(Laskowski	
et	al.,	2016),		as	well	as	learning,	evaluation,	and	prediction	of	outcomes	
(Alexander	&	Brown,	2011;	Jahn	et	al.,	2014).		
	 The	mesolimbic	and	mesocortical	systems	interact.	Reduced	D2/D3	
receptor	availability	in	the	nucleus	accumbens,	indicating	increased	dopamine	
neurotransmission,		is	associated	with	increased	activation	in	the	medial	
prefrontal	cortex	during	reward	anticipation	(Weiland	et	al.,	2014).	However,	
whereas	the	mesolimbic	system	appears	to	support	the	initial	evaluation	of	
stimuli,	the	mesocortical	system	supports	the	higher	cognitive	functioning	
required	for	goal-directed	behaviour.			
3.1.3 Dopamine does not only signal reward 
Dopamine	neurons	fire	in	response	to	aversive	stimuli.	Aversive	stimuli	inhibit	
dopamine	neurons	in	the	dorsal	ventral	tegmental	area	and	excite	those	in	the	
ventral	region	of	the	ventral	tegmental	area	(Brischoux,	Chakraborty,	Brierley,	
&	Ungless,	2009).	Excitatory	responses	to	aversive	stimuli	activate	regions	
involved	in	orienting	behaviour	and	motivational	salience	(Matsumoto	&	
Hikosaka,	2009).	Inhibitory	responses	to	aversive	stimuli	suppress	the	usual	
reward-associated	activation	to	regions	implicated	in	value	computations	
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(Matsumoto	&	Hikosaka,	2009).	Aversive	stimuli	elicit	an	activation-
suppression-activation	response	(Fiorillo,	Song,	&	Yun,	2013).	The	sequence	is	
thought	to	reflect:	an	initial	sensory	intensity	(or	salience);	motivational	value	
(decreased	for	aversive	where	activation	is	increased	for	appetitive);	then	a	
second	rebound	activation,	that	mirrors	the	suppression	seen	at	the	same	time	
following	a	reward	(Fiorillo	et	al.,	2013).	Dopamine	neurons,	therefore,	function	
to	direct	attention	to	an	aversive	stimulus	while	suppressing	reward	associated	
value.	 	 	
	 Dopamine	neurons	fire	to	signal	salience.	Novelty	(Horvitz,	2000;	
Schultz,	2010;	Wittmann,	Bunzeck,	Dolan,	&	Düzel,	2007)	and	stimulus	intensity	
(Fiorillo	et	al.,	2013;	Salamone	et	al.,	2005)	elicit	an	increased	dopaminergic	
response.		Horvitz	(2000)	argued	that	dopamine	neurons	respond	to	salient	and	
arousing	novel	stimuli	but	are	not	involved	in	reward	value.	Subsequent	
findings	show	that,	as	an	outcome	becomes	more	predictable,	neuronal	
responses	to	appetitive	and	aversive	stimuli	attenuate	in	a	similar	manner	
(Matsumoto	&	Hikosaka,	2009).	The	attenuated	neural	response	indicates	
reduced	salience.	However,	repeated	presentation	of	a	reward	was	not	found	to	
reduce	reward	consumption	(Berridge,	1996;	Berridge	&	Robinson,	1998).	The	
disparity	between	attenuated	neuronal	activation	and	sustained	behaviour	
somewhat	supports	Horvitz's	argument.	However,	it	may	also	be	that	continued	
consumption	of	a	reward,	or	successful	avoidance	of	an	aversive	stimulus,	also	
reduces	its	value.	
	 Stimulus	value	influences	the	activation	of	dopamine	neurons;	with	
appetitive	and	aversive	stimuli	represented	on	a	continuum	that	is	differentially	
weighted	at	the	neuronal	level.	The	attenuation	in	dopaminergic	response	due	
to	repetition	is	such	that	there	is	less	activation	for	appetitive	and	less	
inhibition	for	aversive	stimuli	(Matsumoto	&	Hikosaka,	2009).	In	contrast,	
Fiorillo	(2013)	found	that	dopamine	neuron	activation	in	the	midbrain	of	
monkeys	was	no	different	for	predicted	versus	unpredicted	aversive	stimuli.	
Furthermore,	dopamine	neurons	did	not	activate	in	response	to	the	omission	of	
an	aversive	outcome,	which	should	be	signalled	as	a	more	positive	outcome.	
Fiorillo	(2013)	argued	these	findings	suggest	appetitive	and	aversive	stimuli	are	
represented	as	two	different	dimensions.	In	response,	Matsumoto,	Tian,	Uchida	
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and	Watabe-Uchida	(2016)	specifically	investigated	the	way	in	which	dopamine	
neurons	in	mice	responded	to	appetitive	and	aversive	stimulus	value.	Most	
dopamine	neurons	were	inhibited	by	aversive	cues	and	excited	by	appetitive	
cues.	Furthermore,	in	addition	to	a	prediction-related	reduction	in	dopamine	
neuron	firing	to	appetitive	cues,	aversive	cues	elicited	a	prediction-related	
increase	in	dopamine	neuron	firing.	However,	some	neurons	did	show	
variability.	The	degree	to	which	these	neurons	were	affected	by	repetition	for	
appetitive	stimuli	(reduced	excitation)	and	aversive	stimuli	(reduced	inhibition)	
was	directly	related	to	the	degree	of	activation	or	inhibition	of	a	neuron	to	
unexpected	appetitive	and	aversive	stimuli	respectively.		The	findings	support	
and	extend	the	continuum	theory,	highlighting	an	additional	mechanism	by	
which	value	is	weighted.		
3.1.4 Summary 
Animal	studies	indicate	dopaminergic	pathways	support	the	processing	of	
stimuli	to	inform	goal-directed	behaviour	(e.g.,	Bromberg-Martin	et	al.,	2011;	
Laskowski	et	al.,	2016;	Zweifel	et	al.,	2009).	Excitatory	dopaminergic	responses	
to	appetitive	stimuli	mediate	attention	and	value	processing.	In	response	to	
aversive	stimuli,	excitation	supports	attentional	processing,	whereas	inhibition	
suppresses	reward-related	value	processing	(Matsumoto	&	Hikosaka,	2009).	As	
such,	the	negative	value	of	aversive	stimuli	is	supported	by	the	inhibition	of	
dopamine	neurons.	Dopamine	is,	therefore,	integral	to	the	salience	and	value	of	
appetitive	and	aversive	stimuli.			
3.2 Motivational Salience 
3.2.1 What is motivational salience? 
Motivation	has	been	defined	a	number	of	ways:	as	activation	of	an	instinctive	
drive;	as	incentive	salience	resulting	from	conditioned	associations	between	a	
stimulus	and	outcome;	and	as	a	conscious	process	(Anselme	&	James,	2015).	
Berridge	(1996)	challenged	these	views,	arguing	there	is	a	difference	between	
wanting	(anticipatory	pleasure)	and	liking	(consummatory	pleasure)	that	is	
independent	of	subjective	experience.	Whereas	dopamine	influences	wanting,	it	
is	not	required	for	liking	(Berridge	&	Robinson,	1998).	Wanting	is	also	evident	
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in	addiction,	with	prolonged	drug	use	creating	increased	sensitisation	to	
wanting,	but	not	liking	(Robinson	&	Berridge,	2000).	According	to	Berridge	
(2013),	motivation	is	a	component	of	incentive	salience	that	fluctuates	based	on	
state	factors,	such	as	hunger	and	stress.	The	other	component	of	incentive	
salience	is	the	knowledge	acquired	from	previously	learned	associations.	
However,	given	that	incentive	is	often	associated	with	reward,	motivational	
salience	is	a	more	accurate	term	for	the	construct	thought	to	mediate	aberrant	
salience.		
	 The	motivational	salience	of	a	stimulus	is	relative	to	the	context-specific	
information	it	provides.		Le	Pelley,	Beesley,	and	Griffiths	(2014)	investigated	
whether	there	was	a	comparative	influence	of	semantic	and	perceptual	salience	
on	cue	competition.	Le	Pelley	et	al.	(2014)	used	blocking,	where	conditioning	of	
one	element	(B)	of	a	stimulus	(AB)	is	reduced	when	another	element	of	the	
same	stimulus	(A)	has	already	been	conditioned.	Competing	cues	(A)	were	
looked	at	more	frequently	than	target	cues	(B).	However,	unusual	high-salience	
target	cues	(e.g.,	caterpillars	as	food)	were	blocked	more	than	relevant	low-
salience	target	cues	(e.g.,	rice).		Motivational	salience	is,	therefore,	the	level	of	
desire	generated	by	the	context-relevance	of	a	stimulus	to	engage	in	approach	
or	avoidance	behaviour.	
3.2.2 Neurobiology of motivational salience 
Motivational	salience	depends	on	dopaminergic	activation.	Berridge	and	
Robinson	(1998)	suggested	that	the	dopamine	system	is	important	for	
motivational	salience	but	not	for	hedonic	pleasure.	Rats	with	surgically	
depleted	dopamine	exhibited	as	many	hedonic	and	aversive	reactions	to	
appetitive	and	aversive	stimuli	as	healthy	control	rats.	The	authors	also	
suggested	dopamine	is	not	necessary	to	mediate	reward	predictions.	
Specifically,	studies	investigating	reinforcement	learning	often	use	prior	
deprivation	(Berridge,	2012)	–	for	example,	asking	participants	to	fast	before	a	
task	involving	food	as	a	reward.	Increased	dopaminergic	activation	may,	
therefore,	reflect	an	increased	value	of	the	food	reward	due	to	hunger,	or	
increased	motivational	salience	(Berridge,	2012).	This	is	supported	by	evidence	
that	dopamine	depletion	can	reduce	motivated	behaviour,	even	following	
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deprivation.	Hebart	and	Gläscher	(2015)	temporarily	depleted	dopamine	in	
healthy	participants	who	had	fasted.		They	found	that	dopamine	depletion	
reduced	the	motivated	behaviour	for	food-related	rewards.		
	 Bromberg-Martin	et	al.	(2011)	argued	that	different	dopamine	neurons	
are	related	to	distinct	neural	networks	and	so	distinct	roles	in	motivation.	One	
type	of	dopamine	neuron	is	inhibited	by	aversive	stimuli	and	is	excited	by	
appetitive	stimuli;	and	sends	the	resultant	signals	to	neural	regions	involved	in	
seeking,	evaluation,	and	value	learning.	Thus,	this	type	of	dopamine	neuron	
signals	motivational	value.	The	other	type	is	excited	by	both	aversive	and	
appetitive	stimuli	and	projects	to	neural	regions	involved	in	orienting,	
cognition,	and	motivation.	This	second	type	of	dopamine	neuron	therefore	
signals	motivational	salience.	Both	neuron	types	form	parts	of	both	the	
mesolimbic	and	the	mesocortical	systems	associated	with	reward	processing.		
	 As	with	reward,	motivational	salience	is	mediated	by	neurotransmitters	
that	affect	dopamine.		Rodent	studies	suggest	that	presentation	of	aversive	or	
appetitive	stimuli	produces	an	increase	in	norepinephrine	in	the	medial	
prefrontal	cortex,	which	is	required	to	stimulate	dopamine	flow	in	the	nucleus	
accumbens.	Following	presentation	of	rewarding	stimuli,	mice	with	
norepinephrine	depletion	in	the	medial	prefrontal	cortex	had	reduced	
dopamine	in	the	nucleus	accumbens	and	reduced	norepinephrine	in	the	
prefrontal	cortex	(PFC)	compared	to	sham	mice	(Ventura	et	al.,	2007).	
Furthermore,	the	norepinephrine	depleted	mice	showed	no	behavioural	
preference	for	rewarding	stimuli	nor	aversion	to	aversive	stimuli.	Another	
rodent	study	found	a	positive	relationship	between	norepinephrine	release	in	
the	medial	prefrontal	cortex	and	reward	value	(Puglisi-Allegra	&	Ventura,	
2012).		
3.2.3 The Reinforcer Sensitivity Explanation of Motivated Behaviour 
According	to	the	reinforcement	sensitivity	theory	(RST;	Gray,	1970,	1981;	Gray	
&	McNaughton,	2000),	motivated	behaviour	(approach	or	withdrawal)	is	
affected	by	approach	sensitivity	(which	can	be	produced	by	gain	or	omission	of	
loss)	and	withdrawal	sensitivity	(loss	and	omission	of	gain).	Approach	
sensitivity	leads	to	positive	goal	seeking	behaviour,	whereas	withdrawal	
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sensitivity	leads	to	negative	goal	withdrawal	and	can	be	viewed	as	a	higher	
susceptibility	to	fear	(Gray,	1970).	In	this	context,	reinforcers	are	best	labelled	
appetitive	and	aversive,	rather	than	rewarding	or	punishing,	to	ensure	inclusion	
of	reward	and	the	absence	of	punishment	(appetitive)	or	punishment	and	the	
absence	of	reward	(aversive;	Corr,	2001).	At	the	core	of	RST	are	three	
motivational	systems:	the	behavioural	activation	system	(BAS),	the	fight-flight-
freeze	system	(FFFS),	and	the	behavioural	inhibition	system	(BIS).		The	nature	
of	these	systems	can	be	summarised	as	follows:	
• BAS	produces	approach	behaviour,	facilitating	responses	to	appetitive	
stimuli,	including	omission	of	punishers.	
• FFFS	is	associated	with	fear	and	produces	active	avoidance	behaviour,	such	
as	removing	oneself	from	a	perceived	threat	or	avoiding	omission	of	
rewards.		
• BIS	is	associated	with	anxiety,	is	sensitive	to	stimuli,	and	mediates	
behaviour	in	instances	of	approach-avoidance	conflict,	where	both	positive	
and	negative	reinforcers	exist.	
Therefore,	whereas	BAS	is	activated	by	gain	and	produces	approach	behaviour	
and	FFFS	is	activated	by	loss	and	produces	avoidant	behaviour,	BIS	is	activated	
by	conflict	between	competing	levels	of	FFFS	and	BAS	systems	and	perceived	
threat.	BIS	activation	inhibits	the	avoidant	behaviour	initiated	by	FFFS	and	the	
approach	behaviour	initiated	by	BAS.		BIS	activation	also	initiates	cognitive	
functions,	such	as	risk	assessment	and	memory	scanning,	in	order	to	evaluate	
conflict	and	determine	appropriate	behaviour.	
	 A	number	of	factors	affect	the	subsequent	functional	behaviour	
(approach	or	avoidance)	during	conflict.	The	size	of	the	reward	in	relation	to	
the	threat	and		reinforcer	sensitivity	(trait	sensitivity	to	gain	and	loss)	interact	
to	determine	the	decision	to	approach	or	avoid	(McNaughton,	Deyoung,	&	Corr,	
2016).	However,	behaviour	during	conflict	is	also	determined	by	the	perceived	
threat	proximity	or	intensity	(defensive	distance;	McNaughton	&	Corr,	2004;	
McNaughton	et	al.,	2016).	Whereas	a	small	defensive	distance	results	in	freeze	
behaviour	and	an	intermediate	defensive	distance	in	withdrawal,	a	large	
defensive	distance	may	result	in	approach	behaviour.		
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is	affected	by	motivational	distance	and	also	by	the	behavioural	options	
available	(McNaughton	&	Corr,	2004).	A	close	and	substantive	threat	will	result	
in	panic,	producing	undirected	escape	when	this	is	possible	and	attack	when	it	
is	not.	Less	proximal	threat	will	result	in	fear	and	avoidance;	or	if	threat	is	
chronic	and	avoidance	impossible,	it	will	result	in	depression.	Arguably,	all	
these	(including	depression)	are	adaptive	responses	to	danger.	When	both	
approach	and	avoidance	are	activated,	and	in	conflict,	the	BIS	is	activated.	This	
increases	attention	and	arousal,	while	decreasing	defensive	distance	(i.e.	
increasing	perceived	threat).	Recently	it	has	been	suggested	that	BIS	activation	
also	reduces	the	impact	of	appetitive	stimuli	(McNaughton	&	Corr,	2014);	that	
is,	both	the	FFFS	and	BAS	are	subject	to	negative	bias,	which	increases	activity	
in	the	one	and	decreases	activity	in	the	other.	So,	differences	in	sensitivity	of	all	
three	systems	will	affect	the	processing	of	conflicts	with	the	FFFS	(directly)	and	
the	BIS	(indirectly)	affecting	the	defensive	distance	and	the	BAS	affecting	
appetitive	distance	(McNaughton	&	Corr,	2004).	Thus,	abnormally	high	FFFS	or	
BIS	sensitivity	coupled	with	a	distal	threat,	or	even	an	imagined	one,	can	result	
in	a	maladaptive	psychological	response.	As	such,	psychopathology	is	the	
expression	of	abnormally	high	or	abnormally	low	reinforcer	sensitivity.		
	 RST	explains	motivated	behaviour	as	the	interaction	between	approach	
(BAS),	withdrawal	(FFFS),	and	conflict	(BIS).	When	not	in	close	balance	BAS	and	
FFFS	interact	to	inform	motivated	behaviour.	FFFS	activation	increases	
avoidant	behaviour	and	decreases	concurrent	approach	behaviour.	BAS	
activation	increases	approach	behaviour	and	decreases	concurrent	avoidance	
behaviour.	During	approach-avoidance	conflict	(equal	activation	of	BAS	and	
FFFS),	BIS	blocks	output	from	both	FFFS	and	BAS	and	increases	attention	and	
arousal.		Critically,	BIS	activation	also	means	that	aversive	stimuli	are	perceived	
as	more	aversive	and	appetitive	stimuli	are	less	appetitive.		
3.2.4 The BIS/BAS Scale 
The	Carver	and	White	(1994)	BIS/BAS	scale	is	a	20-item	questionnaire	that	
uses	a	4-point	Likert-scale,	with	7	items	providing	a	unidimensional	measure	of	
BIS	(CWBIS).	The	remaining	items	provide	measures	of	three	BAS	(CWBAS)	
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subscales.	The	items	focus	on	emotional	reactions	to	stimuli.	CWBIS	is	intended	
to	be	a	measure	of	anxiety	in	response	to	aversive	stimuli	whereas	the	CWBAS	
subscales	measure	the	author’s	perceived	manifestation	of	distinct	CWBAS	
sensitivities:	goal	pursuit	(drive);	response	to	reward	(reward	responsiveness);	
and	tendency	to	seek	novel	and	rewarding	experiences	and	act	quickly	to	attain	
goals	(fun-seeking).	Given	issues	with	the	BIS/BAS	Scale,	outlined	in	section	
3.2.5,	the	scale	was	not	used	in	the	current	project.	However,	for	completeness	
and	because	the	scale	has	been	a	predominant	measure	for	reinforcer	
sensitivity	over	the	last	30	years,	I	include	here	a	brief	summary	of	the	BIS/BAS	
scale	findings.	
	 	CWBIS	reflects	sensitivities	in	neural	signalling	of	loss.	Boksem	et	al.	
(2006)	found	higher	CWBIS	scores	predicted	larger	error	related	negativity	
amplitude.	Error	related	negativity	occurs	after	an	erroneous	response.	A	follow	
up	study	revealed	higher	CWBIS	scores	were	related	to	larger	error	related	
negativity	amplitude	following	punishment	but	not	reward	(Boksem,	Tops,	
Kostermans,	&	De	Cremer,	2008).	Lower	CWBIS	scores	predicted	larger	error	
signalling	following	gain	compared	to	loss.		This	is	in	line	with	evidence	that	the	
CWBIS	score	predicts	level	of	attenuated	VS	activation	following	gain	(Simon	et	
al.,	2010).	The	self-report	CWBIS	measure	appears,	therefore,	to	reflect	
increased	signalling	of	loss,	thus	loss	sensitivity.		
	 CWBIS	also	reflects	conflict	monitoring.	Amodio,	Master,	Yee,	and	Taylor	
(2008)	used	a	Go/No-Go	task	to	investigate	the	relationship	between	event-
related	negativity	and	N2	and	CWBIS/CWBAS	scale	scores.	The	N2	is	an	event-
related	potential	located	within	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex	and	is	thought	to	
reflect	conflict	monitoring	and	top-down	inhibition	(Nieuwenhuis,	Yeung,	van	
den	Wildenberg,	&	Ridderinkhof,	2003).	Higher	N2	amplitudes	are	indicated	
during	anticipation	of	a	No-Go	(inhibited)	response	to	infrequent	stimuli	
compared	to	an	anticipated	Go	response	(Nieuwenhuis	et	al.,	2003).	Amodio	et	
al.	(2008)	found	N2	amplitudes	were	larger	for	incorrect	responses,	with	CWBIS	
score	predicting	N2	amplitudes	following	response	inhibition	and	error	related	
negativity	amplitude.	CWBIS	has	subsequently	also	been	associated	with	larger	
feedback-related	negativity	amplitude	during	false	feedback	(Balconi	&	Crivelli,	
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2010;	De	Pascalis,	Varriale,	&	D’Antuono,	2010).	Thus,	CWBIS	reflects	
sensitivities	in	neural	activation	during	conflict	monitoring.		
	 CWBAS	provides	an	overall	score	and,	as	noted	above,	three	subscale	
scores	for	reward	responsiveness,	drive,	and	fun-seeking.	CWBAS	reflects	
sensitivities	in	neural	signalling	of	gain.	Boksem	et	al.	(2006)	found	higher	
CWBAS	was	associated	with	larger	error	positivity	amplitude.	Error	positivity	
signals	salience	and	error	awareness	(Boksem	et	al.,	2008).	Higher	CWBAS	was	
associated	with	larger	ERN	amplitude	following	reward	omission	than	
punishment	(Boksem	et	al.,	2008).	This	increased	sensitivity	to	reward	
omission	over	loss	was	also	indicated	in	CWBAS	subscales.	Namely,	CWBAS-
drive	predicted	increased	error	positivity	and	CWBAS-reward	responsiveness	
predicted	increased	error	related	negativity	amplitude	following	reward	
omission	compared	to	loss	(Boksem	et	al.,	2008).	Overall	CWBAS	score	also	
predicted	increased	VS	and	medial	orbitofrontal	cortex	(mOFC)	activation	
following	gain,	and	less	deactivation	of	the	mOFC	following	gain	omission.	
Activation	in	both	the	VS	(Gradin	et	al.,	2011;	Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2014;	White,	
Kraguljac,	Reid,	&	Lahti,	2015)	and	the	OFC	(Bunzeck,	Doeller,	Dolan,	&	Duzel,	
2012;	Jimmy	Jensen	&	Walter,	2014;	Kahnt,	Park,	Haynes,	&	Tobler,	2014;	S	E	
Morris	&	Salzman,	2011)	are	associated	with	tracking	motivational	salience.	
Combined	the	findings	suggest	CWBAS	predicts	increased	salience	of	reward	
and	reduced	sensitivity	to	negative	outcomes.		
	 CWBAS	also	reflects	neural	signalling	related	to	the	assessment	and	
instigation	of	approach	behaviour.	CWBAS	score	was	positively	correlated	with	
left-sided	frontal	cortical	asymmetry,	indicating	greater	approach	motivation	
(Amodio	et	al.,	2008).	CWBAS	score	also	predicts	P3	latency	(De	Pascalis	et	al.,	
2010)	and	amplitude,	especially	when	presented	with	false	feedback	(Balconi	&	
Crivelli,	2010).	Increased	P3	amplitude	is	thought	to	reflect	proactive	
assessment	and	modification	of	behaviour	to	facilitate	better	outcomes	(Balconi	
&	Crivelli,	2010;	Broyd	et	al.,	2012).	Interestingly,	neural	activity	did	not	always	
manifest	in	motivated	behaviour	(Amodio	et	al.,	2008).		
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3.2.5 Construct validity of the BIS/BAS scales 
The	Carver	and	White	(1994)	scales	are	frequently	used	as	measures	of	BIS	and	
BAS.		However,	the	scales	are	not	anchored	in	the	biology	of,	and	do	not	
accurately	reflect,	RST.	First,	there	is	no	scale	for	FFFS.	Secondly,	the	theoretical	
validity	of	the	CWBAS	items	is	questionable	and	provides	three	subscale	
measures	that	do	not	correspond	with	BAS.	Third,	the	scales	fail	to	provide	
appropriate	measures	for	approach	and	avoidant	behaviours.	RST	is	modelled	
on	rodent	behaviour	(and	particularly	the	effects	of	anxiolytic	drugs	on	such	
behaviour),	whereas	the	BIS/BAS	scale	measures	are	self-report.	Furthermore,	
the	BIS/BAS	scale	was	developed	on	the	basis	of	the	initial	RST	outline	and	has	
not	been	amended	to	reflect	updates	to	the	theory.	For	example,	the	scale	does	
not	account	for	goal	conflict,	nor	the	interactive	effect	of	FFFS	and	BAS	on	BIS.	
Thus,	while	initially	a	reasonable	start	for	a	tool	to	measure	the	emotion	
systems	of	RST,	the	BIS/BAS	scales	should	be	interpreted	with	caution.	
Therefore,	more	robust	measures	of	BIS	and	BAS	are	needed.		
3.2.6 The Stimulus Chase Task 
The	Stimulus	Chase	Task	(Hall	et	al.,	2011)	was	designed	to	offer	a	valid,	simple,	
measure	of	FFFS	and	BAS.		The	SCT	is	a	computerised	task	that	uses	response	
latency	to	calculate	approach	and	avoidance	behaviour	and	the	value	of	gain	
and	loss.	Using	the	SCT,	Hall	et	al.	(2011)	reported	a	stronger	approach	than	
avoidance	tendency	when	averaging	over	the	effects	of	gain	and	loss.	
Conversely,	when	averaging	across	approach	and	avoidance,	they	found	
evidence	of	loss	aversion.	Normative	aversion	to	loss,	such	that	loss	is	valued	
more	than	gain	of	equivalent	magnitude,	has	been	demonstrated	by	studies	
within	the	field	of	neuroeconomics	(Lee,	2013).	The	findings	denote	a	complex	
set	of	cognitive	processes	underlying	behavioural	output	in	humans	that	could	
not	be	measured	by	questionnaires	or	even	standard	go-no	go	tasks.		
	 Whereas	a	description	of	the	SCT	is	provided	later	(see	section	5.3.2),	it	
is	worth	highlighting	here	that	analysis	of	SCT	data	is	only	undertaken	for	
individuals	whose	pattern	of	behaviour	adhered	to	the	matching	law.	The	
matching	law	is	the	interaction	between	rates	of	behavioural	response	and	
reinforcement	within	a	reinforcement	schedule	(C.	W.	Chong,	2013).	Of	note,	
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individuals	whose	behaviour	is	chaotic	would	be	excluded	from	analysis	
(section	5.3.2).	The	implications	of	such	loss	of	such	data	needs	to	be	
considered,	especially	in	schizophrenia,	where	impairments	in	reward	
processing	and	motivational	salience	may	result	in	chaotic	behaviour	(see	
sections	3.4,	7.1.3,	and	7.4).	
	
3.2.7 Summary 
Motivational	salience	incorporates	innate	responses,	desire,	and	previous	
experience	(Berridge,	2013;	Le	Pelley	et	al.,	2014).	Motivational	salience	is	
mediated	by	dopaminergic	firing	in	regions	associated	with	reward	processing	
and	is	affected	by	neurobiological	factors,	such	as	stress	and	deprivation	
(Berridge	&	Robinson,	1998;	Bromberg-Martin	et	al.,	2011;	Hebart	&	Gläscher,	
2015).		Motivational	salience	can	be	measured	by	changes	in	neural	activation	
and	motivated	behaviour.	According	to	the	RST,	conflicting	desires	to	approach	
and	withdraw	result	in	increased	arousal	and	attention	concomitant	with	
inhibition	of	both	behavioural	tendencies	(McNaughton	&	Corr,	2004,	2014).	
The	subsequent	decision	to	approach	or	avoid	is	determined	by	defensive	
distance	(McNaughton	&	Corr,	2004;	McNaughton	et	al.,	2016).	Motivational	
salience,	therefore,	is	the	level	of	desire	to	engage	in	motivated	behaviour,	to	
obtain	or	avoid	a	stimulus	or	event	outcome	that	is	affected	by	state	factors	and	
reinforcer	sensitivity.	
3.3 Reward processing and motivational salience  
Activation	in	dopaminergic	pathways	occurs	in	response	to	stimuli	that	grab	
attention	due	to	external	stimulus	properties,	internal	states,	and	previous	
experience.	However,	whether	the	mesolimbic	and	mesocortical	pathways	
support	reward	value	or	motivational	salience	remains	a	matter	of	debate.	In	
this	section,	I	will	briefly	outline	two	separate	functions	of	dopaminergic	firing:	
reward	value	processing	and	motivational	salience.	I	will	review	evidence	from	
imaging	and	behavioural	studies	in	healthy	participants	and	from	single	neuron	
and	behavioural	studies	in	animals.	I	will	then	review	evidence	from	
disruptions	to	dopamine	via	pharmacological	manipulation,	disease,	and	
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lesions.		I	will	use	the	evidence	to	argue	that	dopamine	can	act	as	a	signal	both	
of	reward	value	and	of	motivational	salience.		
3.3.1 Argument 1: Dopamine is a reward signal   
One	argument	is	that	dopamine	signals	reward	and	risk,	not	motivational	
salience.	Schultz	(2015)	argued	that	reward	is	composed	of	external	(i.e.	
physical	sensory)	components,	salience,	and	reward	value.	Reward	value	is	a	
subjective	component	that	leads	to	motivational	salience	and	can	then	be	
estimated	by	a	behavioural	response.	Reward	is	generally	operationalised	as	a	
standard	measure	of	magnitude	across	participants.	For	example,	money	is	
often	used	due	to	the	common	understanding	of	incremental	changes	in	
monetary	value.	According	to	Schultz	(2015),	the	behavioural	response	
(approach)	functions	as	a	measure	of	reward	value.	Specifically,	midbrain	
dopamine	neurons	encode	the	difference	between	the	current	reward	and	
previous	experience	of	that	reward	outcome,	even	in	the	absence	of	associated	
reward	seeking	behaviour	(Bayer	&	Glimcher,	2005).	Additionally,	reward-
related	VS	activation	appears	relative	to	other	available	rewards	(Cromwell,	
Hassani,	&	Schultz,	2005)	and	anticipated	reward	magnitude	(Roiser	et	al.,	
2010).	Schultz	(2017a)	argued	that	reward	value	is	analogous	to	economic	
utility,	or	the	usefulness	of	a	stimulus,	with	reward-prediction	errors	serving	as	
a	measure	of	utility.	Thus,	dopaminergic	activation	facilitates	reinforcement	
learning	based	on	utility,	which	in	turn	informs	reward	value.	
	 The	mesolimbic	system	also	supports	reinforcement	learning.		Increased	
midbrain	activation	is	associated	with	higher	reward	probability	during	
reward-predicting	cue	presentation	(Dreher,	Kohn,	&	Berman,	2006)	and	lower	
reward	probability	at	outcome	(unexpected	reward;	Dreher	et	al.,	2006;	Fiorillo,	
Tobler,	&	Schultz,	2003).	Uncertain	rewards	elicit	sustained	VS	activation	
during	the	delay	between	reward-cue	and	outcome	(Dreher	et	al.,	2006;	Fiorillo	
et	al.,	2003).	The	level	of	VS	activation	is	positively	associated	with	the	degree	of	
uncertainty	rather	than	expected	reward	value	(Dreher	et	al.,	2006).	Such	
sustained	dopaminergic	activation	may	facilitate	reinforcement	learning.	
Compared	to	neutral	cues,	reward	cues	elicit	higher	repetition-related	
functional	connectivity	in	the	right	anterior	hippocampus,		posterior	
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parahippocampal	cortex,	and	mOFC	(Zweynert	et	al.,	2011).	These	findings	
suggest	dopamine	mediates	reinforcement	learning,	signalling	expected	reward	
value	and	better	reward	outcome,	supporting	the	idea	that	dopamine	primarily	
signals	reward.		
	 Schultz	(2013)	defined	motivational	salience	as	the	capacity	for	stimuli	
to	elicit	attention	that	amplifies	neuronal	responses	and	is	evidenced	in	
motivated	behaviour.	He	proposed	three	forms	of	salience:	physical,	novel,	and	
motivational.		Physical	salience	refers	to	the	physical	intensity,	such	as	a	bright	
colour	or	large	object.	Novel	salience	refers	to	novel	or	surprising	stimuli	that	
elicit	attention.	Although	influenced	by	learning	and	memory,	both	physical	and	
novel	salience	are	stimulus	driven	(Schultz,	2015).		Schultz	(2013)	suggested	
that	only	the	motivational	aspect	of	motivational	salience	applies	to	reward	and	
wanting.	However,	he	argued	that	motivational	salience	itself	has	a	limited	
effect	on	reward-based	dopaminergic	systems.	He	based	this	on	evidence	that	
more	dopamine	neurons	fire	to	reward	prediction	errors	(RPE)	than	to	salience	
of	appetitive	and	aversive	events.	
	 However,	reinforcement	learning,	and	associated	increases	in	
dopaminergic	activation,	are	also	shown	in	response	to	aversive	stimuli	(e.g.	
Jensen	et	al.,	2007;	Matsumoto	&	Hikosaka,	2009).	Schultz	(2015)	argued	that	
dopaminergic	responses	to	aversive	or	neutral	stimuli	are	due	to	physical	
intensity,	novelty,	or	presentation	within	a	rewarding	context.	However,	such	
dopaminergic	activation	pertains	to	the	potential	reward	association,	not	
salience	itself	(Schultz,	2017a).		
3.3.2 Argument 2: Dopamine signals salience and reward 
A	second	argument	is	that	the	mesolimbic	dopamine	system	is	a	motivational	
system	that	signals	salience	not	reward	value	(Horvitz,	2000;	Jimmy	Jensen	&	
Walter,	2014).	Esslinger	et	al.	(2013)	found	a	comparable	increase	in	VS	
activation	to	rewarded	and	unrewarded	stimuli	during	decision-making.	
Furthermore,	regardless	of	whether	reward	cues	were	being	attended	to,	
increased	reward-cue	activation	in	the	VS	and	ventral	tegmental	area	has	been	
shown	(Rothkirch,	Schmack,	Deserno,	Darmohray,	&	Sterzer,	2014).	Conversely,	
repeated	rewards	resulted	in	attenuated	activation	in	the	hippocampus,	
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amygdala	(Zweynert	et	al.,	2011),	and	ventral	tegmental	area	(Matsumoto	&	
Hikosaka,	2009)	without	affecting	motivated	behaviour	(Berridge,	1996;	
Berridge	&	Robinson,	1998).		The	continuation	of	motivated	behaviour	suggests	
that	the	reward	still	had	consummatory	value	(i.e.,	it	was	still	rewarding);	but	
that	reward	certainty	reduced	the	salience	of	the	stimulus.	These	findings	
support	the	role	of	the	dopaminergic	system	in	signalling	salience,	which	is	
affected	by	the	context-specific	value	of	a	stimulus.	In	contrast	to	Schultz’s	
(2013)	argument	that	salience	is	predominantly	stimulus	driven,	these	findings	
suggest	that	salience	is	not	just	the	ability	of	a	stimulus	to	grab	attention.	
	 The	arguments	about	the	function	of	the	dopaminergic	system	may	
appear	academic;	but	the	distinction	being	made	here	is	important	in	the	
context	of	aberrant	salience.	If,	as	argued	by	Schultz	(2015),	dopamine	neurons	
primarily	function	to	signal	reward	value,	how	does	this	fit	with	the	aberrant	
salience	hypothesis?	For	example,	dopaminergic	hyperactivation	in	
schizophrenia	would	more	likely	result	in	a	stimulus	that	should	be	neutral	
being	signalled	as	rewarding	rather	than,	given	its	limited	effect,	motivationally	
salient.	However,	a	neutral	stimulus	is	not	rewarding,	therefore	has	no	reward	
value.	Additionally,	the	lack	of	reward	would	not	support	associative	or	
reinforcement	learning.		Dopaminergic	hyperactivation	could	not,	therefore,	
cause	a	neutral	stimulus	to	become	important	based	on	value.	Conversely,	the	
argument	that	dopaminergic	activation	signals	salience	(Horvitz,	2000;	Jimmy	
Jensen	&	Walter,	2014)	fits	within	the	aberrant	salience	framework.	
	 	There	is	evidence	to	support	dopaminergic	function	as	either	reward	
value	or	salience.	Each	is	supported	by	mostly	behavioural	or	fMRI	data	with	
human	participants;	and	by	single	unit	recording	with	animals.	However,	
electroencephalograph	evidence	suggests	dopaminergic	activation	in	reward	
pathways	signals	salience	and	value.		An	electroencephalograph	is	used	to	
record	event	related	potentials	or	rhythms,	which	are	specific	temporo-spatial	
forms	of	activity	generated	by	neural	responses	to	stimuli		(Ventouras,	
Asvestas,	Karanasiou,	&	Matsopoulos,	2011).	Event	related	potentials	
associated	with	reward-based	feedback	are	thought	to	reflect	activation	of	
reinforcement	learning	systems	(Cohen,	Elger,	&	Ranganath,	2007),	via	different	
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aspects	of	error	processing	(De	Pascalis	et	al.,	2010),	that	direct	motivated	
behaviour	to	best	facilitate	goal-attainment	(Walsh	&	Anderson,	2012).		
	 Feedback	event-related	potentials	signal	reward	value	and	stimulus	
salience.	The	P300,	or	P3,	occurs	in	the	centro-parietal	region	during	
anticipation	(cue-P3)	and	feedback	(FB-P3).		Cue-P3	and	FB-P3	amplitudes	
increase	as	a	function	of	reinforcement	magnitude	(Pornpattananangkul	&	
Nusslock,	2015;	Y.	Zheng	et	al.,	2017),	with	larger	amplitudes	for	gain	compared	
to	loss	cues	and	feedback	respectively	(Y.	Zheng	et	al.,	2017).	The	P3	is	thought	
to	respond	to	motivationally	salient	cues	(Broyd	et	al.,	2012),	tracking	the	
process	of	stimuli	identification	(Twomey,	Murphy,	Kelly,	&	O’Connell,	2015).	
The	P3	therefore	represents	an	end-to-end	evaluation	process	of	stimulus	
salience	and	value.			
The	amplitudes	of	reward-based	feedback	ERPs	are	associated	with	
unexpected	outcomes	and	reward	magnitude.	Feedback	related	negativity	is	
associated	with	unexpected	outcomes,	and	reflects	phasic	dopaminergic	firing	
generated	in	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex	(Walsh	&	Anderson,	2012).	Feedback-
related	negativity	amplitude	is	higher	when	the	outcome	is	unexpected	(Cooper,	
Duke,	Pickering,	&	Smillie,	2014;	Sambrook	&	Goslin,	2015;	Talmi,	Atkinson,	&	
El-Deredy,	2013),	for	unexpected	omission	compared	to	unexpected	delivery	
(Talmi	et	al.,	2013),	and	for	high	compared	to	low	magnitude	outcomes	(Hird,	
El-Deredy,	Jones,	&	Talmi,	2018;	Sambrook	&	Goslin,	2015;	Talmi	et	al.,	2013).	
The	data	indicate	the	feedback-related	negativity	is	sensitive	to	salience	and	
value.		
Reward-related	feedback	ERPs	excite	and	inhibit	dopaminergic	firing.	
Feedback-related	negativity	is	also	associated	with	the	generation	of	RPEs	
(Cooper	et	al.,	2014;	Hird	et	al.,	2018;	Sambrook	&	Goslin,	2015).		RPE	can	be	
positive	or	negative	and	reflect	differences	between	expected	and	actual	
outcome	values	(Schultz,	2017c).	Positive	RPE	is	thought	to	generate	increases	
in	phasic	dopamine	firing	whereas	negative	RPE	generates	decreases	(Walsh	&	
Anderson,	2012).		The	feedback-related	negativity,	therefore,	also	reflects	
feedback	monitoring.	
	 Reward-related	feedback	ERPs	signal	errors	in	motivated	behaviour.		An	
event-related	negativity,	sometimes	referred	to	as	error	negativity,	occurs	at	
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fronto-central	sites	(Boksem	et	al.,	2006).	The	event-related	negativity	follows	
an	erroneous	response	(Ventouras	et	al.,	2011).		Event-related	negativity	
amplitude	is	larger	for	errors	resulting	in	monetary	loss	compared	to	failure	to	
gain	(Potts,	2011)	and	unexpected	negative	outcomes	compared	to	expected	
negative	outcomes	(Holroyd,	Nieuwenhuis,	Yeung,	&	Cohen,	2003;	Yasuda,	Sato,	
Miyawaki,	Kumano,	&	Kuboki,	2004).		The	proposed	function	of	the	event-
related	negativity	is	to	inform	future	goal-directed	responses	to	facilitate	more	
adaptive,	or	advantageous,	behaviour	(Boksem	et	al.,	2006;	Holroyd	&	Coles,	
2002).		That	event-related	negative	signals	the	value	of	loss	is	evident	in	the	
form	of	the	variation	in	its	amplitude.		
	 Schultz's	argument	that	dopamine	neurons	signal	reward	conflicts	with	
the	aberrant	salience	hypothesis.	Conversely,	the	aberrant	salience	theory	
aligns	with	the	argument	that	dopamine	signals	salience.	However,	reward	
ERP's	activate	in	response	to	both	appetitive	and	aversive	value	and	salience.	
Rather	than	signalling	either	value	or	salience,	the	so-called	reward	system,	
therefore,	appears	to	monitor	salience	and	value.	
3.3.3 Other neural regions involved in reward and salience 
As	discussed	in	Chapter	2	(section	2.2),	the	processing	of	salience	involves	
regions	within	and	outside	the	reward	pathways.	For	example,the	anterior	
cingulate	cortex	(part	of	the	mesocortical	pathway	and	salience	network)	and	
anterior	insula	(part	of	the	salience	network)	are	associated	with	motivated	
behaviour.	Medford	and	Critchley	(2010)	suggested	that	the	anterior	insular	
cortex	highlights	motivationally	salient	information	whereas	the	anterior	
cingulate	cortex	integrates	the	information	for	selection	and	preparation	of	
responses.	The	anterior	cingulate	cortex	is	involved	in	monitoring	and	
evaluating	actual	outcomes	against	predicted	outcomes	(Alexander	&	Brown,	
2011;	Jahn	et	al.,	2014;	Laskowski	et	al.,	2016).	The	anterior	insula,	which	is	
part	of	the	salience	network,		integrates	sensory	information	(Lamichhane	&	
Dhamala,	2015).	Pharmacological	silencing	of	insula	neurons	in	rats	reduced	
approach	behaviour	towards	food	(Kusumoto-Yoshida,	Liu,	Chen,	Fontanini,	&	
Bonci,	2015).	In	humans,	increased	activation	in	the	right	anterior	insula	was	
associated	with	attention	to	reward-related	cues	(Rothkirch	et	al.,	2014).	
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Lamichhan	and	Dhamala	(2015)	used	dynamic	causal	modelling	to	assess	the	
relationship	between	anterior	cingulate	cortex	and	anterior	insula	during	
decision-making.	Dynamic	causal	modelling	is	used	to	predict	and	infer	the	
neuronal	interaction	between	cortical	regions	(Friston,	Harrison,	&	Penny,	
2003).	Lamichhan	and	Dhamala	(2015)	found	activation	in	the	insula	drove	ACC	
activation,	thus	the	two	regions	interacted	to	inform	goal-directed	behaviour.		
These	findings	support	a	crucial	role	of	the	insula	in	signalling	motivational	
salience	to	inform	motivated	behaviour	initiated	by	the	anterior	cingulate	
cortex.		
	 Another	key	region	involved	in	motivational	salience	is	the	OFC,	which	
plays	a	role	in	motivational	salience,	incorporating	previous	experience	or	
learning.	Early	evidence,	from	individuals	with	frontal	lesions,	suggested	OFC	
damage	caused	perseveration	indicative	of	reversal	learning	and	extinction	
issues	(Rolls,	Hornak,	Wade,	&	McGrath,	1994).		Subsequent	research	has	
shown	increased	activation	in	the	OFC	in	response	to	novel	(Bunzeck	et	al.,	
2012),	rewarding	(Bunzeck	et	al.,	2012;	S	E	Morris	&	Salzman,	2011),	and	
aversive	stimuli	(S	E	Morris	&	Salzman,	2011).	Additionally,	the	OFC	appears	to	
encode	value	for	appetitive	and	aversive	stimuli	comparably	(Kahnt	et	al.,	
2014).	However,	the	OFC	neuron	firing	rates	in	OFC-lesioned	rats	was	not	
attenuated	by	continued	reward-omission,	whereas	in	sham	rats	it	was	
(Takahashi	et	al.,	2011).	There	was	no	difference	in	behaviour	between	sham	
and	lesioned	rats.	Thus,	the	motivated	behaviour	in	OFC-lesioned	rats	reduced,	
in	line	with	reduced	reward	value,	but	neural	activation	signalling	salience	did	
not.	This	finding	suggests	that	the	OFC	plays	a	crucial	role	in	updating	the	
motivational	salience	of	a	stimulus.	Whereas	the	OFC	is	not	the	only	region	
associated	with	motivational	behaviour,	as	discussed	in	the	following	sections	
(3.3.5	and	3.3.7),	disruption	to	OFC	function	directly	influence	motivated	
behaviour.	
3.3.4 Reward, salience, or both? 
The	evidence	that	I	have	summarised	suggests	that,	rather	than	signalling	
reward	or	salience,	dopaminergic	pathways	signal	both	value	and	salience.	
Reinforcement	learning,	associated	with	the	dopaminergic	pathways,	occurs	in	
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response	to	appetitive	(Dreher	et	al.,	2006;	Fiorillo	et	al.,	2003)	and	aversive	
stimuli	(Jensen	et	al.,	2007;	Matsumoto	&	Hikosaka,	2009).	Dopaminergic	
activation	is	moderated	by	reward	value	relative	to	magnitude	(Roiser	et	al.,	
2010),	prior	outcome	(Bayer	&	Glimcher,	2005)	and	current	alternative	
rewards	(Cromwell	et	al.,	2005).	However,	consummatory	behaviour	does	not	
reduce	in	response	to	repeated	rewards	(Berridge,	1996;	Berridge	&	Robinson,	
1998)	but	neural	activation	does	(Matsumoto	&	Hikosaka,	2009;	Zweynert	et	al.,	
2011).	Whereas	uncertain	reward	elicits	sustained	activation	in	the	mesolimbic	
system,	this	attenuates	for	certain	rewards	(Dreher	et	al.,	2006;	Fiorillo	et	al.,	
2003).	As	the	reward	is	still	being	consumed,	the	attenuated	neural	activation	
suggests	processing	of	salience	rather	than	just	value.	This	argument	is	
supported	by	evidence	that	OFC-lesioned	rats	cease	motivated	behaviour	
following	continuous	reward-omission,	despite	no	change	in	OFC	neuron	firing	
rates	(Takahashi	et	al.,	2011).		EEG	evidence	also	suggests	ERPs	associated	with	
reward	processing	signal	value	and	salience	(Lamichhane	&	Dhamala,	2015;	
Potts,	2011;	Rothkirch	et	al.,	2014;	Sambrook	&	Goslin,	2015;	Talmi	et	al.,	2013;	
Y.	Zheng	et	al.,	2017),	tracking	the	progress	of	stimulus	identification	(Twomey	
et	al.,	2015)	and	outcome	(Boksem	et	al.,	2006;	Cooper	et	al.,	2014;	Hird	et	al.,	
2018)	that	directs	future	motivated	behaviour.		
	 The	evidence	of	the	previous	sections	also	challenges	Schultz’s	(2010)	
definition	of	motivational	salience	as	applying	only	to	reward	and	wanting.	
Aversive	stimuli	elicit	dopaminergic	activation	and	reinforcement	learning	
(Jensen	et	al.,	2007;	Matsumoto	&	Hikosaka,	2009).	The	occurrence	and	value	of	
aversive	outcome	are	signalled	in	reward-related	ERPs	(Holroyd	et	al.,	2003;	
Potts,	2011;	Yasuda	et	al.,	2004).	Additionally,	processing	in	regions	such	as	the	
anterior	insula	(Kusumoto-Yoshida	et	al.,	2015;	Lamichhane	&	Dhamala,	2015)	
and	OFC	(Bunzeck	et	al.,	2012;	Kahnt	et	al.,	2014)	are	required	to	initiate	
motivated	behaviour.	Therefore,	the	dopaminergic	systems	appears	crucial	in	
the	initial	detection	and	on-going	signalling	of	stimulus	salience.		
	 Evidence	from	ostensibly	health	individuals,	therefore,	supports	the	role	
of	dopaminergic	pathways	in	processing	motivational	salience	and	value.	This	
fits	with	Berridge’s	(2012)	definition	of	motivational	salience	incorporating	
previously	learned	value	associations	and	current	neurobiological	and	
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environmental	factors.	However,	without	value	(positive	or	negative),	there	is	
no	motivation.	Conversely,	motivation	is	usually	needed	to	obtain	valued	
outcomes.	Behaviour	is	affected	by	both	reward	value	and	salience	(Kahnt	et	al.,	
2014),	which	have	a	strong	interactive	effect.		It	is,	therefore,	not	surprising	that	
research	employing	healthy	participants	has	revealed	activation	in	regions	
associated	with	reward	value	and	salience.			
3.3.5 Influence of dopamine disruptions on reward processing and motivated 
behaviour in rodents 
Human	studies	provide	important	information	about	motivated	behaviour	and	
associated	neural	activation.	However,	they	are	unable	to	provide	the	level	of	
temporo-spatial	information	needed	to	determine	differences	in	neuron	firing	
rates	in	response	to	reward	and	motivation.	Animal	studies	that	combine	
behavioural	measures	with	single-unit	recording,	pharmacological,	or	surgical	
manipulation	offer	additional	insight.		
	 The	argument	that	dopamine	signals	value	is	confounded	by	the	
different	functions	of	presynaptic	and	postsynaptic	D2	receptors.		Bratcher,	
Farmer-Dougan	Dougan,	Heidenreich,	and	Garris	(2005)	investigated	the	
impact	of	D2	and	D1	like	receptor	agonists	on	reward	responding	in	rats.	The	
D2	agonist	produced	a	dose-related	increase	in	lever	press	for	reward.	This	
finding	suggests	D2	receptors	support	signalling	of	reward	value,	as	measured	
by	motivated	behaviour.	Conversely,	the	D1	receptor	agonist	reduced	response	
rates	at	higher	doses,	which	the	authors	argued	reflects	reduced	reward	
sensitivity,	but	rats	continued	to	explore	their	surroundings.	The	authors	
suggested	D2	receptors	regulate	learned	response	whereas	D1	regulate	general	
search	and	respond	to	novel	stimuli.	This	explanation	fits	with	Schultz’s	(2015)	
argument	that	the	dopaminergic	system	relates	to	reward.	However,	
postsynaptic	D2	receptors	stimulate	locomotor	activity	whereas	presynaptic	D2	
receptors	inhibit	locomotor	activity	(Beaulieu	&	Gainetdinov,	2011).	Thus,	D2	
receptor	agonists	can	induce	a	dose	related	effect	whereby	low	doses	affect	
presynaptic	D2	receptors,	inhibiting	locomotor	activity,	whereas	higher	doses	
affect	postsynaptic	D2	receptors	and	increase	activity	(Beaulieu	&	Gainetdinov,	
2011).	Thus,	the	increased	response	behaviour	observed	by	Bratcher	et	al.	
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(2005)	may	be	due	to	this	biphasic	effect	rather	than	reflecting	a	reward	value	
response.		
	 The	influence	of	dopaminergic	firing	on	working	memory	may	account	
for	impairments	in	reinforcement	learning	and	reversal	learning.		
Overexpression	of	striatal	D2	receptors	in	mice	resulted	in	an	increase	in	the	
number	of	stimulus-reward	pairings	before	learned	associations	were	
evidenced	in	behaviour	(Kellendonk	et	al.,	2006).	Additionally,	upregulation	of	
striatal	D2	receptors	was	associated	with	perseveration	of	previously	
reinforced	responses	(Bach	et	al.,	2008)	and	increased	latency	of	response	
during	reversal	trials,	without	impacting	accuracy	(Kellendonk	et	al.,	2006).		
These	findings	implicate	hyperdopaminergic	activation	in	reward	pathways	in	
behavioural	inflexibility	and	slower	reinforcement	learning.		Interestingly,	
overexpression	of	postsynaptic	striatal	D2	receptors	has	been	shown	to	impair	
dopaminergic	firing	in	the	ventral	tegmental	area	(Krabbe	et	al.,	2015),	which	in	
turn	impairs	working	memory	(Duvarci	et	al.,	2018),	evident	in	behaviour	(Bach	
et	al.,	2008).	Rather	than	reward	value	or	motivational	salience,	the	effect	of	
overexpression	on	working	memory	may	account	for	deficits	in	reward-based	
learning	and	behavioural	flexibility.					
	 Overexpression	of	striatal	D2	receptors	influences	motivated	behaviour	
but	not	reward	value.	Rodents	can	be	genetically	modified	(transgenic)	to	
reflect	the	increased	striatal	D2	receptors	in	schizophrenia	(overexpression).	
Overexpression	of	postsynaptic	D2	receptors	in	the	nucleus	accumbens	(part	of	
the	striatum)	resulted	in	increased	willingness	to	expend	effort	for	reward	
without	altering	consummatory	behaviour	or	reward	value	(Trifilieff	et	al.,	
2013).	This	finding	is	in	line	with	evidence	that	elevated	dopamine	enhances	
anticipatory	but	not	consummatory	pleasure	(Smith,	Berridge,	&	Aldridge,	
2011)	and	supports	the	argument	that	dopaminergic	pathways	signal	
motivational	salience.	
	 Rodent	studies	suggest	disruptions	to	dopamine	availability	affects	
motivational	salience	but	not	reward	value	(Smith	et	al.,	2011;	Trifilieff	et	al.,	
2013).	This	supports	the	argument	that	motivational	salience	and	value	are	
separate	factors.		
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3.3.6 Influence of dopamine disruptions on reward processing and motivated 
behaviour in humans 
Whereas	rodent	studies	provide	useful	information,	there	are	limitations	in	
translation	to	human	cognition,	which	is	less	easily	observed	in	behaviour.	
Another	means	to	investigate	reward	processing	and	motivational	salience	in	
humans,	is	to	utilise	combined	behavioural	and	neuroimaging	techniques.	These	
allow	better	insight	into	spatial	(fMRI)	and	temporal	(EEG)	neural	activity	
during	task	performance,	with	behavioural	measures	providing	insight	into	
factors	that	contribute	to	motivation.	Manipulation	of	these	factors	facilitates	
the	use	of	subtraction	method	to	identify	associations	between	behaviour	and	
neural	activation.				
	 Increased	dopamine	availability	reduces	the	negative	value	of	aversive	
stimuli.	Shiner	et	al.	(2014)	used	a	dopamine	agonist	(L-dopa)	to	investigate	
reversal	shifting	during	a	probabilistic	learning	task.	The	probabilistic	learning	
task	allows	the	evaluation	of	response	(behaviour)	to	shifting	reward	
probabilities.	In	a	probabilistic	learning	task,	contingencies	of	reward-
associated	stimuli	are	learnt	through	a	pattern	of	reinforcement	for	correct	
responses	(Waltz	&	Gold,	2007).		The	contingency	is	then	changed,	requiring	the	
participant	to	discern	such	a	change	has	occurred	and	alter	response	strategies	
accordingly	(Waltz	&	Gold,	2007).	Such	reversal	learning	is	dependent	on	the	
ventromedial	prefrontal	cortex	and	dopaminergic	systems	(Waltz	&	Gold,	
2007).	Shiner	et	al.	(2014)	used	cues	signalling	two	outcome	contingencies	for	
incorrect	responses,	gain	omission	or	monetary	loss.	Results	indicated	that,	in	
the	placebo	condition,	accuracy	on	the	first	trial	following	the	reversal	shift	was	
significantly	better	in	the	monetary	loss	compared	to	gain	omission	trials.	This	
finding	suggests	a	stronger	negative	value	of	loss	compared	to	gain	omission.	In	
the	L-Dopa	condition,	performance	in	reversal	shifting	for	monetary	loss	cues	
was	significantly	reduced,	resulting	in	similar	behavioural	responses	to	gain	
omission	and	monetary	loss	cues.	According	to	Corr	and	McNaughton	(2012),	
reduction	in	negative	value	would	be	associated	with	increased	motivated	
behaviour.	The	results,	therefore,	suggest	increased	dopamine	reduces	the	
negative	value	of	more	aversive	outcomes.	This	pattern	was	reflected	in	neural	
activation.	Administration	of	L-Dopa	was	associated	with	reduced	activation	in	
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the	ventromedial	prefrontal	cortex	in	response	to	reversal	cues.	Furthermore,	
compared	to	placebo,	ventromedial	prefrontal	cortex	activation	following	L-
Dopa	was	attenuated	for	reversal	learning	signalled	by	monetary	loss,	but	
increased	for	reversals	signalled	by	gain	omission.	Therefore,	increased	
dopamine	resulted	in	reduced	sensitivity	to	higher	losses.			 	 		
	 Reduced	dopamine	availability	affects	motivated	behaviour.	Parkinson’s	
disease	is	characterised	by	dopamine	loss	that	causes	inflexible	motor	and	
cognitive	function	(Aarts	et	al.,	2012).	Parkinson’s	disease	is	associated	with	
impairments	in	reward	processing.	For	example,	elevated	delay	discounting	
(Szamosi,	Nagy,	&	Kéri,	2012),	whereby	smaller	immediate	rewards	are	valued	
over	larger	future	rewards,	and	impaired	implicit	learning	(Moody,	Chang,	
Vanek,	&	Knowlton,	2010).	Furthermore,	changes	in	behaviour	during	the	task	
to	incorporate	performance	feedback,	exhibited	in	unaffected	individuals,	was	
not	seen	in	medicated	individuals	with	Parkinson’s	disease	(Di	Rosa,	Schiff,	
Cagnolati,	&	Mapelli,	2015).	This	finding	is	comparable	to	the	reduced	valuation	
of	aversive	stimuli	shown	in	unaffected	individuals	administered	with	L-Dopa	
(Shiner	et	al.,	2014),	therefore	an	effect	of	L-Dopa	cannot	be	ruled	out.	
Additionally,	differences	in	neuronal	response	to	reward	in	Parkinson’s	disease	
(unmedicated)	are	not	always	reflected	in	motivated	behaviour	(Goerendt,	
Lawrence,	&	Brooks,	2004).	This	is	thought	to	be	driven	by	compensatory	
neural	mechanisms,	as	regions	of	the	cerebellum	showed	increases	in	activation	
comparable	to	the	OFC	in	unaffected	individuals	(Goerendt	et	al.,	2004).	
Unmedicated	Parkinson’s	disease	has	been	associated	with	aberrant	reward	
processing,	namely	a	reduced	effect	of	anticipated	reward	on	motivated	
behaviour	(Aarts	et	al.,	2012).	This	contrasts	with	increased	motivated	
behaviour	exhibited	in	transgenic	D2	receptor	mice	(Trifilieff	et	al.,	2013).	
Interestingly,	medicated	Parkinson’s	disease	patients	appeared	to	learn	better	
from	positive	feedback	compared	to	unmedicated	patients,	who	learnt	better	
from	negative	feedback	(Frank,	Seeberger,	&	O’Reilly,	2004).	Therefore,	the	
effects	of	dopamine	depletion	contrast	and	compare	with	the	effects	of	
upregulating	striatal	D2	receptors.	
	 Human	data	suggest	attenuated	dopaminergic	firing	is	associated	with	
numerous	reward	processing	impairments	(Di	Rosa	et	al.,	2015;	Moody	et	al.,	
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2010;	Szamosi	et	al.,	2012),	although	these	are	not	always	reflected	in	
motivated	behaviour	(Goerendt	et	al.,	2004).	Additionally,	increasing	dopamine	
availability	dampens	the	negative	value	of	aversive	stimuli,	by	disrupting	
underlying	neural	activation	(Shiner	et	al.,	2014).	Differences	in	rodent	
(Beaulieu	&	Gainetdinov,	2011;	Bratcher	et	al.,	2005)	and	human	data	(Di	Rosa	
et	al.,	2015)	may	explain	the	inconsistent	evidence	of	dopamine's	role	in	
signalling	salience.		The	conflicting	findings	also	highlight	the	limitation	of	
generalising	rodent	behaviour	to	explain	human	cognition.	Overall,	the	evidence	
suggests	a	relationship	between	reward	value	and	motivational	salience	that	is	
mediated	by	dopamine.	
3.3.7 Summary 
Reward	processing	and	motivational	salience	engage	key	dopaminergic	
pathways.	The	two	key	pathways,	mesolimbic	and	mesocortical,	facilitate	initial	
stimulus	evaluation	and	goal-directed	behaviour	(e.g.	Alexander	&	Brown,	
2011;	Chudasama	et	al.,	2013;	Laskowski	et	al.,	2016;	Salamone	&	Correa,	2002;	
Weiland	et	al.,	2014;	Zweynert	et	al.,	2011).	However,	dopaminergic	activation	
also	occurs	in	response	to	aversive	stimuli	indicating	dopamine	modulates	
motivational	salience	(Berridge,	2012;	Matsumoto	&	Hikosaka,	2009).		
Behavioural	evidence	suggests	dopamine	modulates	motivational	
salience	and	value	of	outcome.	The	two	arguments	about	the	function	of	
dopamine,	signalling	reward	value	(Schultz,	2013)	or	motivational	salience	
(Horvitz,	2000;	Jimmy	Jensen	&	Walter,	2014),	were	reviewed.	Overall,	the	
evidence	supports	the	argument	that	the	mesolimbic	and	mesocortical	
pathways	process	both	motivational	salience	and	value.	These	findings	could	be	
interpreted	as	evidence	that	motivational	salience	and	value	are	the	same	thing.	
However,	the	relationship	between	motivational	salience	and	value	is	
illustrated	in	studies	where	disrupted	dopamine	availability	affects	motivated	
behaviour	to	obtain	a	reward	but	not	consummatory	behaviour.	Motivational	
salience	and	value	appear,	therefore,	to	be	separate,	interacting	factors.		
Context	and	physiological	state	also	affect	dopaminergic	activation.		Wise	
(2004)	argued	dopamine	contributes	to	motivational	arousal,	conditioned	
reinforcement,	and	motivational	salience.	He	suggested	reward-predicting	
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conditioning	can	act	to	direct	and	modulate	subsequent	behaviour	and	stamp-in	
memories	for	associations	that	precede	reward.	This	fits	with	evidence	of	
behavioural	differences	using	electroencephalograph	and	disruptions	to	normal	
dopaminergic	functioning.		However,	this	is	just	part	of	the	picture.	Internal	
states	and	alternative	options	and	outcomes	also	affect	firing	in	
mesocorticolimbic	regions.	Much	as	the	study	of	Parkinson’s	disease	has	
provided	insight	into	attenuated	dopamine,	key	insights	can	be	obtained	by	
investigating	populations	where	dopamine	functioning	is	increased	organically	
rather	than	artificially.		In	the	next	section,	I	review	evidence	of	impairments	in	
reward	processing	and	motivational	salience	in	schizophrenia,	which	is	
associated	with	ongoing	hyperdopaminergic	activation.	 
3.4 Reward and Motivation in Schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia	is	associated	with	deficits	in	reward	processing	and	motivation.	
These	deficits	are	expressed	in	atypical	reward-related	behaviour	and	co-
occurrent	neurological	differences.		
3.4.1 Disrupted reward processing and motivational salience in schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia	is	associated	with	impaired	reinforcement	learning	for	
rewarding	outcomes	(Dowd,	Frank,	Collins,	Gold,	&	Barch,	2016;	Serra,	Jones,	
Toone,	&	Gray,	2001).		Compared	with	unaffected	individuals,	participants	with	
schizophrenia,	and	individuals	who	met	the	criteria	for	schizotypal	personality	
disorder	(both	first-degree	relatives	and	unrelated)	were	slower	to	learn	from	
reward	reinforcement	(Serra	et	al.,	2001).	During	reinforcement	learning	
paradigms,	higher	reward	probability	stimuli	are	less	frequently	selected	by	
individuals	with	schizophrenia	than	unaffected	individuals	(Dowd	et	al.,	2016).	
Whereas	these	findings	could	be	explained	as	the	impact	of	negative	symptoms,	
the	link	between	negative	symptoms	and	deficits	in	reward-driven	learning	is	
inconsistent	(Dowd	et	al.,	2016;	Gold,	Waltz,	&	Matveeva,	2012).	Additionally,	
gradual	learning	appears	intact,	albeit	slower,	in	schizophrenia	(Gold,	Waltz,	
Prentice,	Morris,	&	Heerey,	2008).	Reinforcement	learning	impairments	in	
schizophrenia	may,	therefore,	be	limited	to	rapid	learning	(Gold	et	al.,	2008).		
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	 Conversely,	reinforcement	learning	from	aversive	outcomes	appears	
intact,	irrespective	of	the	severity	of	negative	symptoms	(Gold	et	al.,	2012).	
Studies	using	a	Go/NoGo	paradigm	have	found	individuals	with	schizophrenia	
did	not	learn	to	speed	up	responses	to	obtain	reward,	however	the	ability	to	
stop	behaviour	to	avoid	the	aversive	outcome	was	intact	(Strauss	et	al.,	2011;	
Waltz,	Frank,	Robinson,	&	Gold,	2007;	Waltz,	Frank,	Wiecki,	&	Gold,	2011).	
Faster	response	times	to	aversive	stimuli	in	schizophrenia	(Andersen	et	al.,	
2016)	contrasts	with	evidence	that	increasing	dopamine	availability	in	
unaffected	individuals	reduces	the	value	of	aversive	stimuli	(Shiner	et	al.,	2014).		
	 Reduced	reward	value	and	poor	adaptation	to	change	affect	reward-
related	behaviour	in	schizophrenia.		Individuals	with	schizophrenia	have	shown	
enhanced	delay	discounting	(Ahn	et	al.,	2011;	Brown,	Hart,	Snapper,	Roffman,	&	
Perlis,	2018;	Heerey,	Robinson,	McMahon,	&	Gold,	2007;	Weller	et	al.,	2014),	
choosing	smaller,	immediate	rewards	over	larger,	delayed	rewards.	
Inconsistency	in	responding	enhanced	delay	discounting	in	schizophrenia	
(Weller	et	al.,	2014).	However,	even	consistent	responders	with	schizophrenia	
chose	the	smaller,	more	immediate	reward	more	frequently	than	unaffected	
individuals	(Weller	et	al.,	2014).	These	findings	suggest	enhanced	delay	
discounting	predominantly	reflects	reduced	reward	value	rather	than	
impairments	in	strategizing,	attention	to	task,	or	even	motivation.	Reversal	
learning,	which	indicates	the	ability	to	adapt	to	changing	contingencies,	is	also	
impaired	in	schizophrenia	(Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2014;	Waltz	&	Gold,	2007).	
Thus,	individuals	with	schizophrenia	are	less	able	to	adjust	their	behaviour	to	
maximise	reward.		
	 Impaired	working	memory	in	schizophrenia	(Fatouros-Bergman,	
Cervenka,	Flyckt,	Edman,	&	Farde,	2014;	Lee	&	Park,	2005)	may	account	for	
poor	performance	in	reward	paradigms.	Gold,	Waltz,	Prentice,	Morris,	and	
Heerey	(2008)	argued	that	reinforcement	learning	deficits	in	schizophrenia	are	
due	to	the	effect	of	impaired	working	memory	on	reward	value	during	rapid	
learning.		Collins,	Brown,	Gold,	Waltz,	and	Frank	(2014)	investigated	the	effect	
of	working	memory	on	reinforcement	learning	by	manipulating	task	difficulty	
(number	of	items	to	remember).	In	unaffected	individuals,	reinforcement	
reduced	the	speed	of	response,	whereas	difficulty	increased	the	speed	of	
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response.	In	schizophrenia,	reinforcement	learning	was	diminished	over	time	
and	for	higher	task	difficulty,	with	a	larger	effect	of	task	difficulty	in	later	trials.	
Furthermore,	difficulty	had	less	effect	on	speed	of	response.		There	is	also	
evidence	that	working	memory	impairments	in	schizophrenia	are	associated	
with	enhanced	delay	discounting	(Heerey	et	al.,	2007)	and	impaired	reversal	
learning	(Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2014;	Waltz	&	Gold,	2007).	Such	findings	suggest	
impaired	working	memory	contributes	to	anomalous	reward-related	behaviour	
in	schizophrenia.		
	 Schizophrenia	is	associated	with	reduced	motivated	behaviour.	Tasks	
such	as	the	Effort	Expenditure	for	Rewards	Task	(EEfRT;	Treadway	et	al.,	2009)	
provide	an	index	of	motivated	behaviour	(button	press)	for	rewards	of	differing	
magnitude	and	probability	of	winning.	Evidence	from	EEfRT	and	similar	tasks	
suggest	that,	despite	comparable	subjective	monetary	value,	individuals	with	
schizophrenia	are	less	willing	to	expend	effort	for	reward	(Green,	Horan,	Barch,	
&	Gold,	2015;	Reddy	et	al.,	2015),	especially	when	reward	value	and	likelihood	
are	higher	(Fervaha,	Graff-Guerrero,	et	al.,	2013;	Gold	et	al.,	2013).	This	
contrasts	with	unaffected	individuals,	who	show	increased	effort	for	higher	
rewards	and	probability	(Fervaha,	Graff-Guerrero,	et	al.,	2013;	Treadway	et	al.,	
2009).	Evidence	of	an	effect	of	the	interaction	between	probability	and	reward	
on	effort	is	inconsistent	in	unaffected	and	schizophrenia	populations	(Fervaha,	
Graff-Guerrero,	et	al.,	2013;	Gold	et	al.,	2013),	but	has	been	associated	with	
reduced	self-report	motivation	and	pleasure	(William	P.	Horan	et	al.,	2015).			
	 Differences	in	motivated	behaviour	may	be	due	to	impaired	decision-
making	rather	than	reinforcement	learning.	Cognitive	performance	in	
schizophrenia	and	unaffected	individuals	has	been	shown	to	predict	increased	
effort	for	higher	reward	(Gold	et	al.,	2013).	However,	schizophrenia	has	been	
associated	with	a	reduced	ability	(no	reduction	in	response	time)	to	learn	
stimulus	contingencies	from	high	probability	rewards,	but	not	uncertain	(50%)	
rewards	(Koch	et	al.,	2010).	Fervaha,	Foussias,	Agid,	and	Remington	(2013)	
argued	such	findings	reflect	impaired	cost	and	effort	computation,	in	
schizophrenia,	that	is	due	to	either	value	discounting	or	overestimating	costs.	
This	argument	fits	with	evidence	suggesting	impairments	in	value	
representations	during	decision-making	(S	E	Morris,	Holroyd,	Mann-Wrobel,	&	
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Gold,	2011)	and	issues	with	updating	value	during	reversal	learning	in	
schizophrenia	(Gold	et	al.,	2008).	However,	working	memory	also	correlates	
with	differences	in	optimal	decision	making	in	schizophrenia	(Gold	et	al.,	2008;	
Premkumar	et	al.,	2008),	thus	may	underlie	maladaptive	decision-making.		
	 Negative	symptoms	of	schizophrenia	also	impact	motivated	behaviour	
(Gold	et	al.,	2013),	if	not	consummatory	pleasure	(Gard,	Kring,	Gard,	Horan,	&	
Green,	2007).		High	negative	symptoms	were	associated	with	reduced	
reinforcement	learning	in	response	to	rewarding	outcomes	(Gold	et	al.,	2012).	
These	findings	are	accordant	with	reduced	responsivity	to	feedback	in	
medicated	Parkinson’s	disease	(Di	Rosa	et	al.,	2015).	Individuals	with	
schizophrenia	who	scored	high	on	negative	symptoms	showed	no	preference	
for	learning	from	outcome	value	or	probability	(Strauss	et	al.,	2011).	This	
contrasted	with	an	increased	bias	for	probability	over	reward	value	learning	in	
unaffected	individuals	and	individuals	with	schizophrenia	who	scored	low	on	
negative	symptoms	(Strauss	et	al.,	2011).	However,	not	all	studies	compared	
positive	and	negative	symptoms	(Gold	et	al.,	2012)	and	those	that	did	still	found	
low	negative	symptom	scores	were	associated	with	elevated	differences	
compared	to	unaffected	individuals	(Strauss	et	al.,	2011).	Therefore,	the	
findings	demonstrate	an	association	between	reduced	reward	value	and	
schizophrenia	that	is	amplified	by	negative	symptoms.		
	 Schizotypy	research	suggests	impairments	in	motivational	salience	
change	in	line	with	symptom	severity.	Higher	reality	distortion	has	been	shown	
to	predict	increased	responsivity	to	neutral	outcome	cues	(Balog,	Somlai,	&	
Kéri,	2013).	Higher	reported	unusual	experiences	and	introverted	anhedonia	
have	been	associated	with	slower	responses	to	cues	predicting	aversive	
outcomes	(Balog	et	al.,	2013).	Anhedonia	has	been	associated	with	reduced	
effort	for	high	uncertain	rewards	(50%;	Treadway	et	al.,	2009)	and	increased	
effort	for	uncertain	low	and	medium	value	rewards	(McCarthy,	Treadway,	&	
Blanchard,	2015).	Reduced	anticipatory	pleasure	was	associated	with	
prodromal	negative	(Engel,	Fritzsche,	&	Lincoln,	2013)	and	positive	(Schlosser	
et	al.,	2014)	symptoms	of	schizophrenia.	However,	reduced	anticipatory	
pleasure	was	not	reported	in	individuals	with	recent	onset	(<	5	years)	or	
chronic	(>	5	years)	schizophrenia	(Schlosser	et	al.,	2014).		Additionally,		
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depression	only	predicted	reduced	anticipatory	pleasure	in	at	risk	(exhibiting	
prodromal	symptoms)	individuals,	not	schizophrenia	(Schlosser	et	al.,	2014).	
The	findings	suggest	the	directional	relationship	between	motivational	salience	
and	symptom	severity	vary,	although	the	effect	of	antipsychotics	should	be	
considered.	
	 Schizophrenia	is	associated	with	anomalous	reward-related	behaviour	
(Ahn	et	al.,	2011;	Brown	et	al.,	2018;	Heerey	et	al.,	2007;	Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	
2014;	Waltz	&	Gold,	2007;	Weller	et	al.,	2014).	Reinforcement	learning	is	
impaired	for	appetitive	(Dowd	et	al.,	2016;	Serra	et	al.,	2001)	but	not	aversive	
stimuli	(Gold	et	al.,	2012;	Strauss	et	al.,	2011;	Waltz	et	al.,	2007,	2011).	Poor	
working	memory	contributes	to	deficits	in	reinforcement	learning	(Collins	et	al.,	
2014),	adaptation	to	changing	contingencies	(Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2014;	Waltz	&	
Gold,	2007),	and	reward	value	(Heerey	et	al.,	2007)	and	is	associated	with	
maladaptive	decision-making	(Gold	et	al.,	2008;	Premkumar	et	al.,	2008).	
Atypical	reward-related	behaviour	is	exacerbated	by	negative	symptoms		(Gold	
et	al.,	2012;	Strauss	et	al.,	2011)	and	likely	precedes	onset	(Balog	et	al.,	2013;	
Engel	et	al.,	2013;	Schlosser	et	al.,	2014).	However,	reinforcement	learning	for	
aversive	stimuli	appears	intact.	Thus,	dysregulated	dopamine	in	schizophrenia	
affects	reward	processing	and	motivational	salience	for	appetitive	but	not	
aversive	outcomes.			
3.4.2 Reinforcer sensitivity in schizophrenia 
Reduced	loss	aversion	is	indicated	in	schizophrenia.	Currie	et	al.	(2017)	
amended	the	prisoner's	dilemma	to	assess	loss	aversion	in	schizophrenia.		
During	the	standard	prisoner’s	dilemma,	participants	choose	to	stay	silent	(co-
operate)	or	betray	each	other	based	on	known	potential	outcomes	(Flood	and	
Dresher,	1950).	Mutual	co-operation	and	mutual	betrayal	result	in	both	
participants	receiving	a	less	aversive	or	medium	aversive	outcome	respectively.	
However,	if	one	participant	betrays	and	one	co-operates,	the	co-operating	
participant	will	receive	the	most	aversive	outcome.	In	the	amended	version,	all	
outcomes	yielded	gains	in	the	gain	frame,	losses	in	the	loss	frame,	and	equal	
value	outcomes	in	the	neutral	frame	for	co-operate	and	betray	(Currie	et	al.,	
2017).	Unaffected	individuals	exhibited	loss	aversion,	with	a	reduced	number	of	
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co-operate	choices	in	the	loss	compared	to	gain	frame.	This	difference	was	not	
seen	in	the	schizophrenia	group,	who	exhibited	comparable	co-operate	choices	
for	loss	and	gain	frames,	suggesting	reduced	loss	aversion.	However,	
schizophrenia	has	been	associated	with	impaired	value	representation	during	
decision-making	(S	E	Morris	et	al.,	2011)	and	issues	with	updating	value	during	
reversal	learning	(Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2014;	Waltz	&	Gold,	2007)	for	appetitive	
but	not	aversive	stimuli.	It	is	therefore	unclear	whether	the	findings	were	due	
to	reduced	loss	sensitivity,	or	cognitive	or	social	impairment.		
Understanding	sensitivity	to	loss	and	gain	may	explain	differences	in	
motivated	behaviour	in	schizophrenia.	For	example,	there	is	a	comparable	effect	
of	gain	and	loss	on	task	choice	during	social	co-operation	(Currie	et	al.,	2017)	
and	speed	of	response	during	reinforcement	learning	(Collins	et	al.,	2014).		
Some	findings	indicate	reduced	reward	value	(Weller	et	al.,	2014),	however	
increased	loss	aversion	has	also	been	found	(Currie	et	al.,	2017).	Combined	with	
evidence	of	impaired	reinforcement	learning	for	appetitive	but	not	aversive	
stimuli	(Strauss	et	al.,	2011;	Waltz	et	al.,	2007,	2011),	behavioural	findings	point	
to	a	lessening	difference	in	the	effect	of	gain	and	loss	on	motivated	behaviour	in	
schizophrenia.		
3.4.3 Neurological Differences in Reward and Motivation in Schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia	is	associated	with	atypical	VS	activation	during	reward	
processing,	although	findings	are	inconsistent	(Table	3.1).	For	example,	VS	
activation	for	gain	relative	to	loss	outcomes	has	been	reported	as	comparable	
and	dissimilar	to	unaffected	individuals.	Reported	differences	in	VS	activation	
during	reward	anticipation	and	stimulus	valence	are	also	inconclusive.	
Attenuated	VS	activation	in	schizophrenia	is	frequently	reported,	and	predicts	
impairments	in	learning,	symptom	severity,	and	motivated	behaviour.	However,	
there	is	evidence	of	enhanced	VS	activation	in	schizophrenia	during	reward	
processing	and	no	difference	in	comparison	to	unaffected	individuals	during	
reward	processing.			
	 Neural	regions	involved	in	higher	cognitive	functions	also	show	atypical	
activation	during	reward	processing	in	schizophrenia.	Activation	in	task-related	
(amygdala,	hippocampus,	midbrain),	but	not	default	mode	network	(insula,	
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ACC),	regions	is	attenuated	in	response	to	gain	but	not	loss	(Table	3.1).	The	
amygdala	and	hippocampus	support	the	identification	of	salient	stimuli	(J.	
Zheng	et	al.,	2017).	The	amygdala	appears	activated	during	reward	(appetitive)	
processing,	and	is	thought	to	signal	reward	intensity	and	value	(Bissonette,	
Gentry,	Padmala,	Pessoa,	&	Roesch,	2014),	ascertaining	stimulus	relevance	
relative	to	current	motivational	state	(Cunningham	&	Brosch,	2012).	The	
midbrain	contributes	to	the	coordination	of	motor	(Bear,	Connors,	&	Paradiso,	
2007)	and	cognitive	performance	(Andreasen	et	al.,	1996;	Stoodley,	Valera,	&	
Schmahmann,	2012).	The	insula	is	involved	in	signalling	motivationally	salient	
stimuli	(Medford	&	Critchley,	2010),	whereas	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex	is	
thought	to	signal	changes	in	reinforcement	contingencies		(Alexander	&	Brown,	
2011;	Jahn	et	al.,	2014)	and	initiate	motivated	behaviour	(Laskowski	et	al.,	
2016;	Medford	&	Critchley,	2010).	A	meta-analysis	of	seven	studies	revealed,	
among	other	things,	reduced	anterior	cingulate	cortex	volume	in	schizophrenia	
compared	to	healthy	controls	(Baiano	et	al.,	2007).	
	 Overall,	the	picture	is	one	of	atypical	activation	during	reward-
processing	that	impacts	the	end-to-end	assessment	and	tracking	of	salient	
stimuli	in	schizophrenia.	Atypical	VS	activation	contributes	to	decreased	
anticipation	of	reward,	reduced	value	of	positive	outcomes,	and	failure	to	
engage	key	regions	associated	with	decision-making.	Diminished	activation	in	
regions	that	interpret	and	update	information	and	facilitate	adaptation	to	
contingencies	further	impacts	motivational	salience	and	behaviour.	Atypical	
activation	in	individuals	with	a	higher	risk	of	developing	psychosis	suggests	
anomalous	reward	processing	precedes	clinical	symptom	onset.	Understanding	
the	directional	interaction	between	atypical	reward-related	activation	and	
symptoms,	is	an	important	step	in	understanding	the	development	of	psychosis.
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Table	3.1		
Neural	activation	in	schizophrenia	compared	to	unaffected	individuals	during	reward	processing		
Paradigm	 Participants		 Group	differences	 Reference	
VS	activation	during	reward	processing	
MID		 10	SC	
10	UI	
Attenuated	VS	activation	in	SC	in	response	to	reward-	and	loss-cue	stimuli	 Juckel	et	al.	(2006)	
Modified	MID	with	certain	
gain	and	certain	loss		
17	SC	
17	UI	
No	group	differences.	Greater	VS	activation	in	response	to	anticipated	
gains	than	losses	and	for	larger	than	smaller	gains	in	both	groups.		
Waltz	et	al.	(2010)	
Progressive	ratio	task	-	
measure	of	effort	for	reward.		
41	SC	
37	UI	
fMRI	
VS	activation	enhanced	for	wins	compared	to	losses	in	both	groups.	
However,	correlation	between	reduced	VS	activation	and	reduced	effort	
only	found	in	SC.		
Wolf	et	al.	(2014)	
Reinforcement	learning	 15	SC		
20	UI		
15	MDD		
Enhanced	VS	activation	during	encoding	of	expected	reward	value	in	SC.	
	
Gradin	et	al.	(2011)	
Probabilistic	learning	task	
(gain/gain	omission)	
14	SC	
18	UI	
Reduced	VS	responses	during	reward	compared	to	no-reward	outcomes	
in	SC,	which	predicted	negative	symptom	severity	and	diminished	
associative	learning.			
Gradin	et	al.	(2013)	
MID	
	
44	SC	
54	UI	
24	MDD	
26	AD	
Attenuated	VS	activation	during	reward	anticipation	in	SC,	MDD	and	AD.	
Depressive	symptoms	predicted	attenuated	VS	activation	during	reward	
anticipation,	regardless	of	diagnosis		
Hägele	et	al.	(2014)	
	
MID	 54	FDR	
80	UI	
fMRI	
Hypoactivation	in	VS	during	reward	anticipation	in	FDR.		 Grimm	et	al.	(2014)	
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Paradigm	 Participants		 Group	differences	 Reference	
MID		
	
27	SC*	
27	UI	
	
Shorter	RT	for	gain	than	loss	omission	tasks.	Hypoactivation	in	the	VS	
during	reward	(gain	and	loss	omission)	anticipation	in	SC,	which	
correlated	with	increased	salience	attribution	to	neutral	cues	and	positive	
symptoms.		
Esslinger	et	al.	
(2012)	
Pavlovian	learning	of	CS	with	
aversive	or	neutral	UCS	
18	SC	
18	UI	
	
Enhanced	VS	activation	to	neutral	CS.	Neural	finding	consistent	with:	a)	SC	
inability	to	distinguish	between	conditioned	neutral	and	aversive	stimuli	
in	self-report;	and	b)	higher	galvanic	skin	responses	(arousal)	for	neutral	
UCS,	with	levels	similar	to	those	of	aversive	UCS	
Jensen	et	al.	(2008)	
Modified	MID,	where	outcome	
(gain,	loss,	neutral)	was	either	
certain	(outcome	not	affected	
by	behaviour)	or	uncertain	
(outcome	dependent	on	
behaviour)	
31	SC*		
31	UI	
	
Speed	of	response	slowest	for	neutral	cues	in	UI	but	for	certain	gain	and	
loss	cues	in	SC.	
Attenuated	VS	activation	in	SC	for	all	cues,	but	most	pronounced	for	
uncertain	gain	and	loss	cues.			
	
Issue:	Only	analysed	winning	contrast,	(gain	versus	neutral).	The	mean	
activation	in	dorsolateral	PFC	during	uncertain	loss	appears	higher	in	SC	
however	analysis	not	run/reported	
Nielsen	et	al.	
(2012)	
	
Reversal	Learning	(positive	
and	negative	feedback)	
24	SC^		
24	UI	
Attenuated	VS	activation	related	to	impaired	reversal	learning	 Schlagenhauf	et	al.	
(2014)	
Probabilistic	monetary	
reward	task	(gain)	
22	SC	
19	UI	
	
Attenuated	VS	activation	during	prediction	errors	in	SC	
Issue:	assumed	learning	rates	between	UI	and	SZ	the	same	thus	any	
differences	may	be	due	to	slower	learning	in	SZ	
White	et	al.	(2015)	
Reward	processing		 Meta-analysis	 SC	and	UI	from	40	Studies:	anticipation	(23),	feedback	(9),	and	prediction	
error	(8)	suggests	attenuated	VS	activation	during	reward	(gain)	
anticipation	in	SC.	
Radua	et	al.	(2015)	
MID	task	 15	SC^	
15	UI	
	
The	valence	of	unexpected	feedback	affected	response	in	SC.	During	loss	
omission	(gain),	activation	in	the	VS	was	attenuated.	During	gain	omission	
(loss),	activation	in	the	medial	prefrontal	cortex	was	enhanced.	Functional	
connectivity	between	the	VS	and	prefrontal	cortex	was	also	diminished	in	
SC.		
Schlagenhauf	et	al.	
(2009)	
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Paradigm	 Participants		 Group	differences	 Reference	
Atypical	activation	in	other	neural	regions	during	reward	processing	
Probabilistic	reinforcement	
learning	task	(monetary	gain)	
26	SC	
27	UI	
	
Reduced	event-related	negativity	to	negative	feedback	associated	with	
impaired	probabilistic	learning,	but	only	when	certainty	of	winning	was	
high	
Morris,	Heerey,	
Gold,	and	Holroyd	
(2008)	
Classical	conditioning;	
temporal	difference	error		
18	SC	
18	UI	
Attenuated	activation	in	the	midbrain,	insula,	putamen,	and	cerebellum	to	
unexpected	reward	but	not	aversive	(omission)	outcomes	in	SC	compared	
to	UI.	
Waltz	et	al.	(2009)	
Modified	MID	with	certain	
gain	and	certain	loss		
17	SC	
17	UI	
Attenuated	activation	found	in	regions	involved	in	the	interpretation	of	VS	
signals	and	updating	of	information,	including	the	PFC	and	amygdala		
Waltz	et	al.	(2010)	
Modified	gambling	paradigm	 19	SC	
20	UI	
fMRI	
	
Impaired	learning	of	stimulus-reward	contingencies.	The	inverse	
correlation	between	reward	predictability	and	right	dorsolateral	PFC	
activation	in	UI	was	absent	in	SC.		
Koch	et	al.	(2010)	
Reinforcement	learning	 15	SC		
20	UI		
15	MDD		
	
Attenuated	expected	reward	value	activation	in	the	amygdala-
hippocampal	complex	and	parahippocampal	gyrus	in	SC.	
Prediction	error	encoding	activation	attenuated	in	caudate,	thalamus,	
insula,	and	amygdala-hippocampal	complex	in	SC.		
Severity	of	psychotic	symptoms	correlated	with	the	degree	of	attenuated	
activation	during	encoding	of	expected	reward	value	and	prediction	error	
at	outcome	
Gradin	et	al.	(2011)	
Probabilistic	learning	task	
(gain/gain	omission)	
14	SC	
18	HC	
Weaker	functional	connectivity	between	regions,	including	the	midbrain	
and	right	insula,	in	SC.		In	response	to	rewards,	task-related	regions	
(midbrain,	striatum,	amygdala/hippocampus)	did	not	significantly	
activate	but	salience	network	regions	(insula,	anterior	insular	cortex)	did.	
Both	regions	activated	in	UI.	
Gradin	et	al.	(2013)	
MID	 94USib	
57UI	
fMRI	
Enhanced	activation	in	regions	associated	with	default	mode	network	in	
USib	during	reward	anticipation	and	consumption.		
Hanssen	et	al.	
(2015)	
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Paradigm	 Participants		 Group	differences	 Reference	
MID	 21	SCRisk	
24	UI	
Increased	activation	in	prefrontal	cortical	regions	and	the	posterior	
cingulate	cortex	during	reward	anticipation	in	SCRisk.	
Positive	symptoms	correlated	with	VS	and	anterior	insula	activation	
during	reward	anticipation.	There	was	an	inverse	correlation	between	VS	
activation	during	outcome	and	negative	symptoms.		
Wotruba	et	al.	
(2014)	
Classic	conditioning	to	
aversive	stimuli	
100	UI	
SCR	
	
Reality	distortion	and	introvertive	anhedonia	inversely	related	to	skin	
conductance	response	(arousal)	during	presentation	of	aversive	
conditioned	stimuli.	Introvertive	anhedonia	also	correlated	with	response	
time	for	conditioned	stimuli			
Balog	et	al.	(2013)	
	
Note.	MID	=	Monetary	Incentive	Delay	task	where	motivated	behaviour	for	gain	(reward	or	avoid	loss);	CS	=	conditioned	stimulus;	UCS	=	
unconditioned	stimulus;	SC	=	individuals	with	schizophrenia;	SC*	=	antipsychotic	naïve	SC;	SC^	unmedicated	SC;	UI	=	unaffected	
individual;	MDD	=	major	depressive	disorder;	AD	=	alcohol	dependence;	FDR	=	first	degree	relative	of	individual	with	schizophrenia;	
USib	=	unaffected	sibling	of	individual	with	schizophrenia;	SCRisk	=	medication	free	individuals	who	scored	high	on	measures	of	
psychosis	risk	and	proneness;	VS	=	ventral	striatum;	PFC	=	prefrontal	cortex.	
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3.4.4 How much do antipsychotics affect motivated behaviour? 
It	is	worth	considering	the	effect	of	medication,	given	that	antipsychotics	are	
dopamine	antagonists	(Seeman,	1987).	However,	the	findings	regarding	
antipsychotic	dose	and	behaviour	are	inconclusive.		Gold	et	al.	(2013)	found	no	
relationship	between	antipsychotic	dose	and	performance	during	a	
reinforcement	learning	task.		Insel	et	al.	(2014)	found	higher	atypical	
antipsychotic	doses	were	associated	with	increased	reinforcement	learning,	
increased	sensitivity	to	negative	feedback	(changed	behaviour	faster),	and	
reduced	prediction	error	responses	in	the	striatum	and	medial	prefrontal	
cortex.	Antipsychotics	have	also	been	shown	to	reduce	avoidance	behaviour	
(Feng,	Sui,	&	Li,	2013;	Zhang,	Fang,	&	Li,	2011).		
	 The	effect	of	antipsychotics	on	neural	activation	is	similarly	unknown.	
During	reward	anticipation,	typical	antipsychotics	attenuated	bilateral	VS	
activation,	whereas	only	left	VS	activation	was	attenuated	in	individuals	on	
atypical	antipsychotics	(Juckel,	Schlagenhauf,	Koslowski,	Filonov,	et	al.,	2006).		
However,	there	is	also	evidence	of	attenuated	VS	activation	in	unmedicated	
schizophrenia.	In	drug	naïve,	first-episode	psychosis,	activation	was	attenuated	
in	response	to	value	and	motivational	salience	in	the	ventral	tegmental	area,	VS	
and	anterior	cingulate	cortex	compared	to	matched	controls	(Nielsen	et	al.,	
2012).	Attenuated	reward-cue	activation	in	the	VS	positively	correlated	with	
positive	symptom	severity	(Nielsen	et	al.,	2012).	The	level	of	prediction-error	
VS	attenuation	between	drug	naïve	and	previously	medicated	individuals	with	
schizophrenia	was	comparable	(Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2014).	The	findings	suggest	
dampened	activation	in	the	VS	in	both	medicated	and	unmedicated	individuals.		
	 This	brief	review	shows	that	effects	of	antipsychotic	medication	on	
reward	processing	and	motivational	salience	are	inconsistent.	In	response	to	
value	and	motivational	salience,	similar	attenuated	activation	in	key	
mesocorticolimbic	regions	has	been	indicated	in	drug	naïve,	first-episode	
psychosis	and	medicated	schizophrenia.	One	of	the	issues	with	using	dose	as	a	
covariate	is	the	individual	variance	in	dose	efficacy.	In	other	words,	two	
individuals	who	present	with	similar	symptoms,	including	severity,	may	show	
variance	in	symptom	reduction	on	the	same	antipsychotic	and	dose.	Findings	
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indicating	an	association	with	reward	processing	deficits	and	dose	may,	
therefore,	be	due	to	factors	that	contribute	to	dose	efficacy.			
3.4.5 Summary 
Dopamine	could	signal	reward	(Schultz,	2010)	or	control	motivational	salience	
(Horvitz,	2000;	Jimmy	Jensen	&	Walter,	2014);	but	appears	to	do	both	(e.g.	
Boksem	et	al.,	2006;	Cooper	et	al.,	2014;	Dreher	et	al.,	2006;	Hird	et	al.,	2018;	
Twomey	et	al.,	2015)		Indeed,	dopamine	appears	to	mediate	the	interaction	
between	reward	value	and	motivational	salience.		
	 Impairments	in	motivated	behaviour	and	reward	processing	in	
schizophrenia	are	not	comparable	to	findings	which	rely	on	pharmacologically	
induced	dopamine	changes.		In	unaffected	individuals,	dopamine	agonists	
dampen	the	value	of	negative	outcome	(Shiner	et	al.,	2014)	whereas	
overexpression	of	D2	receptors	in	adult	rodents	increases	the	effort	for	reward	
(Trifilieff	et	al.,	2013).	In	schizophrenia,	reinforcement	learning	is	impaired	for	
appetitive	but	not	aversive	stimuli	(Strauss	et	al.,	2011;	Waltz	et	al.,	2007,	2011)	
and	participants	exhibit	reduced	effort	for	reward	(Fervaha,	Graff-Guerrero,	et	
al.,	2013;	Gold	et	al.,	2013;	Green	et	al.,	2015;	Reddy	et	al.,	2015;	Treadway	et	al.,	
2009).		
Positive	and	negative	symptoms	of	schizophrenia	are	associated	with	
different	impairments	that	affect	motivational	salience.	Specifically,	negative	
symptoms	are	associated	with	reduced	anticipation	(Gold	et	al.,	2012;	Strauss	et	
al.,	2011;	Wolf	et	al.,	2014)	whereas	positive	symptoms	affect	salience	(Gradin	
et	al.,	2011).	Neural		(Radua	et	al.,	2015;	Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2014,	2009;	D.	M.	
White	et	al.,	2015)	and	cognitive	(Duvarci	et	al.,	2018;	Gold	et	al.,	2013,	2008;	
Gradin	et	al.,	2011;	Koch	et	al.,	2010;	Krabbe	et	al.,	2015;	Premkumar	et	al.,	
2008;	Waltz	et	al.,	2009)	differences	in	schizophrenia	may	account	for	the	
conflicting	findings	and	highlight	the	limitations	of	research	in	non-clinical	
populations.		Reinforcer	sensitivity,	which	affects	motivated	behaviour	(Gomez,	
Cooper,	McOrmond,	&	Tatlow,	2004)	and	associated	neural	activation	(e.g.	
Amodio	et	al.,	2008;	Balconi	&	Crivelli,	2010;	De	Pascalis	et	al.,	2010;	Simon	et	
al.,	2010),	differs	in	schizophrenia	(Currie	et	al.,	2017).	However,	the	construct	
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validity	of	popular	measures	calls	into	questions	assumptions	made	from	the	
outcome	of	such	measures.		
Finally,	data	on	antipsychotic	medication	and	behavioural	and	neural	
indicators	are	mixed.	This	may	be	due	to	variables	that	affect	dose	efficacy.	The	
effect	of	antipsychotic	medication,	therefore,	requires	further	research	that	
incorporates	factors	beyond	merely	dose.		
	 Overall,	dopamine	appears	to	signal	both	salience	and	reward	value,	and	
may	control	their	interaction.	In	unaffected	individuals,	the	two	processes	are	
so	intrinsically	related	that	it	can	be	difficult	to	disentangle	effects	from	
underlying	neural	mechanisms.	Disruptions	to	normal	dopaminergic	
functioning	suggest	the	interaction	between	value	and	motivational	salience	is	
reliant	on	dopamine.	The	crucial	role	of	dopamine	is	evident	in	behavioural	and	
neural	disruptions	during	reward	processing	and	motivational	salience	in	
schizophrenia.	Importantly,	the	interaction	between	motivational	salience	and	
value	is	disrupted	in	schizophrenia	and	reflected	in	dysregulated	patterns	of	
neural	activation.	The	evidence	therefore	suggests	dopamine	does	not	signal	
value	or	salience,	but	both.		
3.5 Conclusions 
Mesocorticolimbic	pathways	are	associated	with	the	processing	of	both	
appetitive	and	aversive	stimuli	(Bromberg-Martin	et	al.,	2011;	Hage	&	Khaliq,	
2015;	Schultz,	2010),	with	registering	outcome	value,	and	with	motivational	
salience	(e.g.	Boksem	et	al.,	2006;	Cooper	et	al.,	2014;	Dreher	et	al.,	2006;	Hird	
et	al.,	2018;	Twomey	et	al.,	2015).	Deficits	in	reward	processing	in	
schizophrenia	can	be	linked	to	factors	contributing	to	motivational	salience.	
Impaired	decision-making	in	schizophrenia	affects	motivated	behaviour	
(Fervaha,	Graff-Guerrero,	et	al.,	2013;	Gold	et	al.,	2013;	Green	et	al.,	2015;	Reddy	
et	al.,	2015).	Specifically,	the		reduced	ability	to	update	stimulus-value	is	
diminished	(Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2014;	Waltz	&	Gold,	2007),	leading	to	impaired	
value	representations	during	decision-making	(S	E	Morris	et	al.,	2011).	Atypical	
neural	activation	can	account	for	some	differences	in	reward	and	motivation	in	
schizophrenia	(e.g.	Sarah	E.	Morris	et	al.,	2008;	Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2009),	but	
not	all.	However,	dopamine	signals	both	motivational	salience	and	value,	which	
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interact	in	unaffected	individuals.	The	dysregulated	pattern	of	behaviour	and	
neural	activation	in	schizophrenia	may,	therefore,	reflect	a	dissociation	between	
value	and	motivational	salience.
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4 Chapter Four 
Does dysfunctional motivational salience mediate the 
development of aberrant salience? 
4.1 Introduction 
Kapur	(2003)	proposed	that	dopaminergic	dysregulation	in	schizophrenia	
alters	motivational	salience	and	so	results	in	the	aberrant	assignment	of	
importance	to	irrelevant	stimuli.	Typically,	salient	stimuli	trigger	firing	in	
dopamine	neurons	(Fiorillo	et	al.,	2013;	Horvitz,	2000;	Salamone	et	al.,	2005;	
Schultz,	2010;	Wittmann	et	al.,	2007).	This	facilitates	the	assessment	of	the	
stimulus	in	regard	to	value	(threat	or	reward)	and	motivational	salience.	As	
defined	in	the	previous	chapter,	motivational	salience	is	the	desire	to	approach	
or	avoid	a	stimulus	and	incorporates	current	neurobiological	factors,	previous	
outcome,	situational	context,	and	stimulus	value.	According	to	Kapur	(2003),	
hyperdopaminergic	activation	in	schizophrenia	results	in	dopamine	neurons	
firing	outside	the	usual	context.	Given	the	typical	function	of	dopaminergic	
firing,	irrelevant	stimuli	that	are	present	during	dysregulated	firing	may	be	
assigned	value.	In	this	circumstance,	motivational	salience	is	based	purely	on	
spontaneous	neuronal	firing	and	not	on	attributes	of	the	current	external	
stimulus,	such	as	its	utility.	The	assignment	of	importance	to	irrelevant	stimuli	
is,	according	to	Kapur,	aberrant	salience.		
	 As	demonstrated	in	Chapter	2,	there	is	evidence	of	increased	aberrant	
salience	in	schizophrenia.	There	is	also	evidence,	outlined	in	Chapter	3,	that	
schizophrenia	is	associated	with	impaired	reward	processing	that	affects	
motivated	behaviour.	Reported	findings	linking	atypical	activation	in	reward-
related	regions	and	impaired	reward	processing	in	schizophrenia	are	
inconsistent.	However,	dysregulated	dopaminergic	activation	appears	to	affect	
salience	tracking	and	cognitive	functions	(e.g.	decision-making)	that,	in	turn,	
affect	motivational	salience.	In	this	chapter,	I	explore	whether	there	is	evidence	
to	support	Kapur's	(2003)	proposed	relationship	between	motivational	salience	
and	aberrant	salience.	
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	 Extending	the	behavioural	evidence	presented	in	section	2.4.1,	I	first	
review	behavioural	evidence	from	paradigms	not	specifically	measuring	
aberrant	salience.	I	review	behavioural	evidence	indicating	schizophrenia	is	
associated	with	a	tendency	to	focus	on	irrelevant	stimuli	during	reward	
processing.	This	is	followed	by	a	review	of	neuroimaging	evidence	of	atypical	
activation	in	regions	associated	with	reward	processing,	salience,	and	the	self.	
Next,	I	explore	the	disruptions	to	higher	cognitive	processing	and	how	these	
disruptions	may	contribute	to	aberrant	salience.	Finally,	I	highlight	gaps	in	the	
published	research	that	I	aim	to	address.		
4.2 Behavioural evidence 
To	understand	why	such	a	hypothetical	craving	would	be	directed	
toward	one	food	in	particular,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	incentive	
salience	attributed	by	an	activated	dopaminergic	system	is	not	simply	
projected	indiscriminately	toward	every	stimulus	in	sight.	Attributions	of	
incentive	salience	are	always	guided	by	systems	of	associative	
learning.(Berridge,	1996,	p.	17)	
	
The	salience	of	a	stimulus	is	determined	by	many	variables,	such	as	the	
individual’s	current	neurobiological	state,	prior	experience,	and	other	available	
stimuli.	In	schizophrenia,	there	appears	to	be	a	reduced	ability	to	discount	
irrelevant	stimuli	and	a	dampened	effect	of	relevant	stimuli.	Together,	these	
changes	lead	to	increased	distractibility,	aberrant	associative	learning,	and	
reduced	sensitivity	to	loss.		
	 Schizophrenia	is	associated	with	increased	interference	from	task-
irrelevant	cues	with	high	salience.	During	a	modified	Stroop	task,	smokers	with	
schizophrenia	were	slower	than	unaffected	smokers	to	identify	the	colour	of	
smoking-related	words	than	neutral	words	(Freeman	et	al.,	2013).	All	
participants	were	asked	to	refrain	from	smoking	15	minutes	prior	to	giving	
consent.	Reported	wanting	for,	and	enjoyment	of,	smoking	a	cigarette	increased	
with	time,	with	no	difference	between	groups.	Therefore,	the	findings	suggest	a	
reduced	ability	to	ignore	motivationally	salient	cues	in	schizophrenia.	
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	 Schizophrenia	is	also	associated	with	increased	interference	from	
neutral	cues.	Anticevic	et	al.	(2011)	investigated	the	effect	of	distractor	stimuli	
on	working	memory.	During	a	visual	working	memory	task	using	geometric	
shapes,	distractor	stimuli	were	either	task-relevant	(a	geometric	shape),	task-
irrelevant	(aversive	or	neutral	pictures),	or	not	present	(no	distractor).	
Participants	with	schizophrenia	rated	all	distractor	type	stimuli	as	more	
arousing	than	unaffected	individuals,	but	both	groups	rated	aversive	stimuli	as	
more	arousing	than	neutral	stimuli.	Unaffected	individuals	exhibited	reduced	
accuracy	following	aversive	distractors	compared	to	neutral	and	task-relevant	
distractors.	In	contrast,	schizophrenia	was	associated	with	reduced	accuracy	for	
all	distractor	types,	with	more	interference	from	neutral	and	task-relevant	
stimuli	than	unaffected	individuals.	There	was	no	effect	of	distractor	type	on	
response	time	and	group	accuracy	was	comparable	during	no	distraction.	The	
effect	of	neutral	stimuli	on	accuracy	in	schizophrenia,	despite	lower	arousal	
ratings	and	no	impact	on	motivated	behaviour,	suggests	an	inability	to	ignore	
irrelevant	stimuli.		
	 Irrelevant	cues	appear	more	salient	in	schizophrenia.	Morris,	Griffiths,	
Le	Pelley,	and	Weickert	(2013)	investigated	learned	irrelevance	in	
schizophrenia.	Learned	irrelevance	occurs	when	exposure	to	a	stimulus	with	no	
predictive	value	results	in	it	being	deemed	irrelevant.	Learned	irrelevance	can	
interfere	with	later	associative	learning	for	that	stimulus	(Dess	&	Overmier,	
1989).	Morris	et	al.	(2013)	found	learned	irrelevance	was	diminished	in	
schizophrenia	when	cognitive	load	was	high	(higher	number	of	cues),	but	
evident	when	cognitive	load	reduced.	Thus,	when	attentional	resources	were	
limited,	irrelevant	stimuli	were	more	salient.	Individuals	with	schizophrenia	
also	learnt	more	about	nonpredictive	cues	than	unaffected	individuals	and	did	
not	exhibit	the	bias	towards	predictive	cues	seen	in	unaffected	individuals.	The	
difference	between	groups	was	not	accounted	for	by	associative	learning	ability.	
Furthermore,	the	ability	to	ignore	irrelevant	stimuli	was	inversely	related	to	
positive	symptom	severity.	Diminished	learned	irrelevance	has	also	been	
reported	in	individuals	who	score	high	on	introverted	anhedonia	(Haselgrove	et	
al.,	2016),	one	attribute	of	schizotypy.		
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	 Relevant	cues	appear	less	salient	in	schizophrenia.	For	example,	Currie	
et	al.	(2017)	used	a	novel	version	of	the	prisoners’	dilemma	paradigm,	where	
participants	played	against	a	computer	that	followed	pre-programmed	
strategies:	loss,	gain,	or	neutral	(neither	co-operation	nor	betrayal	would	
outperform	the	other).	Unaffected	individuals	were	more	likely	to	co-operate	in	
gain	than	loss	trials.	However,	no	differences	were	indicated	in	co-operation	
choices	between	loss	and	gain	trials	in	schizophrenia.	Schizophrenia	has	also	
been	associated	with	reduced	susceptibility	to	confirmation	bias	(Doll	et	al.,	
2014)	and	reduced	learning	from	positive	(but	not	negative)	feedback	(Dowd	et	
al.,	2016).	These	findings	cannot	simply	be	attributed	to	deficits	in	
reinforcement	learning,	which	appears	intact	in	schizophrenia	(Bansal	et	al.,	
2018;	Collins,	Albrecht,	Waltz,	Gold,	&	Frank,	2017).	Similarly,	the	argument	
that	deficits	in	working	memory	can	account	for	impaired	reinforcement	
learning	(Collins	et	al.,	2017)	fails	to	explain	valance	differences	seen	in	
schizophrenia.	 
	 Aberrant	salience	is	evident	in	the	increased	salience	of	irrelevant	
stimuli	in	schizophrenia	(Anticevic	et	al.,	2011;	R.	Morris	et	al.,	2013).	However,	
reduced	adaptive	salience	also	appears	to	occur	in	schizophrenia	(Currie	et	al.,	
2017;	Doll	et	al.,	2014;	Dowd	et	al.,	2016).	The	argument	that	reduced	adaptive	
salience	is	due	to	the	effect	of	antipsychotics	in	dampening	dopaminergic	
activation	(Roiser	et	al.,	2009)	is	challenged	by	evidence	of	reduced	adaptive	
salience	in	both	medicated	and	unmedicated	first-episode	psychosis	
(Smieskova	et	al.,	2015)	and	attenuated	reward-related	neural	activation	was	
also	found	in	drug	naive	schizophrenia	(Nielsen	et	al.,	2012;	Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	
2014).	Conversely,	increased	aberrant	and	reduced	adaptive	salience	supports	
the	argument	of	a	dissociation	between	value	and	motivational	salience	in	
schizophrenia.	In	other	words,	the	salience	of	relevant	and	irrelevant	stimuli	
appears	to	converge	in	schizophrenia.	
4.3 Neuroimaging evidence 
There	are	a	number	of	neural	regions	associated	with	reward	processing	and	
motivational	salience	that	show	atypical	activation	in	schizophrenia.	Typical	
phasic	firing	of	dopamine	neurons	triggers	activation	or	inhibition	in	these	
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regions.	Dysregulated	dopaminergic	firing	can,	therefore,	lead	to	atypical	
behaviour.	For	example,	the	artificial	stimulation	of	ventral	tegmental	
dopamine	neurons	in	rats	led	to	reward-related	behavioural	responses	to	
neutral	stimuli	that	had	no	predictive	or	sensory	reward	cues	(Saunders,	
Richard,	Margolis,	&	Janak,	2018).	This	is	consistent	with	Kapur’s	(2003)	idea	
that	aberrant	dopaminergic	firing	can	instigate	or	create	aberrant	conditioned	
responses	to	irrelevant	stimuli.		
4.3.1 Atypical activation during reward processing: value or salience?  
One	of	the	key	regions	involved	in	reward	processing,	the	VS,	shows	disordered	
activation	in	schizophrenia.	Compared	to	unaffected	individuals,	schizophrenia	
is	associated	with	reduced	activation	in	the	VS	in	response	to	reward	cues,	
whether	these	relate	to	gain	or	omission	of	loss	(Nielsen	et	al.,	2012;	Radua	et	
al.,	2015).	This	has	been	shown	in	unmedicated	patients	(Juckel,	Schlagenhauf,	
Koslowski,	Wüstenberg,	et	al.,	2006;	Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2009)	and	those	on	
typical,	but	not	atypical,	antipsychotics	(Juckel,	Schlagenhauf,	Koslowski,	
Filonov,	et	al.,	2006).	Attenuated	VS	activation	during	reward	anticipation	has	
also	been	found	in	first-episode	psychosis	(Esslinger	et	al.,	2012)	and	
individuals	with	a	first-degree	relative	with	schizophrenia	(Grimm	et	al.,	2014).	
However,	the	pattern	of	attenuated	VS	activation	in	schizophrenia	is	
inconsistent.	For	example,	compared	to	unaffected	individuals,	individuals	with	
schizophrenia	have	shown	no	difference	in	VS	activation	to	gain	and	loss	
outcomes	(Waltz	et	al.,	2010;	Wolf	et	al.,	2014),	attenuated	VS	activation	to	gain	
only	(Hägele	et	al.,	2014;	Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2009)	and	enhanced	VS	activation	
during	reward	encoding	(Gradin	et	al.,	2011).	A	similar	inconsistent	pattern	has	
been	found	in	response	to	neutral	(non-salient)	cues,	with	VS	activation	
attenuated	(Jimmy	Jensen	&	Walter,	2014)	or	comparable	to	gain	and	loss	cues	
(Nielsen	et	al.,	2012).	Activation	of	the	VS	in	schizophrenia,	therefore,	appears	
inconsistently	dysregulated.		
	 Atypical	VS	activation	during	reward	processing	varies	with	symptom	
severity.	Papanastasiou	et	al.	(2018)	investigated	differences,	in	striatal	and	PFC	
neural	activation	during	reward	processing,	between	individuals	scoring	low	or	
high	on	the	psychotic-like	experience	(PLE)	scale	at	two	time	points:	14	and	19	
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years	of	age.	Compared	to	the	low	PLE	group,	high	PLE	was	associated	with	
decreased	striatal	activation	and	increased	PFC	activation	at	19	compared	to	14	
years.	Positive	symptoms	have	been	associated	with	increased	VS	activation	in	
individuals	considered	UHR	(Wotruba	et	al.,	2014)	but	attenuated	activation	in	
unmedicated	individuals	diagnosed	with	schizophrenia	(Nielsen	et	al.,	2012).	
During	reward	anticipation,	activation	in	the	VS	and	right	anterior	insula	
positively	correlated	with	positive	symptoms	in	UHR	individuals	(Wotruba	et	
al.,	2014).	However,	activity	in	the	left	VS	and	medial	orbitofrontal	cortex	
inversely	related	to	negative	symptoms	(Wotruba	et	al.,	2014).	Attenuated	VS	
activation	correlated	with	the	severity	of	negative	symptoms	in	schizophrenia,	
both	unmedicated	(Juckel,	Schlagenhauf,	Koslowski,	Wüstenberg,	et	al.,	2006)	
and	those	on	typical	antipsychotics	(Juckel,	Schlagenhauf,	Koslowski,	Filonov,	et	
al.,	2006).	Attenuated	VS	activation	in	response	to	salient	stimuli	predicted	
positive	symptom	severity	in	unmedicated	individuals	with	schizophrenia	
(Nielsen	et	al.,	2012).	Hence,	whereas	VS	activation	in	response	to	reward	cues	
was	associated	with	positive	symptoms	in	UHR,	attenuated	VS	activation	was	
related	to	positive	and	negative	symptoms	in	individuals	with	schizophrenia,	
with	some	indication	of	this	in	individuals	with	sub-clinical	symptoms.		
	 As	reviewed	in	Chapter	3,	VS	activation	signals	salience.	In	unaffected	
individuals,	VS	activation	was	enhanced	for	cues	with	high	context	salience	
rather	than	unusual	cues	with	high	novel	salience	(e.g.	rice	versus	a	caterpillar	
as	food;	Le	Pelley	et	al.,	2014),	for	reward-cues	even	when	unattended	(Le	
Pelley	et	al.,	2014),	and	during	decision-making	(Esslinger	et	al.,	2013).	VS	
activation	attenuates	with	repetition	(H.	Matsumoto	et	al.,	2016)	but	motivated	
behaviour	does	not	(Berridge,	1996;	Berridge	&	Robinson,	1998).	Greater	
implicit	aberrant	salience	(as	assessed	by	the	SAT)	predicted	attenuated	
reward-prediction	error	activation,	in	the	VS	and	orbitofrontal	cortex,	and	
higher	ventral	striatal	presynaptic	dopamine	capacity	(Boehme	et	al.,	2015).	
Thus,	as	well	as	reward	value,	enhanced	VS	activation	signals	adaptive	and	
aberrant	salience.	
	 Atypical	VS	activation	affects	aberrant	salience.	Administration	of	an	
NMDA	receptor	antagonist	to	mice,	inducing	schizophrenia-like	responses,	
resulted	in	altered	neural	responses	suggestive	of	increased	aberrant	salience	
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and	reduced	adaptive	salience	(Moessnang,	Habel,	Schneider,	&	Siegel,	2012).	In	
schizophrenia,	incorrect	identification	of	a	distractor	stimulus	as	salient	was	
associated	with	increased	prefrontal	and	striatal	activation	(Ceaser	&	Barch,	
2016).	The	degree	of	striatal	activation	positively	correlated	with	self-reported	
aberrant	salience	(Ceaser	&	Barch,	2016).	Reduced	adaptive	behaviour	in	
schizophrenia	predicted	attenuated	activation	in	the	globus	pallidus,	which	is	
innervated	by	the	VS	(Ceaser	&	Barch,	2016).	
	 EEG	findings	suggests	aberrant	attention	is	given	to	irrelevant	stimuli	in	
schizophrenia.	Anderson	et	al.	(2016)	investigated	neural	activation	to	target	
and	distractor	(novel,	neutral,	and	aversive)	stimuli	in	schizophrenia,	first-
degree	relatives,	and	unaffected	individuals.	ERPs	of	interest	included:	P3a,	
which	is	associated	with	novelty	detection;	P3b,	associated	with	task-relevant	
cues;	and	the	late	positive	potential	(LPP),	which	is	typically	larger	for	
emotional	stimuli.	First-degree	relatives	and	individuals	with	schizophrenia	had	
smaller	P3b	amplitudes	in	response	to	target	stimuli,	indicating	reduced	
attentional	processing.	In	response	to	aversive	stimuli,	they	found	attenuated	
early-LPP’s	in	first-degree	relatives	and	individuals	with	schizophrenia,	
indicating	deficits	in	attention.	First-degree	relatives	also	exhibited	increased	
sustained	attention	(larger	late-LPP)	for	aversive	stimuli	that	was	not	found	in	
schizophrenia.	There	were	no	group	differences	in	P3a	amplitude,	thus	novelty	
detection	appeared	intact	in	schizophrenia.	However,	despite	having	ERP	
amplitudes	that	are	comparable	to	those	seen	in	first-degree	relatives,	
individuals	with	schizophrenia	behaved	differently.	Schizophrenia	was	
associated	with	slower	response	times	for	neutral	and	quicker	response	times	
for	aversive	stimuli.		
	 Conversely,	larger	LPP	amplitudes	(both	early	and	late)	to	negative	
stimuli	have	been	identified	in	schizophrenia.	Horan,	Hajcak,	Wynn,	and	Green	
(2013)	used	neutral	and	unpleasant	pictures,	with	the	latter	preceded	by	
negative	or	neutral	descriptions,	during	EEG.	Unaffected	individuals	had	larger	
LPP	in	response	to	negative	pictures	preceded	by	negative	descriptions	than	
those	preceded	by	neutral	descriptions	or	the	neutral	pictures.	In	
schizophrenia,	compared	to	neutral	conditions,	a	larger	early	LPP	(indicating	
increased	attention	or	motivational	salience)	occurred	in	response	to	negative	
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pictures,	regardless	of	the	description	that	preceded	it.	The	late-LPP	in	
schizophrenia	was	larger	for	negative	stimuli	preceded	by	a	neutral	description	
than	when	preceded	by	a	negative	one.	Thus,	neutral	information	appeared	to	
elicit	sustained	attention	to	negative	stimuli.		
In	schizophrenia,	increased	VS	activation	predicted	aberrant	salience	
whereas	attenuated	activation	in	a	region	innervated	by	the	VS	predicted	
reduced	adaptive	behaviour	(Ceaser	and	Barch,	2016).	EEG	evidence	suggests	
reduced	attention	to	negative	stimuli	in	schizophrenia	and	first-degree	relatives	
(Andersen	et	al.,	2016).	Negative	cues	elicited	sustained	attention	in	first-
degree	relatives,	but	not	schizophrenia,	and	increased	motivated	behaviour	
schizophrenia	(Andersen	et	al.,	2016).	Conversely,	increased	initial	and	
sustained	attention	in	schizophrenia	was	reported	in	response	to	negative	
stimuli	(W	P	Horan	et	al.,	2013).	Sustained	attention	was	enhanced	when	the	
negative	cue	followed	an	irrelevant	stimulus.	The	overall	picture	is	one	where	
atypical	VS	activation	predicts	increased	aberrant	and	decreased	adaptive	
salience	in	schizophrenia		
	 The	relationship	between	VS	activation	and	salience	differs	in	first-
episode	psychosis	(FEP).	Compared	to	unaffected	individuals,	VS	activation	to	
reinforcer	stimuli	was	attenuated	in	antipsychotic	naïve	FEP	participants	
(Esslinger	et	al.,	2012).	The	difference	between	neutral	and	gain	trial	VS	
activation	was	significantly	smaller	than	in	unaffected	individuals,	although	
there	was	no	difference	in	response	time	to	reward	tasks.	Given	the	continued	
motivated	behaviour,	the	findings	suggest	atypical	VS	activation	decreased	
adaptive	salience	rather	than	affecting	reward	value.	However,	salience	
signalling	appeared	intact.	Antipsychotic	naive	FEP	rated	unknown	faces	as	
more	familiar.	In	contrast,	VS	activation	negatively	correlated	with	number	of	
non-famous	faces	rated	as	familiar	(aberrant	salience)	and	positively	with	
correct	identification	of	famous	faces	as	familiar	(adaptive	salience).	In	FEP,	
therefore,	VS	activation	is	attenuated	in	line	with	reduced	adaptive	salience	but	
is	not	enhanced	for	increased	aberrant	salience.		
	 The	pattern	of	striatal	activation	in	individuals	at	risk	of	psychosis	is	
similar	to	that	in	FEP.	Schmidt,	Antoniades	et	al.	(2016)	used	the	SAT	to	assess	
the	neural	correlates	of	aberrant	and	adaptive	salience	over	time	(mean	interval	
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17	months),	in	individuals	who	were	considered	UHR	(assessed	using	the	
Comprehensive	Assessment	of	At-Risk	Mental	States)	compared	to	individuals	
not	at	risk.	The	UHR	scored	higher	on	explicit	aberrant	salience	at	baseline	and	
higher	on	implicit	aberrant	salience	at	follow-up.	There	was	no	evidence	
supporting	a	relationship	between	altered	neural	activation	and	aberrant	
salience	scores.	Explicit	and	implicit	adaptive	salience	were	also	impaired	in	
UHR.	At	baseline,	impaired	adaptive	salience	was	related	to	attenuated	VS	
activation	during	reward	prediction.	At	follow-up	no	differences	between	
groups	were	shown.	Furthermore,	an	improvement	over	time	in	abnormal	
beliefs	in	UHR	was	associated	with	increased	VS	activation	related	to	adaptive	
salience.		
	 The	lack	of	evidence	supporting	a	relationship	between	VS	activation	
and	aberrant	salience	in	FEP	and	UHR	suggests	aberrant	salience	precedes	
striatal	dysfunction.	In	contrast,	attenuated	striatal	activation	appears	to	
coincide	with	reduced	adaptive	salience.	Furthermore,	improved	striatal	
activation	during	adaptive	salience	predicted	symptom	reduction.	Combined	
with	evidence	from	schizophrenia,	the	findings	appear	to	support	an	effect	of	VS	
activation	on	adaptive	but	not	aberrant	salience.		
	 Overall,	schizophrenia	is	associated	with	disordered	VS	activation	during	
reward	processing	paradigms.	However,	inconsistent	finding	suggest	a	poor	fit	
between	VS	activation	and	reward	value	or	valence	processing.	The	findings	
may,	instead,	reflect	the	effect	of	VS	activation	on	salience.	Prodromal	and	FEP	
findings	indicate	that	self-reported	aberrant	salience	precedes	the	onset	of	
changes	in	striatal	activation.	Thus,	aberrant	salience	may	affect	striatal	
function.	A	mechanism	by	which	this	may	occur	is	the	impact	of	cognitive	
functions	that	affect	salience	tracking	in	schizophrenia.		
4.3.2 The central executive network contributes to aberrant salience in 
schizophrenia 
Atypical	activation	in	the	central	executive	network	(CEN)	sustains	the	aberrant	
processing	of	stimulus	salience.	CEN	activation	is	enhanced	during	task-related	
activities	such	as	attention	and	decision-making	(Goulden	et	al.,	2014;	
Sridharan	et	al.,	2008).	A	key	node	of	the	CEN	is	the	dorsolateral	prefrontal	
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cortex	(dlPFC;	Goulden	et	al.,	2014;	Sridharan	et	al.,	2008).	Activation	in	the	
dlPFC	signals	working	memory	and	attentional	processing,	including	the	
filtering	out	of	distractor	stimuli	(Anticevic	et	al.,	2011;	Katsuki	&	
Constantinidis,	2012).		
	 Anticevic	et	al.	(2011)	investigated	the	effect	of	neutral	and	aversive	
distractors	on	working	memory	maintenance.	In	unaffected	individuals,	dlPFC	
activation	predicted	better	working	memory	and,	during	distractor	stimuli,	task	
performance.	The	relationship	between	better	performance	and	dlPFC	
activation	was	absent	in	schizophrenia.	In	unaffected	individuals,	dlPFC	
activation	was	enhanced	in	response	to	aversive,	compared	to	neutral,	
distractor	stimuli.	This	pattern	was	reversed	in	schizophrenia,	with	higher	
dlPFC	activation	in	response	to	neutral	distractor	stimuli.	Given	the	role	of	the	
dlPFC	in	filtering	distractors	(Anticevic	et	al.,	2011;	Katsuki	&	Constantinidis,	
2012),	these	findings	suggest	attenuated	dlPFC	activation	decreases	filtering	of	
irrelevant	stimuli,	increasing	attention	to	neutral	stimuli	yet	diminishing	
attention	to	aversive	stimuli.	This	pattern	of	diminished	difference	between	
aversive	and	neutral	task-related	dlPFC	activation	is	similar	to	that	found	
between	reinforcer	(gain/loss)	and	irrelevant	(neutral)	stimuli	in	reward-
related	regions	(Esslinger	et	al.,	2012;	Gradin	et	al.,	2013;	Grimm	et	al.,	2014)	
The	emerging	pattern	is	one	where	neural	activation	in	response	to	stimuli	that	
could	be	deemed	relevant,	on	the	basis	of	rewarding	or	aversive	outcomes,	is	
diminished	in	schizophrenia	but	activation	to	irrelevant,	neutral	stimuli	is	
enhanced.	
The	neural	correlates	of	aberrant	salience	in	the	CEN	differ	between	
unaffected	individuals	and	individuals	with	schizophrenia.	In	unaffected	
individuals,	attenuated	dlPFC	activation	was	associated	with	explicit	aberrant	
salience,	as	measured	by	the	SAT	(Roiser	et	al.,	2010).	This	finding	contrasts	
with	the	association	between	enhanced	dlPFC	activation	and	aberrant	salience	
in	schizophrenia	(Anticevic	et	al.,	2011).	Differences	in	methodologies	may	have	
contributed	to	the	conflicting	findings.	Anticevic	et	al.	(2011)	measured	implicit	
aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia,	with	increased	dlPFC	activation	indicating	
aberrant	attentional	processing.	Roiser	et	al.	(2010)	assessed	the	correlation	
between	aberrant	reinforcement	learning	and	neural	activation	during	
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presentation	of	low	versus	high	reward	probability	cues	in	unaffected	
individuals.	Irrelevant	stimuli	that	were	erroneously	associated	with	higher	
probability	of	reward	elicited	a	smaller	dlPFC	response.	This	effect	was	greater	
in	unaffected	individuals	who	scored	higher	in	explicit	aberrant	salience.	Given	
Anticevic	et	al.’s	(2011)	findings,	the	attenuated	activation	in	the	dlPFC	in	the	
Roiser	et	al.	(2010)	study	may	reflect	reduced	working	memory.	However,	a	
more	likely	explanation	lies	with	the	issue	of	generalising	findings	from	
unaffected	individuals	to	individuals	with	schizophrenia.	Aberrant	salience	is	
evident	in	unaffected	individuals,	but	higher	in	schizophrenia	(e.g.	Cicero	et	al.,	
2010;	Haralanova	et	al.,	2012;	Katthagen	et	al.,	2016;	Roiser	et	al.,	2010).	
According	to	Kapur	(2003),	hyperdopaminergic	activation	in	schizophrenia	
creates	salience	of	irrelevant	stimuli.	However,	ostensibly	healthy	participants	
would	not	be	expected	to	have	hyperdopaminergic	activation.	Furthermore,	
neural	activation	in	response	to	neutral,	appetitive,	and	aversive	stimuli	differs	
between	unaffected	individuals	and	those	with	schizophrenia	(Esslinger	et	al.,	
2012;	W	P	Horan	et	al.,	2013;	J	Jensen	et	al.,	2008;	Koch	et	al.,	2010).	Therefore,	
underlying	neural	differences	between	the	groups	likely	explain	the	difference	
in	the	degree	of	aberrant	salience.		
4.3.3 The default mode network contributes to aberrant salience in 
schizophrenia 
Atypical	activation	in	the	default	mode	network	(DMN)	precedes	symptom	
onset,	is	associated	with	symptoms	of	schizophrenia,	and	impairs	task-related	
performance.	The	DMN,	which	includes	the	posterior	cingulate	cortex	and	
medial	prefrontal	cortex	(mPFC;	Buckner	et	al.,	2008;	Uddin	et	al.,	2009),	is	
usually	more	active	during	self-referential	tasks	and	less	active	during	task	
performance	(Buckner	et	al.,	2008;	Crone	et	al.,	2011;	Scheibner	et	al.,	2017).	
Reduced	resting-state	functional	connectivity	within	the	DMN	has	been	
reported	in	both	individuals	with	schizophrenia	(Bluhm	et	al.,	2007;	Mannell	et	
al.,	2010;	Whitfield-Gabrieli	et	al.,	2009)	and	first	degree	relatives	(Jang	et	al.,	
2011).	Reduced	prefrontal	resting-state	DMN	functional	connectivity	correlated	
with	increased	psychopathology	scores	in	first	degree	relatives	(Jang	et	al.,	
2011).	In	early	psychosis,	resting	state	hyperactivation	in	the	mPFC	has	been	
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associated	with	positive,	but	not	negative,	symptoms	(Anticevic	et	al.,	2015).	In	
schizophrenia,	reduced	resting-state	right	anterior	PFC	activation	was	
associated	with	negative	symptoms	(Mingoia	et	al.,	2012).	Additionally,	
impaired	working	memory	performance	in	schizophrenia	was	predicted	by	
DMN	hypoactivation	during	resting-state	(Whitfield-Gabrieli	et	al.,	2009).	In	
treatment-resistant	schizophrenia,	increased	resting-state	functional	
connectivity	between	the	dorsal	striatum	and	DMN	regions	correlated	with	
positive	symptom	severity	(T.	P.	White,	Wigton,	et	al.,	2016).	During	task-
related	activity,	first-degree	relatives	and	individuals	with	schizophrenia	
exhibited	increased	activation	in	the	mPFC	and	the	dlPFC,	with	performance	
negatively	correlating	with	mPFC	activation	(Whitfield-Gabrieli	et	al.,	2009).	
Finally,	compared	to	unaffected	individuals,	increased	activation	in	the	DMN	
during	reward	anticipation	has	been	reported	in	individuals	with	subclinical	
symptoms	of	psychosis	(Wotruba	et	al.,	2014)	and	first-degree	relatives	
(Hanssen	et	al.,	2015).	Combined,	the	evidence	suggests	resting-state	DMN	
hypoactivation	is	associated	with	symptoms	of	schizophrenia,	with	DMN	
hyperactivation	during	task-related	activities	impairing	performance.		
	 The	lack	of	DMN	suppression	during	task-related	activation	is	associated	
with	increased	salience	of	irrelevant	stimuli	and	reduced	adaptive	salience.	
Mice	given	an	NMDA	receptor	antagonist,	to	induce	schizophrenia-like	
behaviour,	exhibited	altered,	salience-specific	neural	responses	(Moessnang	et	
al.,	2012).	In	mice	conditioned	to	a	stimulus	pair	(tone	+	shock),	mPFC	
activation	in	response	to	motivationally	salient	stimuli	(tone)	was	reduced	
following	administration	of	the	NMDA	receptor	antagonist.	Conversely,	mice	not	
conditioned	to	a	stimulus	pair	exhibited	an	increased	neural	response	to	
motivationally	salient	stimuli.	In	schizophrenia,	increased	activation	in	DMN	
regions	in	response	to	neutral	distractors	was	also	seen	on	trials	where	the	
behavioural	response	to	a	task	was	incorrect	(Anticevic	et	al.,	2011).		
4.3.4 The salience network: the key to aberrant salience?   
The	SN	acts	as	a	switch	between	the	CEN	and	DMN	(Chand	&	Dhamala,	2016a;	
Goulden	et	al.,	2014;	Sridharan	et	al.,	2008;	Uddin,	2017c).	The	anterior	
cingulate	cortex	(ACC)	and	insula	(specifically	the	anterior)	are	two	nodes	of	the	
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SN	(Menon,	2015;	Uddin,	2017a).	Inactivation	of	the	ACC	reduced	rodent	
anticipatory	behaviour	to	rewarding	stimuli	and	increased	behaviour	to	
irrelevant	stimuli	(J.	Kim,	Wasserman,	Castro,	&	Freeman,	2016).	As	
anticipatory	behaviour	was	related	to	task	choice,	the	authors	argued	the	ACC	is	
necessary	to	reduce	the	distraction	from	irrelevant	stimuli	and	direct	attention.		
	 Atypical	SN	activation	in	schizophrenia	contributes	to	aberrant	salience.	
Reduced	activation	in	the	SN,	including	the	insula,	was	found	during	prediction	
error	at	outcome	(Gradin	et	al.,	2011).	Schmidt,	Palaniyappan	et	al.	(2016)	
found	reduced	right	insula-ACC	connectivity	during	reward	prediction	in	
unmedicated	(but	not	medicated)	first	episode	psychosis	compared	to	
unaffected	individuals.	The	authors	argued	that	the	predictive	strength	of	a	
salient	stimulus	triggers	insula	activation,	which	functions	to	identify	whether	
additional	processing	(motor	action	or	cessation,	acquisition	of	knowledge)	is	
required	to	update	the	predictive	model.	Their	argument	is	supported	by	
evidence	of	reduced	activation	in	the	insula	and	right	precentral	gyrus	(motor	
region)	during	adaptive	salience	in	first	episode	psychosis	(Smieskova	et	al.,	
2015).	Thus,	attenuated	activation	in	the	SN	may	be	a	key	factor	in	the	
difference	between	aberrant	salience	in	unaffected	individuals	and	individuals	
with	schizophrenia.		
4.3.5 The effect of antipsychotics on networks associated with aberrant salience 
Antipsychotics	decrease	activation	in	the	DMN	and	SN	during	the	resting	state.	
Wang	et	al.	(2017)	looked	at	the	effect	of	antipsychotics	on	DMN	and	SN	
functional	connectivity.	Compared	to	unaffected	individuals,	unmedicated	
schizophrenia	was	associated	with	increased	activation	during	resting-state	in	
many	DMN	regions,	including	right	posterior	cingulate/precuneus,	and	
increased	functional	connectivity	in	the	left	medial	frontal	gyrus,	left	precuneus,	
and	left	superior	frontal	gyrus.	Increased	activation	was	also	found	in	most	SN	
regions,	with	only	the	left	superior	temporal	gyrus	showing	increased	
functional	connectivity.	The	alterations	in	functional	connectivity	were	
associated	with	symptom	scores.	Activation	in	the	right	posterior	cingulate	
inversely	correlated	with	negative	symptoms	and	positively	with	positive	
symptom	such	as	delusions,	hallucinations	and	reality	distortions.	Following	6-
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8	weeks	of	treatment	with	antipsychotics,	the	abnormal	pattern	of	functional	
connectivity	in	the	DMN	was	no	longer	evident.	Similarly,	functional	
connectivity	in	regions	of	the	SN	decreased.	The	difference	in	right	posterior	
cingulate/precuneus	activation	pre-	and	post-treatment	negatively	correlated	
with	clinical	global	impressions	score	change.	In	other	words,	reduced	
symptoms	were	associated	with	reduced	hyperactivation	in	DMN	and	SN.	In	
conjunction	with	evidence	suggesting	these	regions	contribute	to	salience	
processing,	these	findings	implicate	the	DMN	and	SN	in	aberrant	salience.		
4.3.6 Summary 
The	aberrant	salience	hypothesis	is	that	positive	symptoms	of	schizophrenia	
arise	from	the	inappropriate	attachment	of	motivational	salience	to	functionally	
neutral	stimuli	and	a	maladaptive	reduction	in	the	motivational	salience	of	
reinforcers	(Kapur,	2003).	Schizophrenia	is	associated	with	atypical	activation	
in	the	VS	that:	is	linked	to	symptoms	(Juckel,	Schlagenhauf,	Koslowski,	Filonov,	
et	al.,	2006;	Nielsen	et	al.,	2012;	Papanastasiou	et	al.,	2018;	Wotruba	et	al.,	
2014);	is	associated	with	salience	during	reward	processing	(Ceaser	&	Barch,	
2016;	Esslinger	et	al.,	2012;	Nielsen	et	al.,	2012);	and	contributes	to	aberrant	
salience	(Ceaser	&	Barch,	2016;	W	P	Horan	et	al.,	2013).	Whereas	research	into	
motivational	and	aberrant	salience	has	focused	on	neural	regions	associated	
with	reward	processing,	other	neural	networks	are	also	implicated.	The	CEN,	
DMN,	and	SN	play	roles	in	salience	processing.	Sustained	attention	to	irrelevant	
stimuli	is	indicated	in	LPP	amplitudes	(Andersen	et	al.,	2016;	W	P	Horan	et	al.,	
2013)	and	CEN	activation	(Anticevic	et	al.,	2011).	Atypical	activation	in	the	DMN	
in	schizophrenia	is	associated	with	aberrant	processing	of	salience,	impaired	
task	performance,	and	is	indicated	in	first-degree	relatives	(Hanssen	et	al.,	
2015;	Whitfield-Gabrieli	et	al.,	2009).	Furthermore,	atypical	DMN	and	CEN	
activation	correlates	with	symptoms,	with	antipsychotics	reducing	both	atypical	
activation	and	symptoms	(Wang	et	al.,	2017).	The	SN	contributes	to	aberrant	
salience	by	failing	to	modulate	activation	in	the	DMN	and	CEN	(Gradin	et	al.,	
2011;	A.	Schmidt,	Palaniyappan,	et	al.,	2016;	Smieskova	et	al.,	2015).	Therefore,	
atypical	activation	in	the	SN	in	schizophrenia	impacts	on	the	CEN,	resulting	in	
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increased,	sustained	attention	to	irrelevant	stimuli,	and	the	DMN,	resulting	in	
aberrant	consolidation	of	information.		
4.4 Cognition and aberrant salience  
So	far,	the	discussion	of	aberrant	salience	has	focussed	on	simple	stimuli	and	
basic	neural	mechanisms	of	association.	However,	a	key	component	of	the	
aberrant	salience	hypothesis	is	the	cognitive	explanation	for	the	salience	of	
irrelevant	stimuli	(Kapur,	2003).	Two	potential	means	by	which	aberrant	
salience	may	contribute	to	such	cognitive	explanations	are	discussed	below.	I	
then	explore	how	impaired	cognitive	function	(discontinuity)	may	contribute	to	
aberrant	salience	leading	to	symptoms	(self-disorders).	Finally,	I	review	
evidence	supporting	the	argument	that	extension	of	the	mechanisms	underlying	
aberrant	salience	provides	an	explanation	within	the	aberrant	salience	
hypothesis	for	the	formation	of	negative	symptoms.		
4.4.1 Explaining irrelevant stimuli 
Anselme	and	James	(2015)	argued	that	conscious	explanations	are	used	to	
rationalise	thoughts,	beliefs,	and	actions.	In	schizophrenia,	neural	mechanisms	
signal	(Boehme	et	al.,	2015;	Ceaser	&	Barch,	2016;	Esslinger	et	al.,	2013)	and	
maintain	(Andersen	et	al.,	2016;	W	P	Horan	et	al.,	2013)	irrelevant	stimuli	as	
important.	However,	irrelevant	stimuli	have	no	predictive	value.	The	failure	of	
stimuli	to	predict	the	expected	outcome	results	in	a	mismatch	between	
expectation	and	outcome,	expressed	as	a	prediction	error	signalled	by	
dopamine	(Anselme	&	James,	2015).	Deficits	in	updating	information	associated	
with	schizophrenia	(Gradin	et	al.,	2011;	Waltz	et	al.,	2009)	may	contribute	to	a	
rigidity	in	beliefs	about	stimulus	associations,	leading	patients	to	formulate	
cognitive	explanations	that	facilitate	the	development	of	symptoms,	such	as	
delusions	and	hallucinations.		
	 Unexpected	outcomes	that	disconfirm	beliefs	trigger	neural	responses	in	
regions	associated	with	reward	processing,	salience,	and	cognition.	
Schwartenbeck,	FitzGerald,	and	Dolan	(2016)	investigated	neural	regions	
associated	with	Bayesian	surprise,	the	shift	in	belief	about	outcomes	due	to	a	
difference	between	prior	and	subsequent	beliefs.	An	example	of	Bayesian	
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surprise	is	the	change	in	predictive	value	of	a	stimulus,	that	is	always	rewarded,	
after	an	unfavourable	outcome.	Bayesian	surprise	elicits	a	strong	attentional	
response	to	the	stimulus	in	question	(Itti	&	Baldi,	2009).	Schwartenbeck	et	al.	
(2016)	found	Bayseian	surprise	activated	regions	in	the	midbrain	(VTA	and	
substantia	nigra	pars	compacta),	inferior	frontal	cortex,	posterior	parietal	
cortex,	and	ACC.	Thus,	the	shift	in	outcome	impacted	not	only	reward	regions	
but	also	those	associated	with	the	highest	levels	of	cognitive	processing.		
4.4.2 Aberrant salience and self-disorders 
Mishara	et	al.	(2016)	argue	that	self-disorders—disruptions	to	a	coherent,	
stable	sense	of	self	that	are	evident	in	schizophrenia—can	also	be	explained	
within	the	aberrant	salience	framework.	Reductions	in	temporal	linking	
(continuity)	can	result	in	discarding	information	from	past	experiences,	causing	
attribution	of	self-generated	actions	to	external	agents,	and	so	dysfunction	of	
cognitive	explanations.	Due	to	the	discontinuity	between	perceived	action	and	
outcome,	future	such	events	are	then	unexpected,	triggering	a	prediction	error	
that	further	disrupts	explanation.	Reduced	continuity	may	also	lead	to	
previously	encountered	novel	events	being	subsequently	assigned	importance	
due	to	the	occurrence	of	neural	activation	that	indicates	salience.	The	
experienced	aberrant	salience	then	further	contributes	to	self-disorders.		
4.4.3 Aberrant salience and negative symptoms 
The	inclusion	of	self-referential	and	salience	processing	networks,	which	are	
disrupted	during	reward	processing	in	schizophrenia	and	linked	to	aberrant	
salience,	may	offer	a	potential	explanation	for	the	negative	symptoms	of	
schizophrenia.	Maeda,	Takahata,	Muramatsu,	and	Okimura	(2013)	found	
negative	symptoms	of	schizophrenia	were	associated	with	a	reduced	sense	of	
agency.	However,	paranoid	schizophrenia	was	associated	with	increased	sense	
of	agency,	even	when	the	external	event	(tone)	preceded	action	(button	press).	
Dysregulated	activation	in	the	DMN	is	indicated	during	reward	and	salience	
processing	and	linked	to	symptoms.	Attenuated	resting-state	activation	in	the	
DMN	is	associated	with	positive	symptoms	(Anticevic	et	al.,	2015)	whereas	
hyperactivation	during	resting-state	is	associated	with	negative	symptoms	
(Mingoia	et	al.,	2012).	Activation	in	the	DMN,	due	to	failure	of	the	SN,	may	
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therefore	play	a	key	role	in	the	expression	of	symptoms	that	arise	from	a	
common	aberrant	processing	of	salience.		
4.4.4 Summary 
Cognitive	explanations	are	affected	by,	and	affect,	aberrant	salience.	Current	
mechanisms	underlying	aberrant	salience	focus	on	the	influence	of	dopamine	
on	motivational	salience.	Cognitive	disruptions	also	contribute	to	aberrant	
salience	leading	to	a	disrupted	sense	of	self.	Inclusion	of	neural	networks	
involved	in	self-referential	processing	and	salience	processing	extends	the	
aberrant	salience	hypothesis	and	may	provide	an	explanation	for	the	
development	of	negative	symptoms.		
4.5 Conclusion 
Schizophrenia	is	associated	with	reduced	adaptive	and	increased	aberrant	
salience.	Specifically,	increased	motivated	behaviour	has	been	reported	for	
irrelevant	(Freeman	et	al.,	2013;	R.	Morris	et	al.,	2013)	and	neutral	cues	
(Anticevic	et	al.,	2011)	and	decreased	motivated	behaviour	for	relevant	cues	
(Currie	et	al.,	2017).	Activation	in	a	key	reward-related	region,	the	VS,	also	
signals	salience	(Ceaser	&	Barch,	2016;	Moessnang	et	al.,	2012).	In	
schizophrenia,	VS	activation	is	attenuated	for	reinforcer	(gain	or	loss)	salience	
(Juckel,	Schlagenhauf,	Koslowski,	Filonov,	et	al.,	2006;	Juckel,	Schlagenhauf,	
Koslowski,	Wüstenberg,	et	al.,	2006;	Nielsen	et	al.,	2012;	Radua	et	al.,	2015;	
Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2009)	and	increased	for	irrelevant	stimuli	(Andersen	et	al.,	
2016),	with	irrelevant	stimuli	enhancing	the	salience	of	negative	stimuli	(W	P	
Horan	et	al.,	2013).		
	 Kapur	(2003)	suggested	that	dysfunctional	motivational	salience	
mediates	the	aberrant	assignment	of	importance	to	irrelevant	stimuli.	The	
proposed	underlying	mechanism	is	the	effect	of	hyperdopaminergic	activation	
in	creating	salience	of	irrelevant	stimuli.	Motivational	salience	is	the	level	of	
desire	to	obtain	or	avoid	a	stimulus	(Berridge,	2013;	Le	Pelley	et	al.,	2014).	
Neurological,	cognitive,	and	behavioural	evidence	suggests	deficits	in	
motivational	salience,	reward	processing,	and	salience	processing	in	
schizophrenia	(see	Chapter	3,	section	3.4).	These	deficits	take	the	form	of	
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reduced	adaptive	salience	and	increased	aberrant	salience	(Anticevic	et	al.,	
2011;	Currie	et	al.,	2017;	Doll	et	al.,	2014;	Dowd	et	al.,	2016;	R.	Morris	et	al.,	
2013).	However,	there	is	an	inconsistent	pattern	of	activation	in	the	striatum,	a	
key	dopaminergic,	reward-related	region.	Whereas	atypical	activation	in	the	
striatum	predicts	reduced	adaptive	salience	in	UHR	(A.	Schmidt,	Antoniades,	et	
al.,	2016),	FEP	(Esslinger	et	al.,	2012),	and	schizophrenia	(Ceaser	&	Barch,	
2016),	there	is	no	such	relationship	with	aberrant	salience.	Indeed,	the	
relationship	between	aberrant	salience	and	enhanced	striatal	activation	only	
appears	evident	in	schizophrenia	(Andersen	et	al.,	2016;	W	P	Horan	et	al.,	
2013).	Thus,	the	effect	of	motivational	salience,	as	a	function	of	reward-related	
regions	alone,	cannot	account	for	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia.		
	 Atypical	activation	in	networks	associated	with	salience	and	self-
referential	processing	may	better	explain	the	development	of	aberrant	salience.	
Activation	in	the	CEN	sustains	aberrant	salience,	impairing	filtering	of	
irrelevant	stimuli	(Anticevic	et	al.,	2011).	Task-related	activation	in	the	DMN	in	
schizophrenia	increases	aberrant	and	reduces	adaptive	salience	(Anticevic	et	
al.,	2011;	Moessnang	et	al.,	2012).	Central	to	both	the	DMN	and	CEN,	is	the	SN,	
which	is	responsible	for	switching	between	the	DMN	and	SN	networks.	
Attenuated	activation	in	the	SN	is	associated	with	increased	aberrant	(A.	
Schmidt,	Palaniyappan,	et	al.,	2016)	and	decreased	adaptive	salience	
(Smieskova	et	al.,	2015).	The	failure	of	the	SN	to	deactivate	the	DMN	results	in	a	
lack	of	continuity	in	self-agency,	leading	to	erroneous	explanations	about	the	
origin	of	action.	The	relationship	between	self-agency	and	action	may	provide	
an	account	for	the	negative	symptoms	of	schizophrenia	within	the	aberrant	
salience	hypothesis	(Maeda	et	al.,	2013).		
	 There	is	limited	support	for	the	idea	that	dysfunctional	motivational	
salience	mediates	the	development	of	aberrant	salience.	The	current	evidence	is	
primarily	based	on	dysregulated	neural	activation	associated	with	atypical	
behavioural	outcomes	for	the	individual	constructs.	No	available	studies	have	
directly	investigated	the	relationship	between	measures	of	aberrant	salience	
and	motivational	salience.	Kapur’s	(2003)	hypothesis	that	motivational	salience	
mediates	aberrant	salience,	therefore,	remains	untested.	Understanding	the	
relationship	between	aberrant	salience	and	motivational	salience	will	inform	
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investigations	into	the	neural	mechanisms	underlying	aberrant	salience.	
Anchoring	of	aberrant	salience	in	neural	systems	may	address	some	of	the	
current	limitations	of	the	aberrant	salience	hypothesis.	Furthermore,	although	
specific	measures	of	aberrant	salience	have	been	developed,	they	have	not	been	
compared.	It	is	important	to	establish	whether	the	construct	of	aberrant	
salience	is	common	to	measures	and	whether	these	constructs	are	unique	to	
schizophrenia.	Thus,	whereas	current	findings	appear	to	support	the	aberrant	
salience	hypothesis,	the	current	projects	seek	to	ascertain	whether	indices	of	
aberrant	salience	are	measuring	the	same	construct,	are	related	to	indices	of	
motivational	salience,	and	are	unique	to	schizophrenia.		
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5 Chapter Five 
The relationships among aberrant salience, reward 
motivation and reward sensitivity 
5.1 Abstract 
Change	in	reward	processing	and	motivation	may	mediate	the	relationship	
between	dopaminergic	dysregulation	and	positive	symptoms	of	schizophrenia.	
We	sought	to	investigate	the	measurement	of	aberrant	salience	and	its	
relationship	with	behavioural	measures	of	reward	and	motivation.	Participants	
(n	=	82)	completed	measures	of	aberrant	salience	(Aberrant	Salience	Inventory,	
Salience	Attribution	Task),	motivation	(Effort	Expenditure	for	Rewards	Task),	
reinforcer	sensitivity	(Stimulus	Chase	Task).	Hypotheses	were	tested	using	
correlation	and	generalised	linear	modelling.	Results	indicated	no	relationship	
between	aberrant	salience	measures.	The	ASI	was	positively	related	to	effort	
expenditure	for	lower	less	likely	rewards	and	predicted	the	use	of	probability	
alone	in	decision-making.		The	only	significant	relationship	between	reward	
and	motivation	was	a	positive	relationship	between	gain	sensitivity	and	
motivated	behaviour	for	higher	more	likely	rewards.	Although	some	support	for	
a	relationship	between	measures	of	reward	motivation	and	aberrant	salience	
was	found,	there	was	no	evidence	the	aberrant	salience	measures	had	
concurrent	validity.	Our	results	suggest	caution	is	warranted	when	interpreting	
measures	of	aberrant	salience.		
5.2 Introduction 
Dysregulation	of	the	neurotransmitter	dopamine	has	long	been	linked	with	the	
symptoms	of	schizophrenia.	One	prominent	hypothesis	on	the	role	of	dopamine	
in	the	development	of	symptoms	is	that	of	aberrant	salience.	According	to	
Kapur	(2003),	dopaminergic	dysregulation	leads	to	the	aberrant	assignment	of	
importance	to,	or	salience	of,	external	objects	and	internal	representations,	
such	as	thoughts.	In	turn,	many	of	the	consequent	epiphenomena,	or	subjective	
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experiences,	require	explanation	in	order	to	make	sense	of	the	world	(Howes	&	
Nour,	2016;	Kapur,	2003).	These	experiences	and	concomitant	explanations	
constitute	the	positive	symptoms	of	psychosis.	Although	not	fully	understood,	
many	regard	the	reward	system	and	motivation	as	key	mediators	in	the	link	
between	dopaminergic	dysregulation	and	psychosis	(Kapur,	2003).	
	 Dopaminergic	firing	is	associated	with	processing	of	reward-related	
stimuli	(Bromberg-Martin	et	al.,	2011;	L.	Zhang	et	al.,	2009;	Zweifel	et	al.,	2009).	
It	is	critical	in	the	evaluation	of	appetitive	(Balconi	&	Crivelli,	2010;	Jahn	et	al.,	
2014;	McNaughton,	2004;	Salamone	et	al.,	2005,	1997;	Wardle	et	al.,	2011)	and	
aversive	(Matsumoto	&	Hikosaka,	2009)	stimuli	and	is	involved	in	the	
production	of	motivated	behaviour,	as	seen	in	reward-based	learning	
paradigms.	For	example,	sensitivity	to	reward	or	punishment	(or	reinforcer	
sensitivity;	Corr	&	McNaughton,	2012)	has	been	shown	to	influence	motivated	
behaviour	(Cooper	et	al.,	2014;	Unger,	Heintz,	&	Kray,	2012).	Contextual	factors	
have	also	been	implicated	in	motivated	behaviour:	Motivated	behaviour	is	
influenced	by	the	likelihood	and	magnitude	of	associated	reward	(Sambrook	&	
Goslin,	2015;	Schultz,	2010),	whether	gain	or	loss	is	immediate	or	delayed	
(Berridge,	2013;	Smith	et	al.,	2016),		and	how	much	effort	is	required	for	a	
reward	(Bardgett,	Depenbrock,	Downs,	Points,	&	Green,	2009;	Salamone	&	
Correa,	2002).		
	 Schizophrenia	is	associated	with	anomalous	reward-related	behaviour	
and	cognitive	differences	in	reward	processing,	especially	when	tasks	require	
adaptation	to	changing	stimuli	or	value	assessments.	Differences	include	an	
impaired	ability	to	adapt	learning	strategies	based	on	changing	contingencies	
(Waltz	&	Gold,	2007),	greater	sensitivity	to	loss	(Scholten,	van	Honk,	Aleman,	&	
Kahn,	2006),	and	a	preference	for	smaller,	more	immediate	rewards	over	larger,	
delayed	rewards	(Heerey	et	al.,	2007).	Behavioural	differences	include	reduced	
willingness	to	expend	effort	for	reward	(Green	&	Horan,	2015;	Reddy	et	al.,	
2015),	especially	for	larger,	more	likely	rewards	(Barch,	Treadway,	&	Schoen,	
2014;	Fervaha,	Graff-Guerrero,	et	al.,	2013;	Gold	et	al.,	2013),	and	an	increased	
willingness	to	expend	effort	on	low	incentive	outcomes	(Fervaha,	Graff-
Guerrero,	et	al.,	2013).	The	difference	in	behaviour	across	high	and	low	
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incentive	scenarios	may	indicate	impairments	in	effort-cost	computation	in	
schizophrenia	(Fervaha,	Graff-Guerrero,	et	al.,	2013;	Gold	et	al.,	2013).	
	 However,	several	limitations	affect	this	literature.	First,	there	is	little	if	
any	research	into	if,	or	how,	factors	contributing	to	motivated	behaviour	relate	
to	aberrant	salience.	Second,	although	some	evidence	has	emerged	consistent	
with	the	aberrant	salience	hypothesis	of	schizophrenia	(Haralanova	et	al.,	2012;	
J	Jensen	et	al.,	2008;	Micoulaud-Franchi	et	al.,	2012),	findings	are	inconsistent.	
For	example,	although	increased	aberrant	salience	has	been	found	in	
schizophrenia	(Pankow,	Katthagen,	et	al.,	2015)	and	those	at	risk	of	psychosis	
(Cicero	et	al.,	2010),	other	findings	indicate	no	significant	difference	compared	
to	unaffected	individuals	(Ceaser	&	Barch,	2016;	Roiser	et	al.,	2009).	Third,	
there	is	a	dearth	of	evidence	that	diverse	measures	of	aberrant	salience	do,	
indeed,	measure	the	same	thing	or	relate	to	well-grounded	measures	of	
reinforcer	sensitivity.	Before	discrepancies	in	schizophrenia	research	can	be	
understood,	it	is	important	to	ascertain	the	validity	of	aberrant	salience	
measures	in	unaffected	individuals.	Therefore,	our	aim	was	to	investigate	the	
relationships	among	measures	of	aberrant	salience,	effort	expenditure,	and	
reinforcer	sensitivity	to	better	understand	the	construct	validity	of	two	
prominent	tests	of	aberrant	salience:	The	Salience	Attribution	Test	(SAT;	Roiser	
et	al.,	2009)	and	the	Aberrant	Salience	Inventory	(ASI;	Cicero	et	al.,	2010).		
	 The	SAT	is	a	computerised	task	that	yields	measures	of	implicit	and	
explicit	aberrant	and	adaptive	salience.	Implicit	salience	is	inferred	from	
response	time	differences	across	task	conditions	whereas	explicit	salience	is	
based	on	awareness	of	predictors	of	reward.	The	ASI	is	a	self-report	measure	of	
subjective	experiences	and	beliefs	attributed	to	aberrant	salience.	ASI	scores	
correlate	with	psychotic	experiences	(Lelli	et	al.,	2015).	Patients	with	
schizophrenia	and	those	identified	as	at-risk	of	psychosis	have	higher	ASI	
ratings	than	control	participants	(Cicero	et	al.,	2010).		
	 Performance	on	the	SAT	and	ASI	was	compared	with	that	on	the	Effort-
Expenditure	for	Rewards	Task	(EEfRT;	Treadway,	Buckholtz,	Schwartzman,	
Lambert,	&	Zald,	2009)	and	the	Stimulus	Chase	Task	(SCT;	Hall,	Chong,	
McNaughton,	&	Corr,	2011).	The	EEfRT	is	a	measure	of	decision-making	under	
conditions	of	differential	effort	expenditure	and	differential	outcome	potentials.	
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Those	with	schizophrenia	choose	hard	tasks	less	often	than	unaffected	
individuals	(Green	et	al.,	2015),	especially	when	the	value	and	likelihood	of	
rewards	are	higher	(Fervaha,	Graff-Guerrero,	et	al.,	2013;	Gold	et	al.,	2013;	
Reddy	et	al.,	2015).	However,	when	reward	value	and	likelihood	are	low,	
patients	choose	hard	tasks	more	often	(Brown	et	al.,	2013;	Fervaha,	Graff-
Guerrero,	et	al.,	2013).		
	 The	SCT	is	grounded	in	reinforcer	sensitivity	theory	(Corr,	2001;	Gray	&	
McNaughton,	2000;	McNaughton	&	Corr,	2004),	which	explains	variations	in	
goal	directed	behaviour	in	terms	of	the	sensitivity	of	approach,	avoidance,	and	
conflict	resolution	systems	(McNaughton	&	Corr,	2014).	The	SCT	provides	
indices	of	sensitivity	of	the	responder	to	gain	and	loss	outcomes	under	different	
conditions	of	approach	and	avoidance	(Hall	et	al.,	2011).	Previous	research	
using	SCT	indicates	individuals	tend	to	exhibit	loss	aversion	and	a	stronger	
approach	than	avoidance	tendency	(Hall	et	al.,	2011).	
	 We	hypothesised	that	measures	of	aberrant	salience	would	be	positively	
correlated	with	each	other,	negatively	related	to	effort	in	high-reward	high-
probability	scenarios,	and	positively	related	to	effort	in	low-reward	low-
probability	scenarios.	Given	evidence	of	higher	sensitivity	to	loss	in	
schizophrenia	(Scholten	et	al.,	2006),	it	was	hypothesised	that	aberrant	salience	
would	predict	an	increase	in	sensitivity	to	loss	relative	to	sensitivity	to	gain.	We	
also	expected	that	effort	expenditure	would	predict	greater	approach	vs.	
avoidance	tendencies	under	conditions	of	high	reward	likelihood	and	value	but	
predict	greater	gain	sensitivity	under	conditions	of	low	reward	likelihood	and	
value.		
	  
5: Study One       Page 115 of 233 
	
5.3 Methods 
5.3.1 Participants 
Undergraduates	(n	=	82)	in	introductory	courses	on	psychology	volunteered	as	
participants.	For	large	effects	in	correlational	analysis	(r	=	0.50)	where	a	=	0.05,	
a	sample	of	82	affords	power	of	>	0.99.	Participants	were	aged	17	to	57	years	
(m	=	20.0,	SD	=	5.7)	and	most	were	female	(68%).	Most	participants	identified	
as	New	Zealand	European	(71%)	with	smaller	numbers	identifying	as	Māori	
(16%)	or	other	ethnic	identity	(23%).	Having	completed	participation,	
volunteers	could	earn	a	small	amount	of	course	credit	based	on	assessment	of	
learning	about	the	study.	Participants	provided	written	informed	consent.	The	
study	was	approved	by	the	University	of	Otago	Human	Ethics	Committee	
(Health).	
5.3.2 Measures  
Aberrant	Salience	Inventory	(ASI)	
The	ASI	(Cicero	et	al.,	2010)	was	used	as	an	orally-administered	self-report	
measure	of	aberrant	salience.	The	ASI	contains	29	questions,	each	requiring	a	
yes	or	no	response	in	reference	to	lifetime	experiences.	Respondents	are	
directed	to	ignore	experiences	that	occurred	under	the	influence	of	drugs	or	
alcohol.	The	ASI	yields	a	single	score	calculated	as	number	of	yes	responses.	ASI	
shows	high	internal	consistency	(a	=	.89;	Cicero	et	al.,	2010;	Lelli	et	al.,	2015)	
and	test-retest	reliability	(.96	over	15	days;	Lelli	et	al.,	2015)		
Effort-Expenditure	for	Rewards	Task	(EEfRT)	
The	EEfRT	(Treadway	et	al.,	2009)	is	a	computerised	performance	task	that	
uses	decision-making	as	a	measure	of	motivation.	The	EEfRT	consists	of	a	series	
of	trials	in	which	the	respondent	must	choose	between	undertaking	a	hard	and	
an	easy	task,	each	of	which	is	associated	with	different	reward	values.	At	the	
start	of	each	trial,	participants	are	advised	the	probability	of	winning	(12%,	
50%	or	88%)	and	the	amount	of	reward	for	the	decision	alternatives.	They	are	
then	to	choose	to	complete	either	the	easy	or	hard	task.	The	easy	task	reward	is	
set	at	$1	and	requires	participants	to	complete	30	button	presses	with	the	
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dominant	index	finger	within	7	seconds.	The	hard	task	reward	varies	between	
$1.24	and	$4.30	and	requires	participants	to	complete	100	button	presses	with	
the	non-dominant	little	finger.	Feedback	at	the	end	of	each	trial	advises	whether	
money	was	available	for	that	trial	and	how	much	won.		
	 The	task	runs	for	20	minutes	so	the	number	of	trials	undertaken	
depends	on	the	proportion	of	hard-	versus	easy-task	decisions.	For	each	trial,	
the	probability	of	reinforcement	and	the	reward	value	for	the	hard	task	vary.	
Over	the	task,	the	probabilities	of	reinforcement	are	equalised,	with	each	
possible	combination	of	probability	and	reward	value	occurring	at	least	once.	
The	dependent	variable	is	task	choice.		
	 Factor	analysis	of	data	collected	from	94	schizophrenia	patients	on	five	
motivational	effort	paradigms,	including	the	EEfRT,	revealed	a	single	factor	
explained	53%	of	observed	variance.	The	correlation	between	the	factor	score	
and	EEfRT	reward	magnitude	was	strong	(r	=	.66;	William	P.	Horan	et	al.,	2015).	
Salience	Attribution	Test	(SAT)		
The	SAT	(Roiser	et	al.,	2009)	is	a	computerised	learning	paradigm	that	uses	
stimulus	reinforcement	to	assess	implicit	and	explicit	aberrant	and	adaptive	
salience.	The	task	consists	of	two	64-trial	blocks.	In	each	trial,	a	fixation	cross	
appears	centre	screen.	Then,	after	1000	ms,	a	line	drawing	of	an	object	or	
animal	appears	in	duplicate,	centred	above	and	below	the	fixation	cross.	A	black	
box	then	replaces	the	fixation	cross	and	participants	are	required	to	press	a	
button	as	soon	as	the	black	box	appears	but	before	it	disappears.	After	each	
trial,	auditory	and	visual	feedback	indicate	whether	the	trial	was	reinforced	and	
the	amount	of	money	earned.		
	 Participants	are	advised	that	reward	is	probabilistically	related	to	the	
stimulus	type	whereas	speed	of	response	determines	the	amount	of	money	that	
can	be	earned	(between	10¢	and	$1).	Participants	are	assigned	one	of	four	
possible	contingencies	that	remain	consistent	throughout	the	task.	The	
contingencies	are	whether	the	dimension	of	colour	(red	or	blue)	or	shape	
(household	object	or	animal)	of	the	picture	is	relevant.	For	the	task	relevant	
dimension,	one	level	(e.g.	household	object)	has	a	high	probability	(87.5%)	of	
being	reinforced	while	the	other	(e.g.	animal)	has	a	low	probability	(12.5%).	For	
5: Study One       Page 117 of 233 
	
the	task	irrelevant	dimension,	both	levels	(e.g.	blue	and	red)	have	a	50%	
probability	of	being	reinforced.	Participants	are	instructed	to	try	and	identify	
which	dimension	yields	the	highest	probability	of	reward.	After	each	trial-block,	
participants	complete	a	VAS	indicating	how	often	(%)	they	believed	each	
dimension	was	reinforced.		
	 SAT	output	for	each	participant	includes	single	measures	for	explicit	and	
implicit	adaptive	salience	and	aberrant	salience.	Implicit	salience	is	measured	
using	response	time	(ms)	while	explicit	salience	is	measured	using	a	VAS	rating	
(mm).	Adaptive	salience	is	calculated	as	the	difference	between	mean	response	
time	(RT)	for	low	(10%;	e.g.	household	object)	versus	high	(90%;	e.g.	animal)	
reinforcement	probability	trials	while	aberrant	salience	was	calculated	as	the	
absolute	difference	in	RT	between	the	two	task-	irrelevant	dimensions	(e.g.	blue	
and	red;	Roiser	et	al.,	2009).	
	 In	unaffected	individuals,	the	SAT	shows	good	discriminant	validity.	
Implicit	aberrant	salience	was	independent	of	learned	irrelevance,	
reinforcement	sensitivity,	working	memory	and	probabilistic	learning	(K.	
Schmidt	&	Roiser,	2009).	Although	explicit	measures	were	related	to	operant	
learning,	explicit	aberrant	salience	was	not	associated	with	schizotypy	(K.	
Schmidt	&	Roiser,	2009).	
Stimulus	Chase	Task	(SCT)	
The	SCT	(Hall	et	al.,	2011)	is	a	computerised	task	that	uses	reinforcement	to	
assess	relative	sensitivity	to	gain	and	loss	and	relative	tendency	to	engage	in	
approach	and	avoidance	behaviour.	In	each	of	two	phases	of	the	task,	
participants	start	with	a	balance	of	$180	and	are	advised	how	much	they	can	
gain	or	lose	at	the	start	of	each	trial,	with	the	probability	of	gain	or	loss	fixed	at	
50%.	The	value	of	gain	and	loss	is	manipulated	in	increments	of	2	between	8	
and	0.	For	example,	in	Block	1	the	gain	and	loss	amounts	are	+$8,	-$8,	Block	2	
+$8,	-$6,	Block	5	+$8,	-$0,	Block	11	+$6,	-$8,	and	Block	12	+$8,	-$8.	Each	block	
consists	of	5	trials.	With	50	blocks	per	phase,	each	incremental	gain	and	loss	
value	combinations	are	presented	in	two	blocks	(10	trials)	in	both	phases.	In	
Phase	1,	participants	must	click	on	the	blue	box	(approach	behaviour)	to	take	a	
chance	on	gaining	or	losing	the	stated	values	whereas	choosing	not	to	click	
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(avoid	behaviour)	will	incur	no	change	in	balance.	In	Phase	2,	avoidance	
behaviour	(not	clicking)	instigates	the	chance	of	winning	or	losing	whereas	
approach	behaviour	leads	to	no	change	in	balance.	Feedback	is	provided	by	a	
change	in	the	colour	of	the	blue	box	(to	red	for	loss,	green	for	gain,	and	grey	for	
no	change)	and	the	balance,	which	is	presented	next	to	the	box.		
	 As	with	the	SAT,	the	rationale	underlying	the	SCT	is	that	response	time	
will	vary	with	the	value	a	respondent	gives	to	a	trial	outcome	(Hall	et	al.,	2011).	
Behaviour	on	the	SCT	adheres	to	predictions	based	on	the	matching	law	(Hall	et	
al.,	2011).	Therefore,	the	matching	law	is	used	to	estimate	gain:loss	sensitivity	
and	approach:avoidance	tendency	ratios,	using	modelling	with	the	Microsoftâ	
Excel	Solver.	Participants	whose	data	does	not	conform	to	the	matching	law	are	
excluded	from	further	analysis.		
5.3.3 Procedure  
Having	provided	written	informed	consent,	participants	completed	a	
demographics	questionnaire	and	the	ASI	followed	by	the	three	computerised	
tasks	(EEfRT,	SAT,	and	SCT).	Computer	tasks	were	administered	in	
counterbalanced	order	across	participants.	Following	completion	of	all	the	
tasks,	participants	were	debriefed,	paid	the	money	they	won	($4	=	NZ$1),	and	
thanked	for	their	time.		
5.3.4 Data Analysis 
For	each	participant,	EEfRT	effort	was	calculated	as	the	proportion	of	hard	task	
choices	by	dividing	the	number	of	hard	task	choices	by	the	total	number	of	
trials	(Treadway	et	al.,	2009;	Treadway	&	Zald,	2013;	Wardle	et	al.,	2011).	The	
number	of	hard	choices	for	each	probability	level,	each	reward	magnitude	(£	$2,	
$2	to	$3,	³	$3),	and	each	probability-magnitude	combination	was	divided	by	
number	of	corresponding	trials.	The	estimated	value	was	calculated	by	
multiplying	probability	by	reward	magnitude	to	provide	the	proportion	of	small	
(<	1),	medium	(³	1	and	<2)	and	large	(³	2)	estimated	values	for	hard	task	
choices.		
	 Mixed	effects	modelling	was	used	to	calculate	group	and	individual	beta	
coefficients	for	models	of	EEfRT	decisions.	Modelling	included	random	
intercepts	and	random	slopes	for	reward	magnitude,	probability,	and	cross-
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level	reward	magnitude	´	probability	interactions.	For	each	participant,	beta	
coefficients	for	reward	magnitude,	probability,	and	their	interaction	were	
calculated	then	linear	modelling	was	used	to	assess	whether	the	effect	of	these	
variables	on	task	choice	during	EEfRT	was	related	to	measures	of	ASI,	SAT	and	
SCT.	As	assumptions	of	normality	were	not	met,	Kendall’s	tau	was	used	for	
correlational	analysis.	Analysis	was	completed	using	the	psych	(Revelle,	2016)	
and	lme4	(Bates,	Maechler,	Bolker,	&	Walker,	2015)	packages	in	R	(R	
Development	Core	Team,	2016)	and	Hmisc	(Harrell	Jr	et	al.,	2016).		
5.4 Results 
Data	from	3	participants	were	excluded	from	analyses	because	these	
participants	demonstrated	they	did	not	understand	task	requirements.	Data	
from	another	4	participants	were	excluded	because	of	equipment	failures.	Table	
5.1	shows	the	descriptive	statistics	from	the	key	measures.		
	 SCT	measures	of	interest	were	overall	gain:loss	and	approach:avoidance	
ratios,	where	a	gain:loss	ratio	over	1	indicates	reduced	loss	sensitivity	and	an	
approach:avoidance	ratio	over	1	indicates	an	approach	tendency.	
	 There	was	no	evidence	that	ASI	scores	correlated	with	SAT	indices	of	
adaptive	or	aberrant	salience,	whether	measured	implicitly	or	explicitly,	or	with	
gain:loss	or	approach:avoidance	ratios	from	the	SCT	(Table	5.2).	No	significant	
correlations	were	found	between	SCT	ratios	and	SAT	indices	(Table	5.2).	On	the	
SAT,	greater	implicit	aberrant	salience	predicted	greater	implicit	adaptive	
salience.	The	relationships	among	ASI	and	SAT	indices	remained	unchanged	
when	analyses	were	restricted	to	those	reporting	no	mental	health	issues	(n	=	
69).	
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Table	5.1		
Demographic	variables	for	ASI,	SAT,	EEfRT	and	SCT	indices	
Demographic		 ASI,	SAT,	EEfRT		
(n	=	82)	
SCT		
(n	=	55)	
Gender	n	(%)	 	 	
					Female		 56	(68)	 36	(65)	
					Male	 26	(32)	 19	(35)	
Age	in	years	m	(SD)	 20	(5.71)	 20	(5.29)	
Ethnicity	n	(%)	 	 	
					NZ	European		 58	(71)	 43	(78)	
					Maori		 5	(6)	 3	(5)	
					Other		 19	(23)	 9	(16)	
Currently	Employed	n	(%)	 12	(15)	 10	(18)	
Household	income	n	(%)	 	 	
					>	200k	 8	(10)	 5	(9)	
					101-150	 23	(28)	 15	(27)	
					76-100k	 20	(24)	 15	(27)	
					51-75k	 14	(17)	 12	(21)	
					26-50k	 7	(9)	 4	(7)	
					<25k	 1	(1)	 -	
Mental	Health	Diagnosis	n	(%)	 12	(15)	 9	(16)	
					Depression	 4	(5)	 4	(7)	
					Anxiety	Disorder	 3	(4)	 2	(4)	
					Depression	and	Anxiety	 2	(2)	 2	(4)	
					Eating	Disorder	 1	(1)	 -	
					Other	 2	(2)	 1	(2)	
Note:	ASI	=	Aberrant	Salience	Inventory;	SAT	=	Salience	Attribution	Test;	EEfRT	=	
Effort	Expenditure	for	Reward	Task;	SCT	=	Stimulus	Chase	Task;	Percent	rounded	to	
nearest	whole	number;	Household	income	in	NZ$	
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	 In	the	mixed	effects	modelling	of	EEfRT	decisions,	effort	was	predicted	
by	the	reward	magnitude	´	probability	interaction	(ß	=	1.89,	z	=	9.30,	p	<	.001;	
Figures	5.1	&	5.2)	but	not	by	reward	magnitude	(ß	=	0.04,	z	=	0.30,	p	=	.77)	or	
probability	(ß	=	-1.15,	z	=	-1.90,	p	=	.06).		
	 Table	5.3	shows	the	correlation	between	measures	of	aberrant	salience,	
effort,	and	SCT.	There	was	a	positive	relationship	between	ASI	ratings	and	effort	
at	each	level	of	the	EEfRT	variables	except	low	probability.	ASI	positively	
correlated	with	effort	for	lower	more	likely	rewards,	higher	less	likely	rewards	
and	with	all	reward	magnitudes	when	the	likelihood	of	winning	was	50%.	There	
was	a	negative	relationship	between	SAT	implicit	aberrant	salience	and	effort	
for	larger	more	likely	rewards.	There	were	no	significant	correlations	between	
effort	expenditure	and	explicit	aberrant	salience.	Higher	implicit	adaptive	
salience	correlated	with	less	effort	for	higher	rewards	and	both	low	and	high	
rewards	when	likelihood	of	winning	was	high.	
	
Table	5.2		
Correlations	(Kendall’s	tau)	among	ASI,	SAT,	and	SCT	indices	
Variable	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	
1.	Aberrant	Salience	Inventory	 	 	 	 	 	 	
2.	SAT	implicit	aberrant	salience	 -.02	
	 	 	 	 	
3.	SAT	explicit	aberrant	salience	 -.06	 .06	
	 	 	 	
4.	SAT	implicit	adaptive	salience	 -.06	 .21**	 	.11	
	 	 	
5.	SAT	explicit	adaptive	salience	 -.10	 .08	 -.15	 -.01	
	 	
6.	SCT	approach:avoidance	ratio	 -.01	 .03	 -.19	 .03	 .06	
	
7.	SCT:	gain:loss	ratio	 	.02	 .06	 -.02	 .06	 .04	 -.27	
Note:	ASI	=	Aberrant	Salience	Inventory;	SAT	=	Salience	Attribution	Test;	
SCT	=	Stimulus	Chase	Task.		
**p	<	.01	
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Figure	5.1.	Beta	coefficient	for	reward	magnitude	on	task	choice	during	EEfRT		
by	probability	of	winning.	Error	bars	represent	95%	confidence	intervals.	
	
Figure	5.2.	Beta	coefficient	for	probability	of	winning	on	task	choice	during	
EEfRT	by	reward	magnitude.	Shaded	area	represents	95%	confidence	intervals.			 	
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Table	5.3	
	Correlation	Coefficients	(Kendall’s	tau)	for	EEfRT	with	ASI,	SAT	and	SCT	
indices.	
	 	 Aberrant	salience	 Adaptive	salience	 	 	
Measure	 ASI	 Implicit		 Explicit		 Implicit		 Explicit		
Approach
:Avoid	
Gain:	
Loss	
Hard	choices	 .28***	 -.08	 .05	 -.11	 -.19*	 -.04	 	.17	
L	Pr	 .11	 -.13	 .14	 -.04	 -.23**	 -.08	 	.10	
M	Pr	 .28***	 	.00	 .04	 -.03	 -.09	 	.02	 	.21*	
H	Pr	 .19*	 -.13	 .05	 -.12	 -.13	 -.12	 	.09	
L	$	 .18*	 -.04	 .05	 -.06	 -.17*	 -.03	 -.04	
M	$	 .19*	 -.02	 .11	 -.04	 -.13	 -.06	 	.12	
H	$	 .27***	 -.08	 .06	 -.17*	 -.13	 -.02	 	.15	
L	Pr,	L	$	 .07	 -.13	 .01	 -.01	 -.13	 -.04	 	.13	
L	Pr,	M	$	 .08	 -.10	 .11	 -.03	 -.15	 -.07	 	.01	
L	Pr,	H	$	 .17*	 -.11	 .08	 -.06	 -.22**	 -.04	 	.12	
M	Pr,	L	$	 .18*	 	.06	 .10	 	.13	 -.12	 	.07	 	.06	
M	Pr,	M	$	 .16*	 	.03	 .04	 	.07	 -.07	 	.04	 	.19	
M	Pr,	H	$	 .29***	 -.04	 .01	 -.12	 -.09	 -.01	 	.25**	
H	Pr,	L	$	 .17*	 -.07	 .01	 -.16*	 -.10	 -.06	 -.09	
H	Pr,	M	$	 .21*	 -.09	 .06	 -.05	 -.12	 -.11	 	.15	
H	Pr,	H	$	 .13	 -.17*	 .09	 -.18*	 -.07	 -.17	 	.19	
L	EV	 .15	 -.07	 .11	 	.04	 -.24**	 -.02	 	.09	
M	EV	 .28***	 -.02	 .04	 -.06	 -.14	 -.02	 	.14	
H	EV	 .13	 -.10	 .01	 -.08	 -.03	 -.07	 	.14	
Note:	L	=	low;	M	=	medium;	H	=	high;	Pr	=	probability;	$	=	reward	magnitude;	
EV	=	expected	value;	ASI	=	Aberrant	Salience	Inventory	Score.	EEfRT	tasks	are	based	on	
proportion	of	hard	task	choices	for	three	Pr	levels	(L	=	.12,	M	=	.5,	H	=	.88);	for	three	
levels	of	RM	(<	$2.00,	$2,00	to	$3.00,	≥	$3.00).	EV	=	Pr	´	$	
*p	<	.05,	**p	<	.01,	***p	<	.001	
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	 The	effects	of	probability	on	task	choice	during	the	EEfRT	were	
predicted	by	ASI	ratings,	R2	=	0.05,	F(1,	80)	=	4.56,	p	=	.04.	Evidence	that	ASI	
ratings	predicted	the	effects	of	reward	magnitude,	R2	=	0.05,	F(1,	80)	=	3.77,	p	=	
.06,	or	the	probability	´	magnitude	interaction,	R2	=	0.04,	F(1,	80)	=	2.10,	p	=	.09,	
was	marginal.	In	contrast,	there	was	no	evidence	that	EEfRT	task	parameters	
predicted	SAT	implicit	aberrant	salience:	for	reward	magnitude,	R2	=	0.00,	F(1,	
80)	=	0.34,	p	=	.56;	for	probability,	R2	=	0.00,	F(1,	80)	=	0.29	,	p	=	.60;	and	for	
their	interaction,	R2	=	0.00,	F(1,	80)	=	0.24,	p	=	.63.		
	 There	was	a	positive	relationship	between	SCT	gain:loss	ratio	and	EEfRT	
effort	for	high	rewards	with	a	50%	probability	of	winning	(Table	5.3).	When	
probability	of	winning	was	50%,	the	relationship	between	gain:loss	and	effort	
for	high	reward	magnitudes	accounted	for	49.9%	of	the	variance,	with	43.6%	
for	medium	reward	and	24.2%	for	low	reward.	There	was	no	evidence	that	
linear	EEfRT	variable	coefficients	were	significant	predictors	of	gain:loss	ratio.	
5.5 Discussion 
Contrary	to	our	expectations,	there	was	no	evidence	that	measures	of	aberrant	
salience	were	correlated.	Furthermore,	measures	of	aberrant	salience	did	not	
correlate	with	measures	of	reward	sensitivity.	Although	aberrant	salience	
correlated	with	EEfRT	as	hypothesised,	ASI	positively	correlated	with	effort	for	
small,	improbable	rewards	while	SAT	implicit	aberrant	salience	negatively	
correlated	with	willingness	to	exert	effort	for	large,	probable	rewards.	Effort	
was	related	to	the	SCT	gain:loss	ratio	in	the	direction	hypothesised	but	only	for	
uncertain	rather	than	low	probability	trials.	Finally,	there	was	no	evidence	of	a	
relationship	between	effort	and	approach:avoidance	behaviour.		
	 The	failure	to	find	a	relationship	between	the	aberrant	salience	
measures	raises	the	question	of	validity	of	one	or	both	measures.	Previous	
research	utilising	the	SAT	has	yielded	inconsistent	patterns	of	results	in	the	
sensitivity	of	explicit	versus	implicit	aberrant	salience	to	differentiate	healthy	
participants	from	those	on	the	schizophrenia	spectrum	(Pankow,	Katthagen,	et	
al.,	2015;	Roiser	et	al.,	2013,	2009).	Furthermore,	evidence	suggests	this	cannot	
simply	be	attributed	to	differences	in	cognitive	ability	(Katthagen	et	al.,	2016).	
One	issue	with	the	SAT	is	the	assumption	that	aberrant	salience	results	in	all	
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irrelevant	stimuli	becoming	salient.	Given	the	aberrant	salience	hypothesis	
suggests	an	errant	pairing	of	dopaminergic	firing	and	irrelevant	stimuli,	the	
inconsistent	findings	using	SAT	may	indicate	individual	differences	in	the	
salience	attributed	to	specific	irrelevant	stimuli.	Similarly,	the	ASI	may	lack	
discriminant	validity.	The	ASI	measures	a	trait	associated	with	schizophrenia,	
labelled	aberrant	salience.	However,	there	is	no	evidence	that	the	ASI	measures	
a	trait	that	is	unique	to	schizophrenia.	Furthermore,	the	ASI	questions	are	open	
to	interpretation	and	a	high	ASI	score	may,	for	example,	reflect	the	openness	
personality	trait.		
	 The	difference	in	the	relationships	of	the	EFfRT	with	the	ASI	and	SAT	
further	support	that	the	two	measures	of	aberrant	salience	are	measuring	
either	different	constructs	or	different	aspects	of	aberrant	salience.	Implicit	
aberrant	and	adaptive	SAT	measures	were	positively	related	and	both	
associated	with	less	effort	for	large,	probable	rewards.	These	findings	suggest	
implicit	SAT	measures	are	measuring	a	similar	construct	(e.g.,	speed	of	
response).	The	construct	validity	of	SAT	is	further	challenged	by	the	lack	of	
evidence	supporting	a	relationship	between	EEfRT	and	explicit	aberrant	
salience	or	predictive	associations	between	the	weighting	of	EEfRT	variables	
during	task	choice	and	SAT	measures.	
	 In	contrast,	higher	ASI	scores	were	associated	with	aberrant	decision	
making	during	the	EEfRT	that	appears	to	be	based	on	mental	effort.	For	
example,	higher	ASI	was	associated	with	hard	task	choice	for	high	value	low	
probability	trials	as	well	as	high	probability	low	value	trials.	The	weight	
assigned	to	variables	during	EEfRT	supports	an	association	between	ASI	score	
and	reduced	mental	effort.	Overall,	participants	appeared	to	use	combined	
reward	magnitude	and	probability	to	determine	task	choice.	However,	
participants	with	higher	ASI	scores	were	more	likely	to	use	probability	alone	in	
deciding	task	choice	during	the	EEfRT.	Task	selection	based	on	one	of	three	
probabilities	arguably	requires	less	mental	effort	than	the	evaluation	of	a	
combined	probability	and	reward	magnitude	or	even	determining	the	
subjective	value	of	a	continuous	reward	magnitude.	The	greater	weight	given	to	
probability	also	explains	the	lack	of	evidence	supporting	the	predicted	negative	
relationship	between	ASI	and	hard	task	choices	during	high	reward	high	
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probability	trials.	These	findings	are	interesting	considering	evidence	from	
previous	research	suggesting	an	impaired	cost-effort	computation	in	
schizophrenia	(Fervaha,	Foussias,	et	al.,	2013)	and,	overall,	indicate	the	ASI	may	
be	a	more	informative	measure	of	aberrant	salience	than	the	SAT.		
	 It	is	unclear	whether	the	lack	of	evidence	supporting	a	relationship	
between	aberrant	salience	and	loss	sensitivity	is	due	to	the	sample	population	
or	measures.	However,	evidence	supported	an	association	between	reward	
sensitivity	and	reward	motivation.	Given	that	the	SCT	outcome	probability	is	
constant	(50%)	and	the	EEfRT	does	not	include	loss	(deduction	of	reward)	
outcomes,	the	correlations	between	the	gain:loss	ratio	and	hard	task	choice	
during	50%	probability	EEfRT	trials	suggest	an	increased	gain	sensitivity	rather	
than	loss	sensitivity.	The	results,	therefore,	indicate	that	higher	gain	sensitivity	
is	related	to	increased	willingness	to	expend	effort	for	higher	value	rewards.		
	 Although	a	healthy	sample	was	required	to	ascertain	baseline	
relationships	between	the	measures,	this	is	one	of	the	key	limitations	of	the	
study.	The	current	evidence	suggests	no	relationship	between	the	measures	of	
aberrant	salience.	One	explanation	for	the	null	relationship	is	that	the	different	
constructs	of	aberrant	salience,	employed	by	the	SAT	and	ASI,	are	associated	
with	differences	in	sensitivity.	Therefore,	although	the	current	study	had	
adequate	power,	a	case-control	design	may	show	a	relationship	between	these	
measures	that	was	masked	by	a	restricted	range	of	scores	from	the	student	
sample.	Interpretation	of	the	results	within	the	framework	of	an	association	
between	aberrant	salience	and	schizophrenia	should,	therefore,	be	cautiously	
applied.		
	 Future	research	should	include	additional	measures	of	reward	and	
motivation,	such	as	probabilistic	learning	and	learned	irrelevance,	and	
neurological	measures,	such	as	EEG.	These	additional	measures	would	help	to	
clarify	the	relationship	between	SAT	indices	and	reward	processing.	
Furthermore,	explanations	for	inconsistent	findings	from	the	SAT	focus	
primarily	on	medication	and	stage	of	symptom	development	(e.g.	at	risk,	
prodromal,	or	active).	The	inclusion	of	schizotypy	measures	would	assist	in	
understanding	whether	specific	schizotypy	factors	or	sub	scales	predict	the	
relationship	between	the	ASI	and	the	SAT.	In	future	research,	the	relationship	
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between	measures	should	be	assessed	in	individuals	with	active	symptoms	
(schizophrenia).	Finally,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	current	findings	may	
have	wider	implications.	Although	the	aberrant	salience	hypothesis	has	been	
applied	to	schizophrenia,	reward	processing	is	affected	in	other	disorders	and	
diseases,	such	as	Parkinson’s	disease	and	addictions.	Thus,	research	is	needed	
to	ascertain	whether	the	aberrant	salience	hypothesis	is	unique	to	
schizophrenia.	
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6 Chapter Six 
Aberrant salience and reward processing: A comparison of 
measures in schizophrenia and anxiety 
6.1 Abstract 
Aberrant	salience	may	contribute	to	the	development	of	schizophrenia	
symptoms	via	alterations	in	reward	processing	and	motivation.	However,	tests	
of	this	hypothesis	have	yielded	inconsistent	results.	These	inconsistencies	may	
reflect	problems	with	the	validity	and	specificity	of	measures	of	aberrant	
salience	in	schizophrenia.	Therefore,	we	investigated	relationships	among	
measures	of	aberrant	salience,	reward,	and	motivation	in	schizophrenia	and	
anxiety.	Individuals	with	schizophrenia	(n	=	30),	anxiety	(n	=	33),	or	unaffected	
by	mental	disorder	(n	=	30)	completed	measures	of	motivation	(Effort	
Expenditure	for	Reward	Task),	reinforcer	sensitivity	(Stimulus	Chase	Task),	and	
aberrant	salience	(Aberrant	Salience	Inventory	[ASI]	and	Salience	Attribution	
Test	[SAT]).	Schizophrenia	participants	scored	higher	than	anxiety	(d	=	.71)	and	
unaffected	(d	=	1.54)	groups	on	the	ASI	and	exhibited	greater	aberrant	salience	
(d	=	.60)	and	lower	adaptive	salience	(d	=	.98)	than	anxious	participants	on	the	
SAT.	There	was	no	evidence	of	a	correlation	between	measures	of	aberrant	
salience.	Schizophrenia	was	associated	with	related	deficits	in	motivated	
behaviour	and	maladaptive	reward	processing.	However,	these	differences	in	
reward	processing	did	not	correlate	with	aberrant	salience	measures.	The	
results	suggest	key	measures	of	aberrant	salience	have	limited	specificity	and	
validity.	These	problems	may	account	for	inconsistent	findings	reported	in	the	
literature.		
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6.2 Introduction 
Aberrant	salience	is	a	prominent	explanation	for	the	development	of	psychosis	
symptoms.	According	to	Kapur	(2003),	dysregulated	dopaminergic	firing	
results	in	the	creation,	or	exaggeration,	of	the	importance	of	external	objects	or	
events	and	internal	thoughts	or	perceptions.	Dopaminergic	firing	is	associated	
with	motivational	salience,	the	cognitive	process	of	directing	attention	and	
behaviour.	In	the	absence	of	a	relevant	stimulus	context,	Kapur	(2003)	
proposes	dopaminergic	firing	leads	to	impairments	in	motivational	salience	and	
the	assignment	of	importance	to	irrelevant	stimuli.	Kapur	(2003)	suggested	
delusions	serve	an	explanatory	function	for	patients,	explaining	the	importance	
of	aberrant	stimuli,	whereas	hallucinations	manifest	from	aberrant	visual	and	
auditory	percepts.	
	 There	is	some	evidence	for	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia,	however	
results	are	inconsistent.	Studies	show	increased	emotional	arousal	(Haralanova	
et	al.,	2012)	and	neural	activation	(W	P	Horan	et	al.,	2013)	to	neutral	stimuli	in	
schizophrenia—a	pattern	that	is	observed	in	unaffected	individuals	who	are	
exposed	to	negative	stimuli.	Compared	to	unaffected	individuals,	those	with	
schizophrenia	rate	environmental	sounds	as	more	invasive,	and	artificial	
abstract	sounds	as	more	familiar	(Micoulaud-Franchi	et	al.,	2012).	Data	from	
measures	of	aberrant	salience,	such	as	the	ASI	(Cicero	et	al.,	2010)	and	SAT	
(Roiser	et	al.,	2009),	show	heightened	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia	
compared	to	controls	(Cicero	et	al.,	2010;	Katthagen	et	al.,	2016;	Pankow,	
Katthagen,	et	al.,	2015).	Additionally,	aberrant	salience	is	associated	with	
abnormal	beliefs	(Roiser	et	al.,	2013),	perceptual	aberration,	and	magical	
ideation	(Cicero	et	al.,	2013,	2010)	in	individuals	with	no	history	of	psychosis,	
suggesting	a	link	between	aberrant	salience	and	psychosis	risk.	Conversely,	SAT	
data	from	other	studies	suggest	salience	is	normal	in	schizophrenia	(Abboud	et	
al.,	2016;	Roiser	et	al.,	2009).	
	 Reasons	for	inconsistent	findings	vary.	Aberrant	salience	may	be	more	
prominent	during	the	prodromal	phase	than	other	illness	phases	(Roiser	et	al.,	
2013)	or	be	attenuated	by	medication	(Roiser	et	al.,	2009).	However,	these	
accounts	have	not	been	replicated	(Smieskova	et	al.,	2015;	Walter	et	al.,	2016).	
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Alternatively,	there	is	limited	evidence	of	the	validity	of	aberrant	salience	
measures	in	schizophrenia.	ASI	scores	correlate	with	psychotic-like	
experiences,	such	as	magical	ideation,	in	unaffected	individuals	and	
discriminate	schizophrenia	from	other	psychopathologies,	such	as	bipolar	
disorder	(Cicero	et	al.,	2010).	The	SAT	shows	good	construct	validity	in	
unaffected	individuals	(K.	Schmidt	&	Roiser,	2009)	and	concurrent	validity	
(Katthagen	et	al.,	2016).	However,	more	robust	validity	studies	are	needed,	
examining	whether	aberrant	salience	measures	correlate	with	cognitive	
processes	associated	with	dopamine	function,	such	as	motivational	salience	and	
reinforcer	sensitivity.		
	 Schizophrenia	is	associated	with	impairments	in	motivational	salience,	
such	as	a	reduced	ability	to	unlearn	previous	associations	(Waltz	et	al.,	2007),	
aberrant	reward-related	behaviour	(Barch	et	al.,	2014;	Fervaha,	Graff-Guerrero,	
et	al.,	2013;	Gold	et	al.,	2013;	McCarthy,	Treadway,	Bennett,	&	Blanchard,	2016;	
Reddy	et	al.,	2015;	Strauss	et	al.,	2011),	and	disrupted	loss	sensitivity	(Currie	et	
al.,	2017;	Scholten	et	al.,	2006;	Trémeau	et	al.,	2008).	Reduced	activation	of	
reward-related	neural	regions	in	schizophrenia	is	associated	with	reward	
receipt	(Gradin	et	al.,	2013;	Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2009),	impaired	reward	
anticipation	(Radua	et	al.,	2015),		and	reward-seeking	behaviour	(Wolf	et	al.,	
2014).		
	 Kapur	(2003)	proposed	that	motivational	salience	mediates	aberrant	
salience.	However,	evidence	of	an	association	between	motivational	salience	
and	measures	of	aberrant	salience	is	limited.	Ceaser	and	Barch	(2016)	found	
incorrect	identification	of	a	distractor	stimulus	as	salient	was	associated	with	
increased	dorsal	striatal	activation	in	schizophrenia,	with	the	degree	of	
activation	positively	correlating	with	ASI	score.	Boehme	et	al.	(2015)	found	high	
SAT	implicit	aberrant	salience	in	unaffected	individuals	was	associated	with	
reduced	ventral	striatum	activation	during	reward	prediction	error.	
	 We	previously	reported	finding	no	evidence	that	the	ASI	and	SAT	indices	
are	correlated	among	undergraduates	with	no	history	of	psychosis	(Neumann	&	
Linscott,	2018).	At	most,	the	ASI	and	SAT	indices	predicted	aspects	of	
willingness	to	expend	effort	under	different	task	conditions.	For	example,	
higher	ASI	scores	predicted	greater	willingness	to	expend	effort	for	small,	less	
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likely	rewards,	and	the	SAT	behavioural	measure	of	aberrant	salience	predicted	
less	effort	for	large,	more	likely	rewards.	The	primary	finding,	that	the	ASI	and	
SAT	were	unrelated,	may	reflect:	(a)	the	effects	of	range	restriction	in	aberrant	
salience	in	unaffected	individuals;	or	(b)	a	typical	pattern	of	reinforcer	
sensitivity	and	motivation	in	unaffected	individuals	compared	to	that	seen	in	
individuals	with	schizophrenia.		
	 Therefore,	our	aim	was	to	investigate	relationships	among	measures	of	
aberrant	salience,	motivation,	and	reinforcer	sensitivity	in	schizophrenia	and	
anxiety	groups.	We	elected	to	compare	schizophrenia	and	anxiety	because	of	
evidence	that	anxiety	results	from	the	conflict	of	competing	goals	during	
reward	processing	(Corr	&	McNaughton,	2012;	Gray	&	McNaughton,	2000).	
That	is,	although	reward	processing	is	associated	with	anxiety	and	psychosis,	
the	sources	of	symptom	development	are	thought	to	differ	between	these	
disorders.	If	aberrant	salience	is	specific	to	schizophrenia,	predicted	
relationships	between	measures	should	be	evident	in	schizophrenia	but	not	in	
anxious	and	unaffected	individuals.		
	 Participants	with	schizophrenia,	anxiety,	and	unaffected	individuals	
completed	measures	of	motivational	salience	(Effort	Expenditure	for	Rewards	
Task	[EEfRT];	Treadway	et	al.,	2009)	and	reinforcer	sensitivity	(Stimulus	Chase	
Task	[SCT];	Hall	et	al.,	2011)	along	with	the	ASI	and	SAT.	We	predicted	that	the	
schizophrenia	group	would	exhibit	greater	aberrant	salience	on	the	ASI	and	
SAT	than	would	unaffected	or	anxiety	groups	(Cicero	et	al.,	2010;	Katthagen	et	
al.,	2016;	Pankow,	Katthagen,	et	al.,	2015).	We	expected	greater	variance	of	
aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia,	resulting	in	relationships	between	measures	
of	aberrant	salience	that	would	not	be	present	in	the	unaffected	and	anxiety	
groups.	We	also	examined	the	relationship	between	measures	of	motivation	and	
aberrant	salience.	We	hypothesised	that,	in	schizophrenia,	aberrant	salience	
would	predict	comparatively	greater	and	lesser	engagement	in	hard	tasks	when	
these	were	poorly	and	richly	rewarded,	respectively	(Fervaha,	Graff-Guerrero,	
et	al.,	2013).	Finally,	we	predicted	that	relative	sensitivity	to	gain	and	loss	
would	correlate	with	aberrant	salience	indices	(Currie	et	al.,	2017;	Scholten	et	
al.,	2006;	Trémeau	et	al.,	2008).	We	also	explored	whether	relationships	among	
measures	were	consistent	across	groups	or	specific	to	schizophrenia.		
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6.3 Methods 
6.3.1 Participants 
Patients	(n	=	34)	with	working	diagnoses	of	schizophrenia,	schizoaffective	
disorder,	schizophreniform	disorder,	or	first	episode	psychosis	were	recruited	
by	referral	from	mental	health	clinicians.	Patients	with	anxiety	(n	=	37)	and	
individuals	with	no	mental	disorder	(n	=	31)	were	recruited	using	posters	in	
hospital	staff	areas	and	an	online	advertisement	in	a	local	newspaper.	Inclusion	
criteria	for	the	anxiety	group	were	meeting	diagnostic	criteria	for	an	anxiety	
disorder	and	reporting	no	prior	or	current	psychotic	symptoms.	The	inclusion	
criterion	for	the	unaffected	group	was	the	absence	of	current	or	past	experience	
of	mental	health	issues.	All	participants	were	aged	18	to	65	years	and	indicated	
no	history	of	neurological	injury	or	disease.	For	the	large	effects	(f2	=	0.35)	
expected	between	measures	of	the	same	construct,	where	a	=	0.05,	a	sample	of	
30	per	group	affords	a	power	of	~0.84.	For	large	effects	(r	=	0.5)	between	
measures	within	groups,	where	a	=	0.05,	a	sample	of	30	affords	a	power	of	
~0.83.	
	 In	the	clinical	groups,	the	Mini-International	Neuropsychiatric	Interview	
(MINI;	Sheehan	et	al.,	2010)	was	used,	in	conjunction	with	other	measures	and	
clinical	evidence,	to	confirm	the	current	working	diagnosis	and	shed	light	on	
symptom	expression.	The	schizophrenia	group	included	one	participant	who	
met	criteria	for	schizoaffective	disorder;	and	two	who	did	not	meet	the	MINI	
diagnostic	criteria	for	schizophrenia	but	were	retained	on	the	basis	of	working	
diagnosis.	Five	referrals	to	the	schizophrenia	group	were	excluded:	one	who	
stated	he	had	faked	symptoms	of	psychosis;	two	who	met	criteria	for	mood	
disorder	with	psychotic	symptoms;	one	with	current	(<	3	months)	alcohol	
dependency;	and	one	who	was	unable	to	complete	the	assessment.	All	anxiety	
participants	met	the	MINI	diagnostic	criteria	for	an	anxiety	disorder.	However,	
two	were	reassigned	to	the	schizophrenia	group	as	they	met	the	MINI	
diagnostic	criteria	for	schizophrenia	and	two	others	were	excluded	because	of	
age	or	current	alcohol	dependence.	One	unaffected	individual	was	excluded	due	
to	prior	diagnosis	of	mental	health	issues.	Table	6.1	shows	demographics	
characteristics	of	participants	included	in	final	analysis.	Table	6.2	shows	MINI	
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output	and	current	positive	symptom	summary	for	schizophrenia	and	anxiety	
participants.			
	 The	study	was	approved	by	the	University	of	Otago	Human	Ethics	
Committee	(H16/026).	All	participants	provided	written	informed	consent.	
Participants	were	offered	payment	of	$25	per	appointment.		
	
Table	6.1	
Demographics	for	unaffected,	anxiety,	and	schizophrenia	groups.	
Demographic		 Unaffected		
(n	=	30)	
Anxiety	
(n	=	33)	
Schizophrenia	
(n	=	30)	
Female	n	(%)	 19	(63)	 25	(76)	 6	(20)	
Age	in	years	M	(SD)	 32	(10)	 35	(02)	 44	(11)	
Ethnicity	n	(%)	 	 	 	
NZ	European		 20	(67)	 26	(79)	 21	(70)	
Maori		 1	(3)	 3	(9)	 4	(13)	
Other		 9	(30)	 4	(12)	 5	(16)	
Currently	employed	n	(%)	 22	(73)	 20	(61)	 6	(20)	
Household	income	n	(%)	 	 	 	
>	200k	 -	 1	(3)	 -	
151-200	 2	(7)	 2	(6)	 -	
101-150	 3	(10)	 5	(15)	 -	
76-100k	 4	(13)	 4	(12)	 1	(4)	
51-75k	 5	(17)	 3	(9)	 2	(8)	
26-50k	 8	(27)		 7	(21)	 1	(4)	
<25k	 8	(27)	 11	(33)	 21	(84)	
First	degree	relative	mental	
health	diagnosis	n	(%)	
	 	 	
Schizophrenia	spectrum		 -	 1	(3)	 4	(13)	
Anxiety	disorder	 2	(7)	 8	(24)	 2	(7)	
Other	 3	(10)	 4	(12)	 3	(10)	
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Table	6.2	
MINI	diagnosis	and	symptom	summary	for	anxiety	and	schizophrenia	groups.	
Diagnosis/Symptoms	 Anxiety	(n	=	33)	 Schizophrenia	(n	=	30)	
Primary	Diagnosis	n	(%)	 	 	
Psychotic	Disorder		 -	 28	(93)	
Mood	Disorder	with	Psychotic	features		 -	 2	(7)	
Positive	Symptoms		 -	 21	(70)	
Delusions		 -	 14	(47)	
Auditory	Hallucinations		 -	 12	(40)	
Visual	Hallucinations		 -	 		6	(20)	
Anxiety		 33	(100)	 -	
General	Anxiety	Disorder		 17	(51.5)	 -	
Social	Phobia/Disorder		 5	(15)	 -	
Panic	Disorder		 3	(9)	 -	
Non-Anxiety	Primary	Disorder		 		7	(21)	 -	
Inconclusive		 1	(3)	 -	
Secondary	Diagnosis	(current)	n	 	 	
General	Anxiety	Disorder	 2	 3	
Social	Phobia/Disorder	 8	 3	
Panic	Disorder	 14	 11	
Agoraphobia	 14	 4	
PTSD	 1	 -	
Major	Depressive	Disorder		 -	 1	
Bipolar	Disorder	I	 -	 2	
Obsessive	Compulsive	Disorder	 -	 4	
Secondary	Diagnosis	(past/recurrent)	n	 	 	
Major	Depressive	Disorder	(recurrent)	 12	 4	
Major	Depressive	Disorder	(past)	 7	 2	
Bipolar	Disorder	I	 1	 3	
Bipolar	Disorder	II	 1	 -	
Manic/hypomanic	episode	 -	 4	
Note.	MINI	=	Mini-International	Neuropsychiatric	Interview.	
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6.3.2 Measures 
The	Alcohol	and	Drug	Abuse	and	Dependence	Screen	(ADDS;	Muthén,	1995)	
was	used	to	screen	for	problematic	substance	use.	The	ADDS	contains	items	
that	address	quantity	and	impact	of	consumption	of	drugs	and	alcohol.	Outcome	
scores	range	from	0	(no	use)	to	240	(severe	dependency).		
	 The	Depression	Anxiety	Stress	Scales	(DASS;	Lovibond	&	Lovibond,	
1995)	were	used	to	quantify	mood	and	anxiety	symptoms.	The	DASS	contains	
42	self-report	items	that	respondents	rate	from	0	=	did	not	apply	at	all	to	
3	=	applied	most	of	the	time,	with	14	items	relating	to	each	of	depression,	
anxiety,	and	stress.		
	 Nine	items	comprising	the	Anxiousness	facet	of	the	Personality	
Inventory	for	DSM-5	(PID-5A;	American	Psychiatric	Association,	2013b)	were	
used	to	assess	anxious	temperament.	Respondents	rate	items	from	0	=	very	false	
or	often	false	to	3	=	very	true	or	often	true.		
	 The	DSM-5	Self-Rated	Level	1	Cross-Cutting	Symptom	Measure	(L1SM;	
American	Psychiatric	Association,	2013a)	was	used	to	screen	for	current	mental	
health	issues.	The	L1SM	is	a	23-item	screen	for	key	features	of	depression,	
anger,	mania,	anxiety,	somatic	symptoms,	suicidal	ideation,	psychosis,	sleep	
problems,	memory	impairment,	repetitive	thoughts	and	behaviours,	
dissociation,	personality	functioning,	and	substance	use	experienced	in	the	past	
two	weeks.	Respondents	rate	items	from	0	=	none	/	not	at	all	to	4	=	severe	/	
nearly	every	day.		
	 The	MINI	(Sheehan	et	al.,	2010)	was	used	to	evaluate	current	and	past	
diagnoses.	The	MINI	is	a	semi-structured	brief	interview	covering	DSM-5	and	
ICD-10	Axis	I	psychiatric	disorders.		
	 The	ASI	and	SAT	were	used	as	measures	of	aberrant	salience,	the	EEfRT	
as	a	measure	of	decision	making,	and	the	SCT	to	assess	relative	sensitivities	to	
gain	and	loss	and	relative	tendencies	for	approach	and	avoidance.	These	
measures	are	described	in	Chapter	5.		
6.3.3 Procedure 
Clinical	group	participants	attended	two	~90-min	sessions.	In	the	first,	
participants	completed	a	demographics	questionnaire	and	the	ASI,	SAT,	EEfRT,	
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and	SCT.	Performance	task	order	was	counterbalanced	across	participants.	
During	the	second	session,	conducted	within	a	week	of	the	first,	participants	
completed	the	AADS,	DASS,	PID-5A,	L1SM,	and	MINI.	Unaffected	participants	
attended	one	2-hr	session	during	which	they	completed	all	measures	except	the	
MINI.		
6.3.4 Data Analysis 
Planned	comparisons	and	ANOVA	with	Games-Howell	post	hoc	analysis	were	
used	to	test	group	differences	in	measures.	Pearson’s	correlation	coefficient	(2-
tailed	unless	otherwise	stated),	with	Holm	adjusted	significance	level,	was	used	
to	assess	relationships	among	measures	within	each	group.	Holm	correction	for	
multiple	comparisons	was	carried	out	on	each	within-group	measure	pair.	For	
planned	comparisons,	ANOVA,	and	correlations,	bias-corrected	and	accelerated	
bootstrapped	confidence	intervals	(95%,	10	000	samples)	were	computed	
using	SPSS	version	25	(IBM	Corp,	2017).		SCT	ratios	were	log-transformed	for	
analysis.	Holm’s	correction	was	applied	to	families	of	hypotheses	using	R	
psycho	package	(Makowski,	2018).		
	 EEfRT	trials	were	categorised	by	probability	(12%,	50%,	88%)	and	
reward	(low	<	$2,	medium	$2	to	$2.99,	high	≥	$3),	yielding	9	trial	types,	and	the	
proportion	of	hard	task	choices	(effort)	was	obtained	for	each	trial	type.	Mixed-
effects	modelling	was	used	to	calculate	the	effects	of	probability,	reward,	and	
reward	´	probability	on	task	choice.	Models	included	random	slopes	and	
intercepts.	Mixed-effects	analyses	were	conducted	using	R	(R	Development	
Core	Team,	2016)	with	the	Hmisc	(Harrell	et	al.,	2016),	lme4	(Bates	et	al.,	
2015),	and	psych	(Revelle,	2016)	packages.		
6.4 Results 
One	outlier	in	the	schizophrenia	group	singularly	skewed	results,	creating	a	
correlation	between	ASI	and	SAT	aberrant	salience.	Data	from	this	outlier	were	
excluded.	SCT	data	from	n	=	41	participants	did	not	fit	the	matching	law.	There	
was	no	difference	between	SCT	fit	and	non-fit	group	means	for	other	indices	(all	
p	>	.10)	and	non-fitting	behaviour	was	not	associated	with	group,	c2(2)	=	5.63,	
p	=	.06.	SCT	data	were	analysed	for:	schizophrenia,	n	=	12;	anxiety,	n	=	23;	and	
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unaffected,	n	=	17.	The	mean	number	of	trials	completed	during	the	EEfRT	was:	
schizophrenia,	m	=	65;	anxiety,	m	=	68;	and	unaffected,	m	=	67.	
6.4.1 Group differences  
Compared	to	anxiety,	schizophrenia	was	associated	with	higher	ASI	and	SAT	
implicit	aberrant	salience	scores	and	lower	explicit	adaptive	salience	scores	
(Table	6.3	and	Appendix	A,	Figure	A1).	The	schizophrenia	group	also	had	higher	
ASI	scores	and	lower	explicit	adaptive	salience	scores	than	the	unaffected	
group.	The	anxiety	group	had	higher	on	ASI	scores	than	the	unaffected	group.		
	 Both	SCT	ratios	differed	across	groups	(Figure	6.1(b)).	Ratios	over	1	
indicate	greater	sensitivity	to	gain	than	loss	and	greater	tendency	to	approach	
than	avoid,	respectively.	Compared	to	the	unaffected	group,	schizophrenia	was	
associated	with	a	higher	approach-avoidance	ratio.		
	 During	the	EEfRT	task,	the	schizophrenia	group	chose	the	hard	task	
more	often	with	lower	less	likely	rewards;	and	less	often	for	higher,	more	
certain	rewards	and	for	medium	and	high	combinations	of	probability	and	
reward	(Figure	1(e)).	There	was	also	an	effect	of	group,	with	the	schizophrenia	
group	selecting	the	hard	task	less	often	than	the	unaffected	and	anxiety	groups.	
The	effects	of	reward	and	reward	´	probability	were	also	significantly	
decreased	in	the	schizophrenia	group	compared	to	the	unaffected	and	anxiety	
groups	(Table	6.4).	There	were	no	main	effects	of	probability.	
	 The	number	of	males	and	females	differed	across	groups,	c2(2)	=	21.29,	p	
<	.001.	Additionally,	the	mean	age	of	the	psychosis	group	(M	=	43.5,	SE	=	2.06)	
was	higher	than	the	unaffected	(M	=	32.10,	SE	=	1.83),	t(58)	=	-4.14,	p	<	.001	,	r	
=	.47,	and	anxiety	(M	=	34.82,	SE	=	1.83)	groups,	t(59.37)	=	-3.16,	p	=	.003,	r	=	
.37.	Multiple	regression	with	bootstrapped	confidence	intervals	(95%,	10	000	
samples)	were	computed	to	investigate	the	effect	of	age	and	sex	covariates	on	
group	differences.	Controlling	for	age	and	sex	did	not	make	any	substantive	
difference	except	that	there	was	no	longer	any	evidence	of	a	schizophrenia	
group	difference	on	low-probability	low-reward	EEfRT	scores	(ß	=	0.07,	95%	CI	
-.02,	0.16).	 	
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Figure	6.1.	Mean	group	scores	showing	significant	differences	in	planned	
comparisons	for	(a)	Aberrant	Salience	Inventory	(b)	Stimulus	Chase	Task	gain-
loss	and	approach-avoidance	ratios,	(c)	SAT	Attribution	Test	implicit	and	
explicit	aberrant	salience,	and	(d)	Salience	Attribution	Test	implicit	and	explicit	
adaptive	salience;	and	ANOVA	and	post	hoc	differences	for	significant	group	
differences	in	(e)	reward	´	probability	combinations	of	the	Effort	Expenditure	
for	Reward	Task.	Error	bars	show	standard	error	of	the	mean.		
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Table	6.3	
Means	and	their	bootstrapped	(BCa)	95%	confidence	intervals	(CI)	for	the	ASI,	
SAT,	SCT	and	EEfRT.	
	 							Group	Mean	(CI)	
Measure	 Unaffected		 Anxiety	 Schizophrenia	
ASI		 n	=	30	 n	=	33	 n	=	30	
	 9.5	(7.34,	11.73)	 13.6	(11.10,	15.89)	 17.7	(16.11,	19.12)	
SAT		 n	=	30	 n	=	33	 n	=	30	
	 Implicit	AS		 17.3	(13.32,	21.84)	 14.5	(11.24,	18.16)	 24.0	(17.80,	30.72)	
	 Explicit	AS		 7.8	(5.20,	11.25)	 10.2	(7.42,	13.33)	 8.8	(5.63,	12.33)	
	 Implicit	AdS		 9.2	(3.58,	14.63)	 10.1	(3.97,	16.33)	 1.5	(-5.78,	8.76)	
	 Explicit	AdS		 40.3	(30.26,	50.58)	 39.2	(28.15,	49.84)	 12.8	(5.73,	20.75)	
SCT		 n	=	17	 n	=	23	 n	=	12	
	 A:A	ratio		 .50	(.45,	.55)	 .54	(.50,	.58)	 .65	(.58,	.73)	
	 G:L	ratio		 -.34	(-.45,	-.25)	 -.34	(-.41,	-.27)	 -.53	(-.70,	-.38)	
EEfRT		 n	=	30	 n	=	33	 n	=	30	
	 Hard	Choices	 .42	(.37,	.47)	 .38	(.34,	.43)	 .26	(.20,	.33)	
	 L	Pr		 .18	(.12,	.25)	 .13	(.10,	.18)	 .21	(.15,	.28)	
	 M	Pr		 .43	(.37,	.49)	 .35	(.28,	.42)	 .24	(.18,	.31)	
	 H	Pr		 .63	(.56,	.70)	 .66	(.58,	.73)	 .33	(.24,	.42)	
	 L	$		 .14	(.09,	.19)	 .17	(.12,	.22)	 .18	(.11,	.26)	
	 M	$		 .36	(.30,	.42)	 .34	(.29,	.40)	 .24	(.18,	.31)	
	 H	$		 .59	(.53,	.66)	 .53	(.47,	.60)	 .31	(.24,	.38)	
	 L	Pr	L	$		 .06	(.02,	.10)	 .07	(.02,	.13)	 .19	(.11,	.29)	
	 L	Pr	M	$		 .19	(.12,	.27)	 .13	(.09,	.18)	 .20	(.14,	.27)	
	 L	Pr	H	$		 .25	(.17,	.35)	 .18	(.12,	.25)	 .23	(.15,	.31)	
	 M	Pr	L	$		 .13	(.07,	.20)	 .12	(.08,	.16)	 .12	(.06,	.18)	
	 M	Pr	M	$		 .38	(.29,	.48)	 .34	(.24,	.45)	 .26	(.17,	.34)	
	 M	Pr	H	$		 .66	(.57,	.74)	 .50	(.40,	.61)	 .32	(.24,	.41)	
	 H	Pr	L	$		 .24	(.16,	.33)	 .31	(.22,	.42)	 .24	(.14,	.36)	
	 H	Pr	M	$	 .60	(.48,	.73)	 .65	(.54,	.76)	 .30	(.20,	.41)	
	 H	Pr	H	$		 .86	(.78,	.93)	 .86	(.77,	.93)	 .39	(.30,	.49)	
Note.	ASI	=	Aberrant	Salience	Inventory;	SAT	=	Salience	Attribution	Test;	
SCT	=	Stimulus	Chase	Task;	EEfRT	=	Effort	Expenditure	for	Reward	Task;	
AS	=	aberrant	salience;	AdS	=	adaptive	salience;	A:A	=	approach-avoid;	
G:L	=	gain-loss;	L	=	low;	M	=	medium;	H	=	high;	Pr	=	probability;	$	=	reward.	 		
6: Study Two       Page 141 of 233 
	
Table	6.4		
Effect	of	reward,	probability,	and	reward	´	probability	on	task	choice.a	
	 	 	 95%	CI	
	 B	 SE	 Lower	 Upper	
Intercept	 -4.62***	 0.67	 -5.92	 -3.31	
Reward	 0.77***	 0.19	 0.39	 	1.14	
Probability	 0.21	 0.88	 -1.51	 1.93	
Anxiety	Group	 0.81	 0.90	 -0.95	 2.57	
Schizophrenia	Group	 2.42**	 0.88	 0.70	 4.15	
Reward	´	Probability	 1.30***	 0.27	 0.77	 1.81	
Reward	´	Anxiety	Group	 -0.48	 0.27	 -1.00	 0.04	
Reward	´	Schizophrenia	Group	 -0.63*	 0.26	 -1.13	 -0.13	
Probability	´	Anxiety	Group	 0.12	 1.19	 -2.20	 2.45	
Probability	´	Schizophrenia	Group	 -0.73	 1.15	 -3.00	 1.53	
Reward	´	Probability	´	Anxiety		 0.23	 0.36	 -0.49	 0.94	
Reward	´	Probability	´	Schizophrenia		 -0.78*	 0.34	 -1.45	 -0.11	
Note.	a	Unaffected	individuals	and	hard	task	choice	are	baseline	
*	p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.01,	***	p	<	.001.	 		
	
6.4.2 Within-group correlations  
There	was	no	evidence	that	the	ASI	correlated	with	any	other	measure	in	the	
schizophrenia	group.	SAT	implicit	and	explicit	adaptive	salience	positively	
correlated,	however	correlations	between	SAT,	EEfRT	and	SCT	indices	did	not	
survive	the	Holm	correction	(Appendix	A,	Table	A1).	Similarly,	none	of	the	
correlations	between	measures	in	the	anxiety	group	survived	the	Holm	
correction	(Appendix	A,	Table	A2).	In	the	unaffected	group,	ASI	and	explicit	
aberrant	salience	predicted	relatively	lower	gain:loss	sensitivity	(Appendix	A,	
Table	A3).	No	other	correlations	survived	Holm	correction.	 
6.5 Discussion 
There	was	partial	support	for	the	idea	that,	compared	to	anxiety,	schizophrenia	
is	associated	with	greater	expressed	aberrant	salience.	Schizophrenia	was	
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associated	with	higher	ASI	and	higher	SAT	implicit	aberrant	salience	scores.	
However,	contrary	to	our	hypotheses,	the	ASI	and	SAT	aberrant	salience	indices	
were	negatively	correlated,	albeit	not	significantly.	We	found	no	evidence	for	a	
relationship	between	aberrant	salience	indices	and	reinforcer	sensitivity	in	
schizophrenia	and	correlations	between	aberrant	salience	and	motivational	
salience	did	not	survive	corrections	for	multiple	testing.	Support	for	the	
construct	validity	of	aberrant	salience	indices	against	reward	processing	
measures	was	also	limited	in	unaffected	and	anxiety	groups.		
	 The	results	have	several	implications	for	the	interpretation	of	ASI	and	
SAT	data.	First,	they	cast	doubt	on	the	validity	of	the	ASI	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	
the	SAT.	The	intermediate	rating	of	the	anxiety	group	suggests	the	ASI	
measures	a	trait	that	is	not	unique	to	schizophrenia.	Furthermore,	the	failure	to	
find	a	relationship	between	the	ASI	and	EEfRT	indicates	that	the	construct	
measured	with	the	ASI	is	not	related	to	motivational	salience.	There	was	no	
evidence	that	implicit	aberrant	salience	predicted	effortful	decision-making	in	
the	schizophrenia	group.	These	findings	rest	in	stark	contrast	to	what	would	be	
expected	given	even	modest	construct	validity	and	specificity.	The	lack	of	
relationship	could	be	due	to	construct	validity	issues	with	the	EEfRT.	However,	
this	is	unlikely	given	the	current	data	from	the	EEfRT	are	in	line	with	a	body	of	
literature	suggesting	maladaptive	behaviour	in	schizophrenia	in	contrast	to	the	
adaptive	behaviour	found	in	unaffected	individuals	(Barch	et	al.,	2014;	Fervaha,	
Graff-Guerrero,	et	al.,	2013;	McCarthy	et	al.,	2016;	Strauss,	Waltz,	&	Gold,	2014).	
	 This	notwithstanding,	the	schizophrenia	group	did	exhibit	a	pattern	of	
inefficient,	maladaptive	behaviour	not	seen	in	the	anxiety	or	unaffected	groups.	
Schizophrenia	was	associated	with	lower	adaptive	but	higher	aberrant	
reinforcement	learning.	During	the	EEfRT,	the	schizophrenia	group	exhibited	
less	adaptive	behaviour,	pursuing	the	hard	task	when	it	was	less	likely	to	yield	
higher	rewards	but	not	when	higher	more	likely	rewards	were	available.	
Impaired	cost	and	effort	computations	in	schizophrenia	have	previously	been	
linked	to	impairments	in	working	memory,	value	representations,	and	cost	
calculations	(Strauss	et	al.,	2014).	The	current	findings	indicate	reduced	
cognitive	effort	during	cost	and	effort	computations	in	schizophrenia.	
Specifically,	stimuli	that	required	greater	cognitive	effort	(e.g.,	determining	
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reward	value	from	a	scale	and	calculating	the	reward	by	probability	
interaction)	had	less	effect	on	task	choice	in	the	schizophrenia	compared	to	
other	groups.	These	findings	are	in	line	with	evidence	suggesting	reduced	
activation	in	the	striatum,	a	region	associated	with	acquired	salience	(Esslinger	
et	al.,	2013),	contributes	to	impaired	reward	processing	(Gradin	et	al.,	2013;	
Radua	et	al.,	2015;	Roiser	et	al.,	2010;	Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2009)	and	effortful	
behaviour	(Wolf	et	al.,	2014)	in	schizophrenia.		
	 Several	alternative	explanations	may	account	for	these	findings.	First,	
aberrant	salience	may	be	more	evident	in	the	prodromal	phase	but	dampened	
in	subsequent	illness	phases	due	to	medication	or	symptom	development	
(Abboud	et	al.,	2016).	If	that	were	the	case,	the	relationship	between	aberrant	
salience	and	motivational	salience	may	also	reduce.	Secondly,	it	may	be	that	the	
schizophrenia	participants	here	exhibited	intact	reinforcement	learning	and	
motivational	salience.	However,	in	line	with	previous	findings	(Fervaha,	Graff-
Guerrero,	et	al.,	2013),	the	schizophrenia	group	exhibited	aberrant	effortful	
behaviour.		
	 The	findings	should	be	considered	in	light	of	several	limitations.	First,	
given	we	examined	aberrant	salience	indices	obtained	using	different	
measurement	methods,	our	expectation	of	obtaining	large	effects	may	have	
been	unreasonable	or	a	larger	sample	should	have	been	used.	However,	we	are	
confident	our	expectations	were	reasonable	and	our	key	interpretation	is	safe	
for	several	reasons.	The	SAT	implicit	and	explicit	measures,	which	involve	
performance	and	global	judgement	methodologies	(respectively),	did	show	
some	evidence	of	significant	within-group	relationships;	despite	common	
methods	for	the	SAT	explicit	and	ASI	measures,	the	magnitude	of	observed	
relationships	were	no	greater	than	those	for	the	SAT	implicit	measures;	and	the	
SAT	implicit	aberrant	salience	measure	was	negatively	related	to	ASI	ratings,	
albeit	not	significantly.	
	 We	did	not	record	information	on	current	medication	for	schizophrenia	
or	anxiety	group	participants.	A	large	proportion	of	the	current	schizophrenia	
group,	however,	reported	current	psychotic	symptoms.		Antipsychotic	
medication	is	not	universally	effective	(e.g.	Gotfredsen	et	al.,	2017)	and,	among	
those	for	whom	it	is	effective,	is	often	not	completely	effective.	However,	future	
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research	should	examine	the	effect	of	antipsychotics.	All	but	one	participant	in	
the	schizophrenia	group	were	receiving	treatment	within	a	health	care	system	
at	the	time	of	participation	whereas	the	anxiety	group	were	not	recruited	via	
health	services	and	many	had	not	sought	formal	treatment.	Furthermore,	
although	unaffected	participants	underwent	screening	for	current	mental	
health	experiences,	there	may	have	been	undiagnosed	or	unreported	mental	
health	issues.	However,	participants	were	asked	about	past	mental	health	in	the	
demographics	questionnaire	and	excluded	if	one	recorded.	
	 The	implications	of	data	loss	due	to	chaotic	behaviour,	resulting	in	
exclusion	from	SCT	analysis,	are	also	worth	considering.		Higher	than	expected	
exclusion	rates	may	be	explained	if	limited	to	individuals	with	schizophrenia,	
where	impairments	in	reward	processing	and	motivational	salience	may	result	
in	chaotic	behaviour	(e.g.	Currie	et	al.,	2017;	Gold	et	al.,	2013;	Reddy	et	al.,	2015;	
Strauss	et	al.,	2011).	However,	all	groups	had	much	higher	SCT	exclusion	rates,	
suggesting	modifications	to	the	way	the	SCT	is	calculated	is	needed	to	include	
non-fitting	behaviour.	Finally,	the	groups	were	not	well	matched	on	age	and	
sex..	Although	there	was	little	evidence	that	the	pattern	of	effects	seen	in	the	
schizophrenia	group	was	attributable	to	sex	or	age,	matching	would	allow	more	
accurate	analysis	of	the	effect.	
	 The	current	findings	suggest	a	variance	in	construct	definition	among	
measures	of	aberrant	salience	and	challenge	the	construct	validity	of	the	
measures.	Caution	should	be	applied	when	interpreting	findings	from	measures	
of	aberrant	salience.	Further	research	is	needed	to	understand	whether	the	
relationships	among	measures	are	dependent	on	stage	of	psychosis,	medication,	
or	common	comorbidities	such	as	anxiety.		
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7 Chapter Seven 
Discussion 
The	current	research	project	investigated	the	validity	and	specificity	of	
measures	of	aberrant	salience.	Across	two	studies,	I	examined	whether	
measures	of	aberrant	salience:	correlated	with	each	other;	were	related	to	
measures	of	motivational	salience;	and	measured	a	construct	unique	to	
schizophrenia.			
	 I	found	increased	aberrant	salience	and	reduced	adaptive	behaviour	in	
schizophrenia	compared	to	other	psychopathologies,	namely	anxiety	disorders,	
as	well	as	unaffected	individuals.	This	extends	previous	research	(Chapters	2	
and	3).	The	schizophrenia	group	had	higher	ASI	scores	than	both	control	groups	
and	higher	SAT	implicit	aberrant	salience	scores	than	the	anxiety	group.	
Reduced	adaptive	behaviour	in	schizophrenia	was	evident	in	lower	SAT	explicit	
adaptive	salience	scores	and	inefficient	choices	made	during	the	EEfRT.	The	SCT	
data	revealed	a	shift	in	relative	approach:avoidance	tendencies	in	
schizophrenia,	with	an	increased	tendency	to	approach	or	a	decreased	tendency	
to	avoid,	but	no	difference	in	sensitivity	to	loss	or	gain	compared	to	the	other	
groups.	The	data	for	the	anxiety	and	unaffected	groups	were	comparable	for	all	
indices	except	the	ASI,	where	elevated	scores	were	also	found	in	anxiety.			
	 Conversely,	across	the	groups,	there	was	no	evidence	of	convergent	
validity	between	aberrant	salience	measures.	There	was	also	very	little	
evidence	to	support	an	association	between	aberrant	salience	and	motivational	
salience.	Indeed,	the	minimal	evidence	of	relationships	among	measures	in	
undergraduates	was	absent	in	schizophrenia.			
	 Below,	I	highlight	key	similarities	and	differences	in	the	findings	from	
the	current	study	compared	to	the	literature,	looking	first	at	the	individual	
measures	and	then	their	interactions.	I	suggest	implications	of	the	current	
findings.	Finally,	I	highlight	limitations	and	identify	key	research	questions	
facing	the	field.		
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7.1 Aberrant and adaptive salience in schizophrenia 
The	current	findings	suggest	individuals	with	schizophrenia	experience	
aberrant	salience.	However,	aberrant	salience	was	also	present	in	unaffected	
and	anxious	individuals.	The	sensitivity	and	specificity	of	the	ASI	and	SAT	
differed.	There	was	also	a	pattern	of	maladaptive	motivated	behaviour	in	
schizophrenia	but	not	unaffected	and	anxious	individuals.		
7.1.1 The ASI 
The	ASI	is	used	to	measure	an	individual’s	subjective	experience	of	aberrant	
salience.	This	is	based	on	yes/no	responses	to	29	questions	designed	to	
ascertain	each	of	the	five	common	experiences	Cicero	et	al.	(2010)	thought	
reflected	aberrant	salience:	attention	to	previously	irrelevant	stimuli,	
heightened	perception,	sense	of	understanding,	enhanced	emotionality,	and	
heightened	cognition.		
Higher	ASI	scores	are	not	unique	to	schizophrenia.	Individuals	
considered	at	risk	of	developing	schizophrenia	(i.e.	high	schizotypy	scores)	and	
individuals	with	schizophrenia	or	schizoaffective	disorder	(Cicero	et	al.,	2010)	
scored	higher	on	the	ASI	than	unaffected	individuals.	However,	the	current	
study	found	elevated	ASI	scores	in	anxiety.	Whereas	participants	with	
schizophrenia	scored	significantly	higher	on	the	ASI	than	both	the	anxiety	and	
unaffected	groups,	the	anxiety	group	scored	significantly	higher	than	the	
unaffected	group.	The	current	findings	may,	therefore,	indicate	aberrant	
salience	is	not	unique	to	schizophrenia,	the	ASI	is	measuring	something	else,	or	
the	ASI	is	measuring	an	aspect	of	aberrant	salience	that	is	present	in	other	
psychopathologies	(e.g.,	hyperarousal).			
7.1.2 The SAT 
The	SAT	uses	a	reinforcement	learning	paradigm	to	measure	implicit	salience	
based	on	speed	of	response	and	explicit	salience	based	on	subjective	reflection	
about	outcomes	of	trials	in	the	task.	Adaptive	and	aberrant	salience	were	
distinguished	by	the	objective	relationship	of	stimuli	with	available	outcomes.	
The	task	relevant	stimulus	type	(e.g.,	colour)	predicts	high	(87.5%)	or	low	
(12.5%)	probability	of	winning	based	on	level	(e.g.	blue	or	red).	Conversely,	the	
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other	stimulus	type	(e.g.,	shape)	is	task	irrelevant,	as	the	probability	of	winning	
from	either	level	(e.g.,	household	object	or	animal)	is	chance	(50%).	An	
assumption	of	the	task	is	that	participants	will	learn	from	the	feedback	which	
stimulus	type	and	level	predicts	reward	most	often.	This	knowledge	will	be	
evident	in	faster	speed	of	response	to	high	compared	to	low	probability	
outcomes	and	greater	accuracy	in	recalling	the	probability	of	reward	for	each	
level.	For	the	aberrant	stimulus	types,	speed	of	response	and	probability	
estimates	should	be	similar	as	both	are	rewarded	at	chance.		
	 The	SAT	aberrant	salience	indices	yield	inconsistent	results.	Previous	
studies	have	found	no	difference	in	implicit	or	explicit	aberrant	salience	
between	unaffected	individuals	and	individuals	with	schizophrenia	(Abboud	et	
al.,	2016;	Roiser	et	al.,	2009)	and,	conversely,	higher	implicit	aberrant	salience	
in	schizophrenia	(Katthagen	et	al.,	2016;	Pankow,	Katthagen,	et	al.,	2015).	In	the	
current	study,	higher	SAT	implicit	aberrant	salience	in	the	schizophrenia	group	
compared	to	the	anxiety	group	seemed	to	indicate	that	SAT	may	differentiate	
between	psychopathologies.	However,	the	current	project	yielded	no	support	
for	the	SAT	in	differentiating	between	schizophrenia	and	unaffected	individuals	
in	implicit	or	explicit	aberrant	salience.		
	 There	is	no	consistent	relationship	among	SAT	indices.	In	line	with	
previous	findings	(Katthagen	et	al.,	2016;	Pankow,	Katthagen,	et	al.,	2015;	
Roiser	et	al.,	2009,	2010),	there	was	no	evidence	of	a	relationship	between	
explicit	and	implicit	aberrant	salience	indices	in	undergraduates,	anxiety,	
schizophrenia,	or	unaffected	individuals	(after	correction	for	multiple	
comparisons).	The	relationship	between	SAT	adaptive	salience	indices	was	also	
inconsistent.	The	only	relationship	to	survive	adjustment	for	multiple	
comparison	in	schizophrenia	was	the	positive	relationship	between	explicit	and	
implicit	adaptive	salience.	This	finding	was,	however,	not	evident	in	
undergraduates,	the	anxiety	group,	or	unaffected	individuals.	Prior	research	has	
found	a	positive	relationship	between	SAT	adaptive	salience	indices	in	
unaffected	individuals	(Roiser	et	al.,	2010)	and	for	schizophrenia	and	
unaffected	individuals	when	data	not	grouped	(Katthagen	et	al.,	2016;	Roiser	et	
al.,	2010).	The	findings	suggest	that	explicit	and	implicit	indices	are	not	
measuring	the	same	constructs.	
7: Discussion       Page 148 of 233 
	
	 Reward-related	impairments	in	schizophrenia	may	confound	results	
obtained	using	the	SAT.	Schizophrenia	is	associated	with:	impaired	reward-
related	reinforcement	learning	(Dowd	et	al.,	2016;	Serra	et	al.,	2001);	
diminished	reward	valuation	(Ahn	et	al.,	2011;	Brown	et	al.,	2018;	Heerey	et	al.,	
2007;	Weller	et	al.,	2014);	an	inability	to	rapidly	adjust	behaviour	to	optimise	
outcomes	(Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2014;	Waltz	&	Gold,	2007);	impaired	working	
memory	(Fatouros-Bergman,	Cervenka,	Flyckt,	Edman,	&	Farde,	2014;	Lee	&	
Park,	2005);	and	reduced	motivation	(Green	et	al.,	2015;	Reddy	et	al.,	2015).	
Such	impairments	in	schizophrenia	would	reduce	the	ability	to	differentiate	
between	high	and	low	reward	probability	(relevant)	stimuli,	leading	to	less	
disparity	in	speed	of	response	(impaired	adaptive	salience).	These	behavioural	
findings	are	in	line	with	evidence	that	attenuated	VS	activation	in	schizophrenia	
disrupts	reward-related	function	(Gradin	et	al.,	2013;	Koch	et	al.,	2010;	
Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2014;	Waltz	et	al.,	2010).	Furthermore,	atypical	neural	
activation	during	reward-processing	in	schizophrenia	interrupts	salience	
tracking	(e.g.,	Koch	et	al.,	2010;	Waltz	et	al.,	2010),	impairing	the	ability	to	
utilise	relevant	information,	and	contributing	to	reduced	motivated	behaviour.		
	 The	operationalisation	of	SAT	aberrant	salience	lacks	sensitivity	and	
specificity.	All	groups	exhibited	implicit	aberrant	salience,	measured	as	the	
absolute	difference,	in	speed	of	response	or	subjective	rating,	between	the	two	
irrelevant	stimulus	types.	In	line	with	some	previous	findings	(Abboud	et	al.,	
2016;	Roiser	et	al.,	2009;	Smieskova	et	al.,	2015)	but	in	contrast	to	others	
(Katthagen	et	al.,	2016;	Pankow	et	al.,	2015),	unaffected	individuals	did	not	
significantly	differ	from	schizophrenia	in	aberrant	salience.	If	the	SAT	aberrant	
salience	indices	measure	the	construct	of	aberrant	salience,	the	collective	
findings	suggest	aberrant	salience	is	not	unique	to	schizophrenia.	However,	the	
differences	in	implicit	and	explicit	indices	of	aberrant	salience	could	be	due	to	a	
number	of	other	factors,	such	as	individual	response	strategies	or	guessing.	
Other	sources	of	systematic	measurement	error	could	have	included	the	effects	
of	cognitive	abilities	(e.g.	memory)	and	knowledge	(e.g.,	how	percentiles	work)	
on	the	accuracy	of	explicit	indices.	Furthermore,	there	was	a	positive	
relationship	between	SAT	implicit	indices	in	undergraduates,	that	was	not	
replicated	in	anxiety,	schizophrenia,	or	unaffected	individuals.	Whereas	this	
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may	be	a	spurious	correlation,	it	serves	to	highlight	the	inconsistent	results	
obtained	from	the	SAT.		
	 The	labelling	of	SAT	explicit	and	implicit	indices	as	measures	of	one	
construct	is	misleading	and	unsupported.	Roiser	et	al.	(2009)	argued	the	failure	
to	find	heightened	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia	was	due	to	the	effect	of	
antipsychotics	on	dampening	aberrant	salience.	However,	evidence	to	support	
this	argument	is	mixed	(Abboud	et	al.,	2016;	Smieskova	et	al.,	2015).	Overall,	a	
more	likely	conclusion	is	that	the	SAT	lacks	sensitivity	and	specificity.	A	similar	
pattern	of	inconsistent	results	across	groups	was	found	when	comparing	the	
SAT	with	specific	measures	of	motivational	salience.				
7.1.3 Aberrant motivated behaviour in schizophrenia 
The	EEfRT	provides	indices	of	the	willingness	to	expend	effort	relative	to	
reward	value	and	probability	of	winning.	Levels	of	probability	were	low	(12%),	
moderate	(50%),	or	high	(88%)	and	levels	of	reward	magnitude	were	small,	
medium,	or	large.	Effort	was	defined	as	the	willingness	to	choose	the	hard	task	
and	was	calculated	across	all	magnitude-probability	combinations,	as	well	as	
magnitude	and	probability	levels.	
	 The	SCT	provides	orthogonal	measures	of	gain	relative	to	loss	sensitivity	
and	approach	relative	to	avoidance	behaviour.	The	SCT	is	expressed	as	ratios,	
where	ratios	over	1	indicate	greater	sensitivity	to	gain	than	loss	and	a	greater	
tendency	to	approach	than	avoid	respectively.	The	probability	of	any	outcome	is	
50%.	The	SCT	measures	are	calculated	using	the	matching	law	(see	Section	
5.3.2).	Therefore,	participants	who	did	not	behave	in	a	manner	consistent	with	
the	matching	law,	such	that	the	speed	of	response	(including	choosing	not	to	
respond)	was	relative	to	the	outcome	value,	were	excluded	from	further	
analysis.	
	 Schizophrenia	was	associated	with	maladaptive	behaviour	that	was	
distinct	from	anxiety	and	unaffected	individuals.	The	schizophrenia	group	had	
higher	approach	relative	to	avoidance	tendency	but	were	less	willing	to	exert	
effort	for	reward.	Consistent	with	previous	findings	(Fervaha,	Graff-Guerrero,	et	
al.,	2013;	Gold	et	al.,	2013),	schizophrenia	was	associated	with	reduced	adaptive	
and	increased	aberrant	motivated	behaviour	during	the	EEfRT.	These	findings	
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may	reflect	devaluation	of	reward	(Ahn	et	al.,	2011;	H.	E.	Brown	et	al.,	2018;	
Heerey	et	al.,	2007;	Weller	et	al.,	2014)	or	difficulties	with	cost	and	effort	
computations	(Fervaha,	Foussias,	et	al.,	2013;	Morris	et	al.,	2011).	Alternatively,	
individuals	with	schizophrenia	may	have	been	responding	without	considering	
outcome	likelihood.	
7.1.4 Observations during motivational measures 
Comments	from	participants	with	schizophrenia	during	the	SCT	revealed	a	
potential	effect	of	aberrant	salience	on	motivated	behaviour.	One	participant	
described	focusing	on	either	the	loss	or	gain	amount	but	not	both.	For	example,	
if	they	could	win	$6	or	lose	$8,	they	commented	on	how	they	wanted	to	win	the	
$6	and	responded	to	the	task	accordingly.	Other	times,	participants	would	focus	
purely	on	avoiding	the	loss,	no	matter	how	minimal,	without	considering	
potential	gain.	These	observations	are	in	line	with	behavioural	evidence	
suggesting	attenuated	responses	to	reward	but	intact	responses	to	aversive	
outcomes.	Importantly,	such	data	was	excluded	from	SCT	analysis	as	the	
response	pattern	was	inconsistent	with	the	matching	law.		
	 The	reduced	use	of	all	available	information	was	also	observed	during	
the	EEfRT.	For	example,	one	participant	asked	a	number	of	times	why	they	did	
not	get	any	money	following	an	unrewarded	hard	task.	Their	comment	suggests	
they	were	focusing	more	on	reward	magnitude	than	probability.	As	suggested	
by	Fervaha	(2013),	decision-making	will	be	impaired	where	participants	were	
not	using	all	available	information.	This	notwithstanding,	the	attention	to	just	
one	aspect	of	a	stimulus	is	also	indicative	of	reduced	adaptive	salience.			
	 Other	observations	suggested	symptoms	impacted	decision-making.	One	
participant,	who	advised	they	were	hearing	voices	at	the	start	of	the	session,	
stated	that	the	SCT	was	measuring	their	psychic	abilities.	They	appeared	to	
ignore	the	information	given	during	the	task,	and	verbalised	their	choices	based	
on	their	intuition.	Another	participant	stated	that	the	computer	would	take	
away	their	money	once	they	got	to	a	certain	level.	Therefore,	whereas	the	
motivational	salience	indices	provided	evidence	for	reduced	adaptive	
behaviour,	observations	suggest	such	findings	may	also	reflect	response	
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patterns	based	on	task-irrelevant	information.	In	other	words,	aberrant	
salience.		
7.2 The absence of convergent validity  
A	key	finding	from	the	current	research	was	the	lack	of	relationships	among	the	
ASI	and	the	SAT	aberrant	salience	indices.	The	failure	to	find	convergent	
validity	may	be	due,	in	part,	to	the	differing	operationalisation	of	aberrant	
salience.	The	ASI	is	a	retrospective,	self-report	measure	of	the	experience	of	
aberrant	salience	that	is	subject	to	memory	and	related	biases.	The	SAT	is	a	
behavioural	measure	that	relies	on	reward-related	processing	(implicit)	and	
working	memory	(explicit).	The	explicit	SAT	measure	of	aberrant	salience,	
while	self-report,	is	limited	to	the	stimuli	presented	during	the	task.	Therefore,	
the	ASI	and	the	SAT	implicit	and	explicit	indices	appear	to	be	measuring	very	
different	things,	which	may	or	may	not	reflect	different	aspects	of	aberrant	
salience.	However,	their	lack	of	convergence	with	motivational	salience	indices	
challenges	the	validity	of	the	ASI	and	SAT	as	measures	of	aberrant	salience.			
7.2.1 The ASI and motivational salience 
Among	undergraduates	there	was	an	association	between	the	ASI	and	aberrant	
motivated	behaviour.	Analysis	of	the	EEfRT	and	ASI	variables	revealed	higher	
ASI	scores	were	associated	with:	more	effort	for	higher	less	likely	rewards;	
lower	more	likely	rewards;	and	rewards	where	the	likelihood	of	winning	was	
chance.	Additionally,	participants	scoring	high	on	the	ASI	were	less	likely	to	use	
all	the	available	information	to	determine	effort.	Undergraduates	with	a	low	ASI	
score	used	both	probability	and	reward	magnitude	to	determine	task	choice.	In	
contrast,	undergraduates	who	scored	high	on	the	ASI	were	more	likely	to	use	
probability	of	winning	alone	to	determine	task	choice.	However,	a	higher	ASI	
score	was	also	associated	with	an	overall	increased	willingness	to	exert	effort	
(choose	the	hard	task	more	often)	and	increased	effort	for	high	value	outcomes,	
including	when	the	outcome	was	uncertain.	Conversely,	there	was	no	
association	between	ASI	score	and	SCT	indices.	The	findings	provide	some	
support	for	an	association	between	the	ASI	and	aberrant	motivational	salience.	
7: Discussion       Page 152 of 233 
	
However,	the	findings	were	far	from	the	consistent	outcome	that	would	be	
expected	based	on	the	aberrant	salience	hypothesis.	
	 There	was	no	association	between	the	ASI	and	aberrant	motivated	
behaviour	in	schizophrenia.	Despite	elevated	ASI	scores	in	schizophrenia,	the	
expected	increase	in	evidence	of	a	relationship	between	the	ASI	and	
motivational	salience	was	not	found.	Even	prior	to	correction	for	multiple	
comparisons,	there	was	no	evidence	of	a	relationship	between	the	ASI	and	
motivated	behaviour	in	schizophrenia.	In	fact,	the	only	relationship	to	survive	
correction	was	the	negative	relationship	between	the	ASI	and	the	SCT	gain:loss	
ratio	in	unaffected	individuals.	Given	the	relationship	between	aberrant	
motivated	behaviour	and	ASI	in	undergraduates,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	different	
data	collection	methods	for	the	measures	account	for	the	lack	of	relationship.		
7.2.2 Does the ASI measure aberrant salience? 
The	ASI	has	good	face	validity	but	lacks	construct	validity.	The	failure	to	find	a	
positive	relationship	with	the	SAT	aberrant	salience	indices	may	be	due	to	
issues	with	the	SAT.	However,	the	failure	to	find	a	relationship	between	the	ASI	
and	aberrant	motivational	behaviour	suggests	that	what	the	ASI	is	measuring	is	
not	related	to	motivational	salience.	Kapur	(2003)	proposed	deficits	in	
motivational	salience	underlie	the	relationship	between	dopaminergic	
dysregulation	and	aberrant	salience.	The	failure	to	find	evidence	of	this	
relationship	in	schizophrenia,	therefore,	challenges	the	ASI	as	a	measure	of	
aberrant	salience.	However,	other	factors	need	to	be	considered.	
Observations	during	the	administration	of	the	ASI	indicated	that	the	
language	used	in	the	questionnaire	is	complicated,	ambiguous,	and	may	
confound	results.	The	wording	used	was	not	always	clear	to	participants.	
During	the	current	studies,	participants	(from	all	groups)	often	asked	for	clarity.	
For	example,	“Do	you	often	become	fascinated	by	the	little	things	around	you?”	
would	elicit	a	request	for	clarification	on	what	type	of	little	things.	A	number	of	
participants	did	not	understand	the	words	ominous	and	trivial.	Participants	
sometimes	verbalised	their	thought	processes	prior	to	providing	a	response,	
highlighting	another	key	issue:	interpretation.	Some	participants	talked	about	
how	their	beliefs	or	spirituality	related	to	their	heightened	awareness	and	
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understanding,	and	even	to	the	assignment	of	importance	to	things	that	
previously	were	unimportant.	Another	time	a	participant	diagnosed	with	
schizophrenia	responded	to	the	question,	“Do	you	sometimes	feel	like	you	are	
finding	the	missing	piece	to	a	puzzle?”,	by	stating	that	when	they	did	puzzles,	
they	often	found	the	missing	piece	so	responded	with	yes.	I	also	observed	that	
some	participants	took	longer	to	think	about	questions	than	others,	which	may	
reflect	issues	with	comprehension	and	interpretation.		
The	ASI	could	be	improved	by	a	number	of	changes.	The	wording	needs	
clarifying	and	simplifying.	The	use	of	a	scale,	rather	than	simply	yes	or	no,	would	
also	aid	in	determining	the	degree	of	variability	in	experience.	Participants	
would	frequently	ponder	the	words	sometimes	and	ever.	There	was	no	
benchmark	against	which	a	participant	could	determine	their	experience.	For	
example,	ever	may	have	been	taken	to	mean	once,	sometimes	as	more	than	once,	
or	the	two	words	interpreted	interchangeably.	The	use	of	a	scale,	for	example	
never,	rarely,	once	in	a	while,	sometimes,	almost	always,	would	better	enable	
participants	to	quantitively	evaluate	frequency.	Such	a	scale	would	also	provide	
useful	information	on	the	variability	of	experience	and	whether	this	variance	
predicted	schizophrenia.	For	example,	some	participants	may	be	very	extreme	
on	the	presence	or	absence	of	an	experience,	whilst	others	may	have	a	more	
consistent,	mid-level	experience	range	that	is	not	accurately	captured	by	the	
current	ASI.	
7.2.3 The SAT and motivational salience 
Implicit	SAT	indices	were	associated	with	aberrant	motivated	behaviour	in	
undergraduates.	Students	with	higher	implicit	aberrant	salience	were	less	likely	
to	exert	effort	for	higher,	more	likely	rewards.	Thus,	implicit	aberrant	salience	
predicted	reduced	adaptive	behaviour.	However,	higher	implicit	adaptive	
salience	was	also	associated	with	less	effort	for	high	reward	value,	including	
when	there	was	a	low	or	high	probability	of	winning.	These	findings	were	
unsurprising	given	the	positive	relationship	between	the	SAT	implicit	measures	
in	undergraduates.	Conversely,	higher	explicit	adaptive	salience	predicted	
adaptive	motivated	behaviour,	but	only	when	there	was	a	low	expectation	of	
success.	There	was	no	evidence	of	an	association	between	explicit	aberrant	
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salience	and	maladaptive	motivational	salience.	Furthermore,	none	of	the	SAT	
indices	were	predicted	by	the	effect	of	value	or	likelihood	of	reward	on	task	
choice	or	SCT	indices.	These	findings	reflect	the	inconsistent	relationships	
reported	between	the	SAT	indices.		
	 There	was	no	evidence	of	a	relationship	between	the	SAT	and	EEfRT	or	
SCT	in	the	schizophrenia.	The	weak	inverse	association	between	adaptive	
behaviour	and	aberrant	salience	failed	to	survive	adjustment	for	multiple	
comparisons.	Indeed,	none	of	the	relationships	between	the	SAT	and	EEfRT	in	
schizophrenia,	anxiety,	or	unaffected	individuals	survived	correction	for	
multiple	comparison.	Prior	to	correction,	however,	the	correlations	between	
indices	in	anxious	individuals	did	suggest	an	association	between	aberrant	
salience	and	both	loss	sensitivity	and	maladaptive	motivated	behaviour.	The	
only	robust	finding	between	the	SAT	and	SCT	was	the	relationship	between	loss	
sensitivity	and	aberrant	salience	in	unaffected	individuals.	Combined,	these	
findings	further	highlight	issues	with	the	utility	of	the	SAT.	Kapur	(2003)	
proposed	that	motivational	salience	mediates	the	relationship	between	
hypodopaminergic	activation	and	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia.	According	
to	Roiser	et	al.	(2009),	the	SAT	measures	aberrant	and	adaptive	salience.	If	both	
these	statements	hold	true,	there	should	be	a	relationship	between	aberrant	
salience	and	maladaptive	motivated	behaviour	that	is	enhanced	in	
schizophrenia.	The	current	projects	found	no	evidence	of	this.				
7.2.4 Does the SAT measure aberrant salience?  
The	SAT	indices	yield	inconsistent	results	for	aberrant	salience	(Abboud	et	al.,	
2016;	Katthagen	et	al.,	2016;	Pankow,	Katthagen,	et	al.,	2015;	Roiser	et	al.,	
2009)	and	adaptive	salience	(Abboud	et	al.,	2016;	Katthagen	et	al.,	2016;	
Pankow,	Deserno,	et	al.,	2015;	Roiser	et	al.,	2009)	in	schizophrenia.	Differences	
in	SAT	data	obtained	from	individuals	with	schizophrenia	may	reflect	
impairments	in	reward	processing	(e.g.,	Dowd	et	al.,	2016;	Serra	et	al.,	2001)	
rather	than	salience.	For	example,	reported	increased	aberrant	and	reduced	
adaptive	salience	SAT	indices	in	schizophrenia	may	reflect	the	effect	of	outcome	
value	on	behaviour.	
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	 Flaws	in	the	underlying	assumptions	of	the	SAT	may	also	confound	
results	in	schizophrenia.	The	task-irrelevant	stimuli	are	rewarded	50%	of	the	
time,	thus	are	not	actually	task	irrelevant.	Another	issue	is	the	assumption	that	
there	will	be	a	difference	between	irrelevant	stimulus	types,	rather	than	specific	
stimuli.	The	SAT	aberrant	salience	is	calculated	based	on	a	difference	between	
levels	(e.g.,	household	objects	and	animals)	of	each	stimulus	type	(e.g.,	shape).	
This	assumes	that	participants	with	schizophrenia	will	group	stimuli	in	a	
similar	manner,	based	on	the	type	of	picture	(as	instructed).	However,	as	
argued	by	Berridge	(1996),	all	stimuli	are	not	equal	when	it	comes	to	
motivation.	The	contingencies	in	the	SAT	control	for	bias	towards	a	stimulus	
type	(e.g.,	prefer	red	over	blue)	but	they	cannot	account	for	the	personal	
identification	of	stimulus	relevance	in	schizophrenia.	Participants	with	
schizophrenia	may	focus	on	the	combined	stimulus	characteristics	or	adopt	a	
response	strategy	that	has	very	little	to	do	with	reinforcement	schedules.	For	
example,	a	participant	may	respond	to	a	blue	gorilla	and	blue	chair	more	
quickly	than	any	other	stimuli.	If	colour	is	relevant,	and	blue	is	rewarded	only	
12.5%	of	the	time,	this	will	lead	to	less	difference	between	irrelevant	cues	
(reduced	aberrant	salience)	while	also	reducing	adaptive	salience.	Attempts	to	
generalise	a	pattern	of	behaviour	in	schizophrenia,	based	on	a	set	of	stimuli	that	
show	differentiation	in	unaffected	individuals	is,	therefore,	limited.	 		
	 The	SAT	should	be	used	with	caution	as	a	measure	of	aberrant	salience.	
The	SAT	has	yielded	a	decade	of	inconsistent	results	and	lacks	sufficient	
evidence	of	construct	validity.	Continued	use	of	a	measure	that	has	poor	
construct	validity	does	little	to	advance	understanding	of	aberrant	salience	in	
schizophrenia	and,	at	worst,	may	mislead	the	field.	This	situation	is	comparable	
to	the	BIS/BAS	scale	(Carver	&	White,	1994).	The	BIS/BAS	scale	is	still	in	use,	
despite	being	an	inadequate	measure	of	BIS	and	BAS	as	defined	by	reinforcer	
sensitivity	theory.	Continued	publication	of	studies	using	the	BIS/BAS	scale	
over	the	last	25	years	has	facilitated	self-perpetuating	validity	and	very	little	
critique	as	to	whether	the	measure	is	fit	for	purpose.			
	 In	summary,	there	is	limited	evidence	of	aberrant	salience	in	
schizophrenia	using	the	SAT	indices.	Conversely,	the	SAT	highlights	issues	with	
reduced	adaptive	salience.	The	SAT	indices	of	aberrant	and	adaptive	salience	
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may	be	subject	to	confounds,	such	as	cognitive	impairments	in	schizophrenia	or	
the	failure	to	account	for	the	personal	specificity	of	aberrant	salience.	However,	
the	continued	use	of	the	SAT	as	a	measure	of	aberrant	salience	is	not	supported	
by	the	current	findings.			
7.2.5 Relationship between motivational salience indices  
Evidence	of	relationships	among	motivational	salience	indices	was	limited.	In	
undergraduates,	reduced	loss	sensitivity	correlated	with	increased	willingness	
to	exert	effort	when	there	was	only	a	chance	of	obtaining	the	reward.	This	
relationship	was	strengthened	when	the	reward	value	was	high.	The	
correlations	between	the	SCT	and	EEfRT	in	schizophrenia,	anxiety,	and	
unaffected	individuals	failed	to	survive	correction	for	multiple	comparisons.	
However,	the	pattern	of	significant	relationships	prior	to	correction	is	worth	
noting.		Unaffected	individuals	with	higher	relative	approach	tendency	were	
more	willing	to	exert	effort	for	low	probability	trials	across	all	reward	values.	In	
anxiety,	greater	relative	approach	tendency	inversely	related	to	increased	
reward	value,	whereas	reduced	loss	sensitivity	related	to	effort	under	
conditions	of	lower	probability	of	rewarding	outcome.	Conversely,	there	was	no	
pattern	of	related	behaviour	between	the	EEfRT	and	the	SCT	in	schizophrenia.	
Therefore,	even	though	only	those	individuals	whose	behaviour	fitted	the	law	of	
effect	were	included	in	SCT	analysis,	schizophrenia	was	still	associated	with	
atypical	patterns	of	motivated	behaviour.			
7.2.6 Summary 
The	SAT	and	ASI	are	purported	to	be	measures	of	aberrant	salience	with	no	
convergent	validity	and	questionable	sensitivity	and	specificity.	Whereas	
individuals	with	schizophrenia	scored	higher	on	the	ASI	and	SAT	implicit	
aberrant	salience,	there	was	no	relationship	between	the	indices.	Furthermore,	
there	was	no	relationship	between	aberrant	motivated	behaviour	and	measures	
of	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia.	Issues	with	each	of	the	measures	may	
have	contributed	to	the	lack	of	convergence.	However,	the	combined	findings	
challenge	the	construct	validity	of	the	SAT	and,	to	a	lesser	degree,	the	ASI	as	
measures	of	aberrant	salience.	There	is,	however,	an	alternative	explanation	to	
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consider:	that	motivational	salience	does	not	mediate	the	relationship	between	
dopaminergic	dysregulation	and	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia.		
	
7.3 Does motivational salience mediate aberrant salience? 
Kapur	(2003)	argued	that	motivational	salience	mediates	the	relationship	
between	dopaminergic	dysregulation	and	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia.	
The	current	findings	do	not	support	this	hypothesis.	One	explanation	is	that	the	
SAT	and	ASI	are	not	measuring	aberrant	salience.	However,	an	alternative	
explanation,	that	motivational	salience	does	not	mediate	aberrant	salience,	
cannot	be	ruled	out.		
	 Motivational	salience	requires	dopaminergic	activation	(Berridge	&	
Robinson,	1998;	Hebart	&	Gläscher,	2015),	which	signals	both	reward	value	
(Schultz,	2015)	and	salience	(Horvitz,	2000;	Jimmy	Jensen	&	Walter,	2014)	
within	the	mesocorticolimbic	system	(Bromberg-Martin	et	al.,	2011).	
Furthermore,	dopaminergic	firing	facilitates	the	maintenance	and	updating	of	
stimulus-outcome	associations	(Cooper	et	al.,	2014;	Hird	et	al.,	2018;	Sambrook	
&	Goslin,	2015;	Talmi	et	al.,	2013;	Walsh	&	Anderson,	2012)	and	motivated	
behaviour	(Boksem	et	al.,	2006;	Holroyd	&	Coles,	2002;	Ventouras	et	al.,	2011).	
Atypical	dopaminergic	firing	is	associated	with	reward	processing	impairments	
(Di	Rosa	et	al.,	2015;	Moody	et	al.,	2010;	Szamosi	et	al.,	2012)	but	not	
necessarily	motivated	behaviour	(Goerendt	et	al.,	2004).	Schizophrenia	is	
associated	with	impaired	reward	processing	(Ahn	et	al.,	2011;	Brown	et	al.,	
2018;	Dowd	et	al.,	2016;	Heerey	et	al.,	2007;	Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2014;	Serra	et	
al.,	2001;	Waltz	&	Gold,	2007;	Weller	et	al.,	2014)	and	maladaptive	motivated	
behaviour	(Fervaha,	Graff-Guerrero,	et	al.,	2013;	Gold	et	al.,	2013;	Green	et	al.,	
2015;	Reddy	et	al.,	2015;	Treadway	et	al.,	2009).	However,	neuro	imaging	data	
yields	inconsistent	evidence	of	atypical	activation	in	key	reward	processing	
regions	in	schizophrenia	(Esslinger	et	al.,	2012;	Gradin	et	al.,	2011;	Hägele	et	al.,	
2014;	Juckel,	Schlagenhauf,	Koslowski,	Wüstenberg,	et	al.,	2006;	Waltz	et	al.,	
2010;	Wolf	et	al.,	2014).	The	inconsistent	findings	suggest	neural	activation	
outside	the	reward	pathways	is	affecting	motivated	behaviour	in	schizophrenia.		
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	 Atypical	activation	in	the	SN,	CEN,	and	DMN	contributes	to	aberrant	
salience.	Activation	in	the	SN	signals	motivational	salience	and	informs	goal-
directed	behaviour	(Lamichhane	&	Dhamala,	2015).	The	SN	regulates	the	
relative	activation	in	the	CEN	and	DMN	(Chand	&	Dhamala,	2016a;	Goulden	et	
al.,	2014;	Sridharan	et	al.,	2008;	Uddin,	2017c).	Increased	activation	in	the	CEN,	
which	predicts	task	related	performance,	was	found	in	response	to	salient	
(aversive)	stimuli	in	unaffected	individuals	but	to	irrelevant	(neutral)	stimuli	in	
schizophrenia	(Anticevic	et	al.,	2011).	Activation	in	the	DMN	usually	signals	
self-referential	processing	and	is	attenuated	during	task-related	processing	
(Buckner	et	al.,	2008;	Crone	et	al.,	2011;	Scheibner	et	al.,	2017).	In	
schizophrenia,	DMN	hyperactivation	contributes	to	reduced	task	performance	
(Whitfield-Gabrieli	et	al.,	2009),	symptom	severity	(T.	P.	White,	Wigton,	et	al.,	
2016;	Whitfield-Gabrieli	et	al.,	2009),	and	aberrant	salience	(Anticevic	et	al.,	
2011).	Atypical	SN	activation	in	schizophrenia	may,	therefore,	result	in	reduced	
processing	of	salient	stimuli	and	increased	self-agency	and	importance	of	
irrelevant	stimuli.	In	other	words,	the	SN	may	be	central	to	reduced	adaptive	
salience	and	increased	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia.		
	 The	failure	to	find	a	relationship	between	motivational	salience	and	
aberrant	salience	may	reflect	a	directional	difference	in	the	relationship	
between	motivational	salience	and	aberrant	salience.	Specifically,	impaired	
functioning	of	the	SN	in	schizophrenia	may	mediate	aberrant	salience,	which	
then	affects	motivational	salience.	The	effect	of	impaired	SN	functioning,	in	
reducing	adaptive	salience	and	increasing	aberrant	salience,	fits	with	the	
maladaptive	pattern	of	behaviour	found	in	schizophrenia.	The	effect	of	
antipsychotics	on	regulating	SN	and	DMN	activation	is	also	related	to	reduction	
in	symptom	severity	(Wang	et	al.,	2017).	Therefore,	the	link	between	
dopaminergic	activation,	aberrant	salience,	and	symptoms	is	not	inconsistent	
within	the	amended	framework.			
7.4 Limitations 
The	current	research	has	limitations.	Information	about	current	medication,	
including	antipsychotics,	was	not	obtained.	As	antipsychotics	dampen	
dopaminergic	activation,	antipsychotics	may	have	had	an	effect	on	motivational	
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salience,	aberrant	salience,	or	both.	ASI	scores	do	not	appear	to	be	affected	by	
antipsychotics	(Tofani	et	al.,	2016).	In	regards	to	the	SAT,	individuals	on	
antipsychotics	who	did	not	experience	delusions	or	negative	symptoms	scored	
lower	explicit	aberrant	salience	compared	to	unaffected	individuals	and	those	
experiencing	delusions	and	negative	syptoms	(Roiser	et	al.,	2009).	No	such	
effect	was	found	for	hallucinations,	implicit	aberrant	salience,	or	adaptive	
salience	indices.	In	the	current	study,	20	of	the	participants	with	schizophrenia	
reported	current	positive	symptoms,	including	delusions	and	hallucinations.	
Comparison	of	individuals	with	and	without	positive	symptoms,	however,	
revealed	no	group	differences	in	the	ASI	or	SAT	scores,	minimal	effect	on	the	
EEfRT,	but	higher	gain	relative	to	loss	sensitivity	in	the	positive	symptom	
group.	Sample	sizes	were	too	small	for	a	meaningful	comparison	of	current	
delusions	versus	hallucinations.	Whereas,	the	combined	evidence	suggests	it	is	
unlikely	that	antipsychotic	dose	would	have	affected	the	results,	inclusion	of	
current	medication	would	have	been	beneficial	for	comparison	with	previous	
and	future	research	and	generalisability.		
	 Cognitive	ability	may	have	confounded	between-group	results.	
Schizophrenia	is	associated	with	impaired	cognitive	functioning	that	affects	
reward	processing.	The	inclusion,	for	example,	of	working	memory	and	
decision-making	indices	would	have	facilitated	analysis	of	the	effect	of	cognitive	
ability	on	SAT,	SCT,	and	EEfRT	performance.		
	 Data	from	participants	whose	behaviour	on	the	SCT	did	not	fit	with	the	
law	of	effect	were	excluded	from	analyses.	The	number	of	excluded	participants,	
from	all	groups,	was	higher	than	expected.	Further	research	into	the	
parametres	used	during	SCT	analysis	is	therefore	indicated.	Additionally,	as	
evident	in	the	current	research	findings	for	the	EEfRT,	schizophrenia	is	
associated	with	maladaptive	motivated	behaviour.	Future	research	should,	
therefore,	also	explore	variations	in	approach:avoidance	tendancy	and	gain:loss	
sensitivity	in	individuals	who	do	not	fit	the	model,	including	across	groups	and	
between	measures.		
	 The	reduced	sample	size	for	SCT	analysis	may	have	contributed	to	the	
lack	of	consistent	relationship	between	the	SCT	and	EEfRT.	However,	it	may	
also	be	that	the	SCT	and	EEfRT	are	measuring	unrelated	aspects	of	motivated	
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behaviour.	Future	research	should	explore	this	relationship	and	include	
additional	measures	of	motivational	salience.		
	 Participants	were	not	demographically	matched	across	groups.	This	was	
partly	due	to	endemic	differences	in	schizophrenia,	such	as	gender	and	the	
impact	of	on-going	engagement	with	mental	health	services	on	socioeconomic	
variables.	Indeed,	there	is	evidence	of	a	matching	fallacy	effect,	whereby	
matching	groups	on	factors	such	as	education	or	IQ	creates	a	mismatch	
(Kremen	et	al.,	1995;	Kremen,	Seidman,	Faraone,	&	Tsuang,	2008)	However,	
anxious	and	unaffected	individuals	were	fairly	evenly	matched	for	age,	
employment,	and	household	income.		
	 Finally,	the	MINI	was	not	administered	to	unaffected	individuals.	
However,	unaffected	individuals	did	complete	the	DSM-5	Self-Rated	Cross-
Cutting	Symptom	Measure	Level	1	and,	where	applicable,	Level	2.	All	of	the	
unaffected	individuals	rated	0	for	psychosis	and	did	not	have	clinical	levels	of	
anxiety.	Given	this,	it	is	unlikely	that	administration	of	the	MINI	would	have	
identified	clinically	significant	symptoms	in	unaffected	individuals.			
7.5 Future research ideas 
The	current	findings	raise	issues	with	the	two	published	measures	of	aberrant	
salience,	the	SAT	and	ASI.	In	future	research,	investigators	should	seek	to	assess	
whether	changes	in	wording	could	improve	the	utility	of	the	ASI	as	a	measure	of	
aberrant	salience.	However,	as	with	many	self-report	measures,	scores	on	the	
ASI	are	affected	by	factors	such	as	memory,	self-reflection,	and	subjective	
interpretation.	Inconsistencies	in	SAT	data	suggest	future	measures	should	
avoid,	or	control	for,	known	confounds	such	as	the	effect	of	reward-related	
impairments	in	schizophrenia.	Alternative	measures	of	aberrant	salience	are	
needed	to	ascertain	whether	aberrant	salience	is	evident	in,	and	unique	to,	
schizophrenia.		
Investigators	could	build	on	existing	methodologies	used	during	
behavioural	and	neuroimaging	studies	indicating	aberrant	salience	to	formulate	
and	develop	new	measures	of	aberrant	salience.	Existing	methodologies	fall	into	
two	broad	categories,	namely	distractor	interference	and	arousal.	For	example,	
schizophrenia	was	associated	with	higher	distractibility	during	task	
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performance,	especially	from	irrelevant	neutral	stimuli	(Anticevic	et	al.,	2011).	
Compared	to	negative	stimuli,	neutral	stimuli	were	associated	with	higher	self-
reported	emotional	arousal	(Haralanova	et	al.,	2012;	Okruszek	et	al.,	2016)	and	
physiological	arousal	in	schizophrenia	(Haralanova	et	al.,	2012;	W	P	Horan	et	
al.,	2013).	Both	distractor	and	arousal	tasks	would	benefit	from	the	inclusion	of	
appetitive	as	well	as	neutral	and	aversive	stimuli.	This	would	provide	further	
insight	into	the	effect	of	reduced	reward	value	on	the	salience	of	irrelevant	
stimuli,	which	may	further	the	understanding	of	the	aversive	undertone	of	
positive	symptoms.	The	use	of	eye-tracking	for	visual	stimuli	tasks	would	also	
assist	in	ascertaining	the	relationship	between	attention	to	stimuli	and	
behavioural	or	self-report	responses.		
The	argument	that	aberrant	salience	contributes	to	symptom	
development	has	yet	to	be	investigated.	One	approach	would	be	to	assess	the	
association	between	sensory	specific	aberrant	salience	and	symptoms.	For	
example,	an	association	between	auditory	hallucinations	and	task	interference	
from	irrelevant	auditory	stimuli	would	strengthen	the	argument	that	aberrant	
salience	contributes	to	symptom	development.	Future	research	could	use	
auditory	and	visual	stimuli	in	the	same	paradigm	to	ascertain	whether	such	a	
relationship	is	evident.			
Further	research	is	needed	to	confirm	whether	or	not	there	is	an	
association	between	aberrant	salience	and	motivational	salience	in	
schizophrenia.	The	failure	to	find	a	relationship	in	the	current	study	may	reflect	
either	the	study	limitations	or	the	complexity	and	number	of	the	EEfRT	
variables.	A	more	simplistic	measure	of	motivational	salience,	and	more	robust	
measure	of	aberrant	salience,	may	reveal	an	association.	Furthermore,	the	
direction	of	the	relationship	between	aberrant	salience	and	motivational	
salience	needs	to	be	understood	and	clarified.	
Finally,	investigators	should	seek	to	anchor	the	construct	of	aberrant	
salience,	as	it	contributes	to	symptoms	of	schizophrenia,	to	known	neural	
systems	and	their	functions.	For	example,	the	relationship	between	aberrant	
salience	and	the	SN	in	schizophrenia	warrants	further	investigation.	
Neurological	evidence	suggests	key	regions	involved	in	self-referential	
processing	may	influence	aberrant	salience	(Pauly,	Kircher,	Schneider,	&	Habel,	
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2014).	The	ASI	(Cicero	et	al.,	2013)	and	the	SAT	aberrant	salience	(Roiser	et	al.	
2010)	are	associated	with	self-identity	and	self-referential	processing,	
respectively.	In	future	studies,	investigators	should	seek	to	clarify	whether	
atypical	activation	in	SN	leads	to	a	failure	to	switch	between	DMN	and	CEN	
during	self-referential	and	task-related	activities.	If	so,	the	relationship	between	
activation	in	each	of	the	networks	and	aberrant	salience	should	be	examined	to	
clarify	which	of	these	networks,	if	any,	contributes	to	aberrant	salience	in	
schizophrenia.		
7.6 Conclusion 
The	current	findings	suggested	increased	aberrant	salience	and	reduced	
adaptive	behaviour	in	schizophrenia.	This	is	in	line	with	previous	behavioural	
and	neurological	evidence.	However,	the	lack	of	relationship	between	
motivational	salience	and	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia	challenges	Kapur's	
(2003)	argument	that	motivational	salience	mediates	the	relationship	between	
dopaminergic	hyperactivation	and	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia.	However,	
there	was	no	evidence	of	convergent	validity	between	the	ASI	and	SAT,	and	
minimal	evidence	of	the	expected	relationships	between	aberrant	salience	and	
motivational	salience	indices.	Whereas	amendments	to	the	ASI	may	improve	its	
validity,	the	SAT	is	confounded	by	reward-related	impairments	in	
schizophrenia.	However,	it	may	be	that	there	is	no	relationship	between	
motivational	salience	and	aberrant	salience.	Instead,	atypical	activation	in	the	
salience	network	may	disrupt	the	functional	connectivity	between	the	DMN	and	
CEN,	leading	to	increased	aberrant	salience	and	reduced	adaptive	salience.	
Further	research	is,	therefore,	needed	to	understand	the	cognitive	and	neural	
mechanisms	underlying	aberrant	salience	in	schizophrenia.		
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Appendix A 
Chapter 6 Supplementary Material 
Table	A1	
Correlation	between	variables	for	Schizophrenia	Group	
	 ASI	 Aberrant	Salience	 Adaptive	Salience	
	 	 Implicit	 Explicit	 Implicit	 Explicit	 A:A	 G:L	
Implicit	AS	 -.17	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Explicit	AS	 .17	 .11	 	 	 	 	 	
Implicit	AdS	 .04	 -.16	 .10	 	 	 	 	
Explicit	AdS	 -.14	 -.23	 -.21	 .50**	 	 	 	
A:A	 .40	 .06	 -.55	 .00	 -.37	 	 	
G:L	 -.14	 .12	 -.11	 .07	 .36	 -.48	 	
Hard	Choices	 .21	 -.06	 .17	 -.24	 -.16	 .32	 -.32	
L	Pr	 .15	 .06	 .16	 -.35	 -.30	 .15	 -.49	
M	Pr	 .25	 .05	 .31	 -.32	 -.24	 .06	 .05	
H	Pr	 .18	 -.20	 .05	 -.04	 .04	 .41	 -.30	
L	$	 .18	 -.16	 .15	 -.11	 -.18	 .33	 -.07	
M	$	 .23	 -.07	 .08	 -.28	 -.19	 .15	 -.20	
H	$	 .21	 -.14	 .05	 -.25	 -.08	 .29	 -.37	
L	Pr,	L	$	 .12	 .02	 .22	 .00	 -.16	 -.15	 .08	
L	Pr,	M	$	 .07	 .00	 .08	 -.36	 -.21	 .01	 -.67*	
L	Pr,	H	$	 .19	 .10	 .12	 -.45*	 -.35	 .32	 -.39	
M	Pr,	L	$	 .16	 -.23	 .37*	 -.07	 -.18	 .07	 .49	
M	Pr,	M	$	 .18	 .34	 .25	 -.31	 -.17	 -.59*	 .50	
M	Pr,	H	$	 .24	 .01	 .20	 -.32	 -.20	 .26	 -.28	
H	Pr,	L	$	 .19	 -.21	 -.06	 -.16	 -.13	 .53	 -.37	
H	Pr,	M	$	 .25	 -.20	 .11	 -.02	 -.10	 .57	 -.18	
H	Pr,	H	$	 .11	 -.16	 .09	 .03	 .20	 .19	 -.26	
L	EV	 .13	 -.01	 .23	 -.35	 -.32	 .13	 -.38	
M	EV	 .27	 .03	 .13	 -.32	 -.18	 .16	 -.05	
H	EV	 .09	 -.24	 .05	 .02	 .19	 .21 -.31	
$	Coef	 .01	 .02	 -.19	 -.31	 -.33	 .36	 -.48	
Pr	Coef	 -.05	 -.26	 -.23	 -.20	 -.37*	 .48	 -.37	
$	´	Pr	Coef	 .03	 .15	 .21	 .35	 .54**	 -.43	 .39	
	
Note:	ASI	=	Aberrant	Salience	Inventory;	Aberrant	Salience	=	Salience	Attribution	Test	
Aberrant	Salience;	Adaptive	Salience	=	Salience	Attribution	Test	Adaptive	Salience;	A:A	
=	Stimulus	Chase	Task	approach-avoid	ratio;	G:L	=	Stimulus	Chase	Task	gain-loss	ratio.	
For	Effort	Expenditure	for	Reward	Task	variables:	L	=	low;	M	=	medium;	H	=	high;	
Pr	=	probability;	$	=	reward;	Coef	=	coefficient.	
*	p	<	.05.	**	p	<	.01.	***	p	<	.001.		
Only	highlighted	correlations	survived	Holm	correction	for	multiple	comparisons.		
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Table	A2	
Correlation	between	variables	for	Anxiety	Group	
	 ASI	 Aberrant	Salience	 Adaptive	Salience	
	 	 Implicit	 Explicit	 Implicit	 Explicit	 A:A	 G:L	
Implicit	AS	 -.32†	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Explicit	AS	 -.02	 -.08	 	 	 	 	 	
Implicit	AdS	 -.11	 -.10	 .01	 	 	 	 	
Explicit	AdS	 -.15	 -.45**	 -.23	 .22	 	 	 	
A:A	 -.03	 .03	 .17	 -.31	 .08	 	 	
G:L	 .20	 -.03	 -.53**	 .24	 -.16	 -.53**	 	
Hard	Choices	 .04	 -.15	 .02	 .07	 -.08	 -.10	 .46*	
L	Pr	 .26	 -.03	 -.03	 -.17	 -.44**	 -.21	 .47*	
M	Pr	 -.04	 .04	 -.08	 .18	 -.17	 -.41	 .56**	
H	Pr	 -.06	 -.30	 .12	 .08	 .24	 .40	 .01	
L	$	 .05	 -.04	 .17	 -.23	 -.17	 .54**	 -.15	
M	$	 -.11	 -.09	 .04	 .12	 -.06	 -.02	 .48*	
H	$	 .07	 -.14	 -.07	 .14	 -.03	 -.48*	 .49*	
L	Pr,	L	$	 .26	 .00	 .07	 -.13	 -.25	 .14	 .02	
L	Pr,	M	$	 .08	 -.13	 -.10	 -.09	 -.05	 -.15	 .38	
L	Pr,	H	$	 .19	 .07	 -.02	 -.13	 -.55**	 -.19	 .33	
M	Pr,	L	$	 .22	 -.14	 -.05	 -.18	 -.23	 -.02	 .35	
M	Pr,	M	$	 -.19	 .01	 .05	 .28	 -.18	 -.13	 .45*	
M	Pr,	H	$	 -.03	 .13	 -.14	 .15	 -.09	 -.52*	 .45*	
H	Pr,	L	$	 -.16	 .02	 .20	 -.15	 -.04	 .58**	 -.27	
H	Pr,	M	$	 -.06	 -.08	 .08	 -.02	 .11	 .20	 .23	
H	Pr,	H	$	 .04	 -.50**	 .01	 .24	 .41*	 -.34	 .23	
L	EV	 .30	 -.05	 -.05	 -.21	 -.45**	 -.12	 .47*	
M	EV	 -.13	 .07	 .09	 .07	 -.09	 .01	 .27	
H	EV	 .06	 -.46**	 -.01	 .15	 .47**	 -.07	 .14	
$	Coef	 .01	 .12	 .28	 -.15	 -.31	 -.04	 -.23	
Pr	Coef	 -.12	 .12	 .46**	 -.25	 -.28	 .35	 -.39	
$	x	Pr	Coef	 .02	 -.20	 -.40*	 .31	 .49**	 -.29	 .33	
	
Note:	ASI	=	Aberrant	Salience	Inventory;	Aberrant	Salience	=	Salience	Attribution	Test	
Aberrant	Salience;	Adaptive	Salience	=	Salience	Attribution	Test	Adaptive	Salience;	A:A	
=	Stimulus	Chase	Task	approach-avoid	ratio;	G:L	=	Stimulus	Chase	Task	gain-loss	ratio.	
For	Effort	Expenditure	for	Reward	Task	variables:	L	=	low;	M	=	medium;	H	=	high;	
Pr	=	probability;	$	=	reward;	Coef	=	coefficient.	
†	p	<	.05.	1-tailed		
*	p	<	.05.	**	p	<	.01.	***	p	<	.001	two-tailed	
No	correlations	survived	Holm	correction	for	multiple	comparisons		
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Table	A3	
Correlation	between	variables	for	Unaffected	Group	
	 ASI	 Aberrant	Salience	 Adaptive	Salience	
	 	 Implicit	 Explicit	 Implicit	 Explicit	 A:A	 G:L	
Implicit	AS	 -.12	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Explicit	AS	 .16	 .33†	 	 	 	 	 	
Implicit	AdS	 .09	 -.05	 .17	 	 	 	 	
Explicit	AdS	 -.03	 -.20	 .00	 .17	 	 	 	
A:A	 -.04	 .07	 .16	 .25	 -.46	 	 	
G:L	 -.57*	 -.28	 -.69**	 -.30	 .04	 -.16	 	
Hard	Choices	 -.10	 -.17	 .01	 .09	 -.13	 .33	 .03	
L	Pr	 .02	 .02	 .05	 .13	 -.38*	 .58*	 -.13	
M	Pr	 .00	 -.18	 -.10	 -.13	 -.20	 .17	 .05	
H	Pr	 -.22	 -.20	 .05	 .18	 .27	 -.03	 .20	
L	$	 -.13	 -.08	 .02	 .30	 -.25	 .40	 -.08	
M	$	 -.11	 -.05	 .00	 .03	 -.18	 .30	 -.06	
H	$	 .11	 -.03	 .09	 .09	 .01	 .14	 -.08	
L	Pr,	L	$	 .02	 -.04	 .14	 .35	 -.17	 .60*	 -.24	
L	Pr,	M	$	 .07	 -.02	 .00	 .10	 -.40*	 .59*	 -.33	
L	Pr,	H	$	 -.03	 .05	 .06	 .06	 -.32	 .48*	 .01	
M	Pr,	L	$	 -.29	 -.06	 -.04	 .14	 -.38*	 .39	 -.10	
M	Pr,	M	$	 -.14	 -.05	 -.08	 -.24	 -.06	 .16	 .09	
M	Pr,	H	$	 .23	 -.19	 -.08	 -.14	 -.07	 .06	 .04	
H	Pr,	L	$	 -.02	 -.15	 -.04	 .19	 -.02	 .22	 .10	
H	Pr,	M	$	 -.22	 -.13	 .02	 .10	 .08	 .00	 .18	
H	Pr,	H	$	 -.20	 -.19	 .09	 .11	 .43*	 -.38	 .18	
L	EV	 .00	 .01	 .03	 .16	 -.45*	 .61**	 -.18	
M	EV	 .11	 -.18	 -.06	 -.09	 -.08	 .18	 .05	
H	EV	 .02	 -.01	 .12	 .17	 .37*	 -.29	 -.07	
$	Coef	 .09	 -.26	 -.01	 -.22	 -.18	 -.13	 .15	
Pr	Coef	 .02	 -.26	 -.01	 -.16	 -.20	 -.13	 .10	
$	x	Pr	Coef	 -.03	 .24	 .01	 .17	 .28	 .08	 -.05	
	
Note:	ASI	=	Aberrant	Salience	Inventory;	Aberrant	Salience	=	Salience	Attribution	Test	
Aberrant	Salience;	Adaptive	Salience	=	Salience	Attribution	Test	Adaptive	Salience;	A:A	
=	Stimulus	Chase	Task	approach-avoid	ratio;	G:L	=	Stimulus	Chase	Task	gain-loss	ratio.	
For	Effort	Expenditure	for	Reward	Task	variables:	L	=	low;	M	=	medium;	H	=	high;	
Pr	=	probability;	$	=	reward;	Coef	=	coefficient.	
†	p	<	.05.	1-tailed		
*	p	<	.05.	**	p	<	.01.	***	p	<	.001.		
Only	highlighted	correlations	survived	Holm	correction	for	multiple	comparisons.	
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Figure	A1.	Mean	group	scores	showing	non-significant	differences	in	planned	comparisons	for	reward	´	probability	combinations	of	the	
Effort	Expenditure	for	Reward	Task.	Error	bars	show	standard	error	of	the	mean.		
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Appendix B 
R Code used for Data Analysis 
General information 
The	R	programme	uses	various	packages	and	commands.	I	have	included	a	list	
of	the	packages	used	for	each	of	the	analyses	along	with	the	master	code.	Within	
each	master	code	the	dataframe	filename	has	been	replaced	with	dataframe.	
The		variable	name	(e.g.,	ASI	score,	SAT	implicit	aberrant	salience)	has	been	
replaced	with	numbered	variables	(e.g.	Variable1).	Columns	within	the	
dataframe	are	selected	using	the	c()	command.		
	 For	the	EEfRT	dataframe,	the	definitions	of	columns	identified	in	the	
code	are	as	follows:	Participant		is	participant	ID;	Choice_Hard_1	is	whether	
hard	task	was	chosen	(hard	task	choice	coded	as	1	and	easy	task	choice	coded	
as	0);	RM_Hard	is	the	reward	magnitude	(monetary	value)	for	the	hard	task	
choice;	and	Probability	is	the	probability	of	winning	(0.12,	0.5,	0.88).	
 
R Commands: Chapter 5 
Correlation analysis 
Packages	used:	Hmisc	
The	master	command	for	undertaking	correlational	analysis	between	each	of	
the	variables	was:		
cor.test(dataframe$variable,	dataframe$variable,	method	=	"kendall")	
Mixed effects modelling of EEfRT data 
Packages	used:	lme4;	mlmRev;	ggplot2;	reshape2;	sjPlot	
Modelling	was	then	undertaken	sequentially	using	the	steps	presented	in	Table	
B.1.	Where	multiple	models	calculated	for	a	step,	only	the	model	with	the	best	
fit	was	used	in	subsequent	comparisons.		
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Table	B.1	
Mixed	effects	models,	and	R	code,	used	in	analysing	the	EEfRT	data	
Step	 Purpose	
Code	
1.	 Calculate	Null	Model	
NullModel	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	1	+(1|	Participant),	family	=	binomial(link	=	"logit"),	data	=	dataframe)	
2.	 Calculate	the	fixed	effects	models	(known	variables	of	reward	magnitude	and	probability)		
RewardMagnitude	<-	glm(formula	=	Choice_Hard_1	~	RM_Hard,	data	=dataframe,	family=	"binomial")	
Probability	<-	glm(formula	=	Choice_Hard_1	~	Probability,	data	=dataframe,	family=	"binomial")	
RewardMagnitudeXProbability	<-	glm(formula	=	Choice_Hard_1	~	RM_Hard*Probability,	data	=dataframe,	family=	"binomial")	
Fixed	<-	glm(formula	=	Choice_Hard_1	~	Probability	+	RM_Hard,	data	=dataframe,	family=	"binomial")	
3.	 Compare	fixed	effects	models	
anova(NullModel,	RewardMagnitude,	Probability,	RewardMagnitudeXProbability,	Fixed)	
4.	 Calculate	random	effects	model	
Random	<-glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	(1|Participant),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
5.	 Compare	null,	fixed,	and	random	effects	models	
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anova(NullModel,	Fixed,	Random)	
6.	 Calculate	varying	slopes	and	intercepts	for	each	variable	(reward	magnitude	and	probability):	
a) fixed	variable	with	varying	intercept	for	each	participant	
Model1	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	Variable	+	(1|Participant),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
b) fixed	variable	with	varying	slopes	
Model2	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	Variable	+	(0+RM_Hard|Participant),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
c) fixed	variable	with	varying	intercepts	and	slopes	
Model3	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	Variable	+	(1+RM_Hard|Participant),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
7.	 Compare	slopes	and	intercepts	models	for	each	variable	
anova(Model3,	Model2,	Model1)	
8.	 Calculate	slopes	and	intercepts	for	interaction	between	variables:	
a) fixed	variables	with	varying	intercept	for	each	participant	
Int1	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+(1|Participant),		
														control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
b) fixed	variable	with	varying	slopes	
Int2<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+	(0+RM_Hard*Probability|Participant),		
													control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
c) fixed	variable	with	varying	intercepts	and	slopes	
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Int3	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+	(1+RM_Hard*Probability|Participant),		
														control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
9.	 Compare	slopes	and	intercept	models	for	interaction	between	variables	
anova(Int3,	Int2,	Int1)	
10.	 Calculate	independent	random	effects	model:	
effortFinalModel1	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+		
																																	(1|Participant)	+	(0+RM_Hard|Participant)	+	(0+Probability|Participant)	+	(0+RM_Hard:Probability|Participant)	,		
																															control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
11.	 Calculate	models	that	fall	between	independent	random	and	correlated	random	effects:	
effortFinalModel2	<-glmer(Choice_Hard_1~RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+		
																												(1|Participant)	+	(0+RM_Hard|Participant)	+	(0+Probability|Participant),	
																										control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),	family	=	"binomial",data	=	dataframe)	
effortFinalModel3	<-glmer(Choice_Hard_1~RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+	(1+RM_Hard|Participant),	
																										control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),	family	=	"binomial",data	=	dataframe)	
effortFinalModel4	<-glmer(Choice_Hard_1~RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+	(1+Probability|Participant),	
																										control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),	family	=	"binomial",data	=	dataframe)	
effortFinalModel5	<-glmer(Choice_Hard_1~RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+	(1+RM_Hard+Probability|Participant),	
																										control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),	family	=	"binomial",data	=	dataframe)	
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12.	 Calculate	correlated	random	effects	model:	
effortFinalModel6	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+	
																																	(1+RM_Hard+Probability+RM_Hard:Probability|Participant),	
																															control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
13.	 Compare	models	to	ascertain	best	fit	
AIC(effortFinalModel1,	effortFinalModel2,	effortFinalModel3,	effortFinalModel4,	effortFinalModel5,	effortFinalModel6)	
	
Note:	In	steps	where	models	are	compared,	the	model	with	the	best	fit	is	identified	in	bold.	For	step	7,	the	highlighted	model	was	the	
same	for	both	reward	magnitude	and	probability.	
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Individual beta coefficients for EEfRT 
For	each	individual,	logistic	regression	coefficients	for	choice	during	the	EEfRT	
predicted	from	reward	magnitude,	probability,	and	reward	magnitude	x	
probability	were	calculated.	
	
Packages	used:	ggplot2;	lme4;	reshape2	
	
The	following	master	function	was	used	to	select	individual	participant	data:	
subXEff	<-	dataframe[dataframe$Participant	==	"1",	c("Participant",	
"Choice_Hard_1",	"RM_Hard",	"Probability"	)]	
where:	X	refers	to	the	participant	ID	within	the	EEfRT	data	dataframe;		
	
Beta	coefficients	were	then	calculated	using	the	following	master	code:	
SubXglm	<-glm(Choice_Hard_1	~	Probability	+	RM_Hard	+	
Probability:RM_Hard,	data	=	subXEff,	family	=	binomial("logit"))	
	
R Commands: Chapter 6 
Mixed effects modelling of EEfRT data 
Packages	used:	lme4;	mlmRev;	ggplot2;	reshape2;	sjPlot	
	
Modelling	was	then	undertaken	sequentially	using	the	steps	presented	in	Table	
B.2.	Where	multiple	models	calculated	for	a	step,	only	the	model	with	the	best	
fit	was	used	in	subsequent	comparisons.		
Individual beta coefficients for EEfRT 
For	each	individual,	logistic	regression	coefficients	for	choice	during	the	EEfRT	
predicted	from	reward	magnitude,	probability,	and	reward	magnitude	x	
probability	were	calculated.	The	R	codes	used	were	the	same	as	those	used	for	
Chapter	5	analysis.		
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Table	B.1	
Mixed	effects	models,	and	R	code,	used	in	analysing	the	EEfRT	data	
Step	 Purpose	
Code	
1.	 Calculate	Null	Model	
NullModel	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	1	+(1|	Participant),	family	=	binomial(link	=	"logit"),	data	=	dataframe)	
2.	 Calculate	the	fixed	effects	models	(known	variables	of	reward	magnitude,	probability,	and	group)		
RewardMagnitude	<-	glm(formula	=	Choice_Hard_1	~	RM_Hard,	data	=dataframe,	family=	"binomial")	
Probability	<-	glm(formula	=	Choice_Hard_1	~	Probability,	data	=dataframe,	family=	"binomial")	
Group	<-	glm(formula	=	Choice_Hard_1	~	Group,	data	=dataframe,	family=	"binomial")	
RewardMagnitudeXProbability	<-	glm(formula	=	Choice_Hard_1	~	RM_Hard*Probability,	data	=dataframe,	family=	"binomial")	
RewardMagnitudeXGroup	<-	glm(formula	=	Choice_Hard_1	~	RM_Hard*Group,	data	=	dataframe	family=	"binomial")	
ProbabilityXGroup	<-	glm(formula	=	Choice_Hard_1	~	Probability*Group,	data	=	dataframe,	family=	"binomial")	
Fixed	<-	glm(formula	=	Choice_Hard_1	~	Probability	+	RM_Hard,	data	=dataframe,	family=	"binomial")	
3.	 Compare	fixed	effects	models	
anova(NullModel,	RewardMagnitude,	Probability,	Group,	RewardMagnitudeXProbability,	RewardMagnitudeXGroup,	
ProbabilityXGroup,	Fixed)	
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4.	 Calculate	random	effects	model	
Random	<-glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	(1|Participant),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
5.	 Compare	null,	fixed,	and	random	effects	models	
anova(NullModel,	Fixed,	Random)	
6.	 Calculate	varying	slopes	and	intercepts	for	each	variable	(reward	magnitude,	probability,	group):	
d) fixed	variable	with	varying	intercept	for	each	participant	
Model1	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	Variable	+	(1|Participant),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
e) fixed	variable	with	varying	slopes	
Model2	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	Variable	+	(0+RM_Hard|Participant),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
f) fixed	variable	with	varying	intercepts	and	slopes	
Model3	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	Variable	+	(1+RM_Hard|Participant),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
7.	 Compare	slopes	and	intercepts	models	for	each	variable	(reward	magnitude	and	probability	only	as	group	slopes	and	intercepts	had	
negligible	effect)	
anova(Model3,	Model2,	Model1)	
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8.	 Calculate	slopes	and	intercepts	for	interaction	between	variables:	
d) fixed	variables	with	varying	intercept	for	each	participant	
Int1	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+(1|Participant),		
control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
e) fixed	variable	with	varying	slopes	
Int2<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+	(0+RM_Hard*Probability|Participant),		
													control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
f) fixed	variable	with	varying	intercepts	and	slopes	
Int3	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+	(1+RM_Hard*Probability|Participant),		
														control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
9.	 Compare	slopes	and	intercept	models	for	interaction	between	variables	
anova(Int3,	Int2,	Int1)	
10.	 Calculate	independent	random	effects	model:	
effortFinalModel1	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	Group	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+	RM_Hard:Group	+			
Probability:Group	+	RM_Hard:Probability:Group	+	(1|Participant)	+	(0+RM_Hard|Participant)	+	
(0+Probability|Participant)	+	(0+RM_Hard:Probability|Participant),	control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),		
family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
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11.	 Calculate	models	that	fall	between	independent	random	and	correlated	random	effects:	
effortFinalModel2	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1~RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	Group	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+	RM_Hard:Group	+		
Probability:Group	+	RM_Hard:Probability:Group	+	(1|Participant)	+	(0+RM_Hard|Participant)	+	
(0+Probability|Participant),	control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)			
	
effortFinalModel3	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1~RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	Group	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+	RM_Hard:Group	+		
Probability:Group	+	RM_Hard:Probability:Group	+	(1+RM_Hard|Participant),		
control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)		
effortFinalModel4	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1~RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	Group	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+	RM_Hard:Group	+		
Probability:Group	+	RM_Hard:Probability:Group	+	(1+Probability|Participant),	
control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
effortFinalModel5	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1~RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	Group	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+	RM_Hard:Group	+		
Probability:Group	+	RM_Hard:Probability:Group	+	(1+RM_Hard+Probability|Participant),	
control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
12.	 Calculate	correlated	random	effects	model	(failed	to	converge):	
effortFinalModel6	<-	glmer(Choice_Hard_1	~	RM_Hard	+	Probability	+	Group	+	RM_Hard:Probability	+	RM_Hard:Group	+		
Probability:Group	+	RM_Hard:Probability:Group	+	(1+RM_Hard+Probability+RM_Hard:Probability|Participant),	
control=glmerControl(optimizer="bobyqa"),	family	=	"binomial",	data	=	dataframe)	
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13.	 Compare	models	to	ascertain	best	fit	
AIC(effortFinalModel1,	effortFinalModel2,	effortFinalModel3,	effortFinalModel4,	effortFinalModel5)	
	
Notes:	In	steps	where	models	are	compared,	the	model	with	the	best	fit	is	identified	in	bold.	For	step	7:	group	was	excluded	as	slopes	
and	intercepts	had	negligible	effect;	the	highlighted	model	was	the	same	for	both	reward	magnitude	and	probability.	Final	model	6	was	
best	fit	but	failed	to	converge	so	was	excluded	from	final	model	best	fit.
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